Florida Institute of Technology

Scholarship Repository @ Florida Tech
Theses and Dissertations
5-2017

Examining the Safety Climate of U.S. Based Aviation
Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) Organizations
Kole Osaretin Uhuegho

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.fit.edu/etd
Part of the Aviation Commons

Examining the Safety Climate of U.S. Based Aviation
Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) Organizations
by
Kole Osaretin Uhuegho

Bachelor of Engineering
Mechanical Engineering
University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria
1985
Master of Business Administration
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria
1995
Master of Science
Air Safety Management
City University, London, United Kingdom
2010
A dissertation submitted to the College of Aeronautics
Florida Institute of Technology
as part of the degree requirements for a
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Aviation Sciences
Melbourne, Florida
May, 2017

© Copyright 2017 Kole Osaretin Uhuegho
All Rights Reserved

The author grants permission to make single copies__________________________

We the undersigned committee
hereby approve the attached dissertation
Examining the Safety Climate of U.S. Based Aviation
Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) Organizations
by
Kole Osaretin Uhuegho

_________________________
Michael A. Gallo, Ph.D.
Professor
College of Aeronautics
Committee Chair

________________________
Deborah S. Carstens, Ph.D.
Professor
College of Aeronautics
Chair, Graduate Programs

_________________________
Isaac Silver, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
College of Aeronautics

________________________
William D. Shoaff, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
School of Computing

Korhan Oyman, Ph.D., Dean, College of Aeronautics

ABSTRACT
TITLE: Examining the Safety Climate of U.S. Based Aviation Maintenance,
Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) Organizations
AUTHOR: Kole Osaretin Uhuegho
MAJOR ADVISOR: Michael A. Gallo, Ph.D.
The primary purpose of this study was twofold: (a) to replicate Fogarty
(2005) by determining if the current study’s data were consistent with Fogarty’s
model involving the three constructs of Safety Climate, Psychological Strain, and
Errors; and (b) to examine the extent to which the sample data supported Bandura’s
(1977) reciprocal causation model involving the three corresponding dimensions of
Environment, Person, and Behavior. The study used an explanatory correlational
design to measure the relationships between the targeted variables associated with
U.S based civilian MRO workers. Safety Climate/Environment variables included
recognition, safety concern, supervision, feedback, and training; Psychological
Strain/Person variables included stress and psychological distress such as
depression and anxiety; and the Errors/Behavior variable was maintenance errors,
which was defined as participants’ reflection on the extent to which they made
maintenance errors on the job (both self-detected and those identified by their
supervisors. The sample consisted of 134 volunteer MRO workers who completed
all of the study’s protocols. Participants were solicited from one national MRO and
several smaller MROs.
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The results of an SEM analysis did not support Fogarty’s (2005) model and
underwent several revisions, including eliminating three of the five Safety Climate
factors, before acceptable fit indices were obtained. The final model also did not
have any significant paths, and unlike Fogarty’s model Psychological Strain did not
significantly mediate the relationship between Safety Climate and Errors. The
results of separate multiple regression analyses that examined the relationships
among Bandura’s three dimensions, however, confirmed that each dimension had a
significant influence on the other two. Findings suggest that improving employees’
perceptions that their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues can reduce
employees’ stress and psychological distress levels, and concomitantly, both
improved perceptions of safety concern and reduced stress/distress levels could
lead to a reduction in maintenance errors. Other findings suggest a negative
relationship between age and maintenance errors, but a positive relationship
between years experience working at an MRO and maintenance errors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background and Purpose
Background. The aviation profession has seen its share of major disasters,
and the costs associated with these disasters, excluding human life, have been as
much as $60 billion in loss revenue (Walker, Walker, Thienstham, & Pukthuanog,
2014). Initially, aviation accident investigators concentrated mostly on engineering
failures as the most likely probable cause of aviation disasters. This focus,
however, has been extended to include an investigation of an airline’s safety
culture. For example, subsequent to the inflight structural breakup and crash near
Eagle Lake Texas, which killed all 14 people onboard, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) suggested that the probable cause of the accident was “The
failure of Continental Express management to establish a corporate culture which
encouraged and enforced adherence to approve quality assurance procedure”
(NTSB, 1992, p. 54). This accident linked the aviation industry with a safety
culture mindset found in health care (Abdu & Saber, 2011), and made aviation
organizations become thoughtful of the importance to improve safety culture for
the sake of professionalism and the traveling public.
One of the key areas for improving safety culture within the aviation
profession lies with aviation maintenance organizations. As observed by Siddiqui,
Iqbal, and Manarvi (2012, p. 1), “Aviation maintenance is a complex and
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demanding endeavor, and it is an integral component of airline safety.” Siddiqui et
al. further noted that one of the greatest sources of airline accidents has been
attributed to human errors made by ground crew and maintenance personnel. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also has identified maintenance as a
contributing factor in numerous aviation accidents (McKenna, 2002, p. 2). Both
awareness of how important maintenance is to the aviation industry and the
corresponding problems associated with maintenance have been recognized by the
FAA in its strategic plan for human factors in aviation maintenance program
(Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). However, to date there has been a dearth of
systematic studies that have studied aviation maintenance organizations (Fogarty,
2004). Similar to the financial costs associated with aviation disasters, Atak and
Kingma (2011) estimated that the cost to businesses for failing to maintain aviation
assets is more than $6 billion over a 5-year period, and aircraft owners lose revenue
when an aircraft is not airworthy.
Although aviation maintenance has changed over the years—for example,
newer aircraft comprise power plants, avionics system, and composite materials
that did not exist in earlier models (Vreeman, 1992)—humans still are performing
maintenance. Park, Kang, and Son (2012) suggested that aircraft accidents affect
the reputation of the aviation industry when maintenance errors made by
maintenance personnel are the cause of an air disaster. Park et al. maintained that a
strong safety culture is needed to improve the performance of aircraft maintenance
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in organizations and to achieve higher organization performance levels. As a result,
the limited studies that have been conducted have focused either on safety culture
or safety climate.
Guldenmund (2000) noted that safety culture and safety climate are
complex concepts (p. 225), and “there is no real consensus on how to describe the
climate or culture of an organization …” (p. 226). In support of this observation,
Guldenmund presented 16 different definitions of safety climate and safety culture
(pp. 228–229) acquired from the literature:
Nine mention organization member’s perceptions whereas six definitions
(also) refer to beliefs and six (also) to attitudes. Five of these are about
safety culture. Roughly, perceptions are more associated with climate
whereas attitudes are considered to be a part of culture. (p. 229)
Among what Guldenmund concluded from his literature review of safety culture
and safety climate were: (a) the two concepts are ill defined; (b) their relationship is
unclear; (c) there is confusion about what causes safety culture and safety climate,
there is no consensus on the content of the two concepts, and there is little
discussion about the consequences of safety culture and safety climate; and (d)
“there is no satisfying model of safety culture nor safety climate” (p. 247). With
respect to this latter point, Guldenmund proposed an integrative framework that
merged safety climate with safety culture; this framework is analogous to
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model.
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Person (P)

Environment (E)

Behavior (B)

Figure 1.1. Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model.

As depicted in Figure 1.1, Bandura posited there is relationship among the
three dimensions of Person (physical characteristics or cognitive processes),
Behavior (observable actions/reactions), and Environment (general conditions and
stimuli in the outside world). In other words, each dimension “influences the other
two in a phenomenon known as reciprocal causation” (Ormrod, 2012, p. 118). For
example, in the context of the current study, an MRO’s management could help
reinforce safety behavior by recognizing workers through incentive programs
relative to the fewest errors they commit, but the workers’ behavior also could be
influenced by their perception of how they believe they are being recognized. In
this example, management’s recognition would be an environment variable, the
number of errors committed would be a behavior variable, and the workers’
perceptions would be a person variable.
One of the challenges in measuring an organization’s safety culture, though,
is deciding what instruments to use as well as what approach to pursue. When
couched against Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model, prior studies have
used quantitative measures such as attitude scales to measure the Person dimension,
and qualitative approaches such as content analysis and interviews to assess the
4

Behavior and Environment dimensions. Data acquisition strategies have included
interviewing personnel, visiting the organization, and studying an organization’s
recorded/stored safety and security data. For example, Ostrom, Wilhelmsen, and
Kaplan (1993) developed an 86-item questionnaire that was used to examine the
safety culture of EG&G Idaho, Inc., a Department of Energy Contractor at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. In addition to the questionnaire data,
Ostrom et al. also noted that other “forms of data should be collected and analyzed
before making judgments about the safety culture of an organization (including)
accident statistics, safety performance data, records of employee and management
concerns, and other measures of product quality and organizational performance”
(p. 167). Similarly, Jin and Chen (2013) studied the safety culture of a regional
U.S. general construction company and assessed the organization’s safety culture
by employing both qualitative and quantitative methods. The former approach
involved observations, focus group discussions, interviews, and case studies, and
required the cooperation of management. Management cooperation also was
needed to examine the company’s safety records.
Although such data are appropriate and would provide a holistic view of an
organization’s safety culture, gaining access to an organization’s records and
personnel poses a formidable challenge. A more practical and feasible approach to
assessing safety culture would be to focus on safety climate. The focus on safety
climate is important because, as Reason (1997) observed, the safety climate of an
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organization is analogous to its safety health. Thus, surveying an organization’s
safety climate is tantamount to assessing the organization’s safety health (Fogarty,
2004, p. 85). Assessing the safety climate of an organization also provides a
window to an organization’s safety culture. Guldenmund (2000, p. 221) discussed
this distinction between safety climate and safety culture as follows: “… climate
(is) the overt manifestation of culture within an organizational. Therefore, climate
follows naturally from culture or, put another way, organizational culture expresses
itself through organizational climate.”
Recognizing both the advantages of employing a fully quantitative scale for
measuring safety climate as well as the need for such a scale to be used for aviation
maintenance organizations, Fogarty (2004) developed and validated the
Maintenance Environment Survey (MES). Using Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden,
Sharma, and Gibbons’ (2004) five-factor model, Fogarty applied a structural
equation modeling (SEM) approach to data acquired from 240 personnel
responsible for the maintenance of a large Australian military helicopter fleet.
Fogarty (2005) further refined and validated the MES using data he acquired from
150 maintenance engineers working at a major helicopter repair base for the
Australian Army.
The current study endeavored to replicate Fogarty (2005) by testing his
causal model, which is given in Figure 1.2. The data source, though, was aviation
maintenance personnel working at U.S. based civilian maintenance, repair, and
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Figure 1.2. Fogarty’s (2005) causal model, which was validated using data from maintenance
engineers working at a major helicopter repair base for the Australian army.

overhaul (MRO) organizations. The current study also endeavored to assess MROs’
safety climate relative to the three dimensions of Bandura’s (1977) model.
Purpose. The primary purpose of the current study was two-fold: (a) to
replicate Fogarty (2005) by determining if the current study’s data were consistent
with Fogarty’s model involving the three constructs of Safety Climate,
Psychological Strain, and Maintenance Errors; and (b) to examine the extent to
which the sample data supported Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model
involving the three dimensions of Environment, Person, and Behavior.
In the context of the current study, Safety Climate was operationally defined
as “the individual’s perceptions of the organization’s policies, procedures, and
rewards relevant to safety in the organization” (Fogarty, 2005, p. 75) and was
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measured using five subscales of Fogarty’s MES: (a) the Recognition subscale
measured participants’ perceptions of the recognition they receive for doing good
work, (b) the Safety Concern subscale measure participants’ perception of their
organization’s safety concern, (c) the Supervision subscale measured participants’
perceptions of their supervisor’s standards relative to safety, (d) the Feedback
subscale measured participants’ perceptions of the feedback they receive for their
work performance, and (e) the Training subscale measured participants’
perceptions of their organization’s training standards. Psychological Strain referred
to “a state of well-being in which every individual realizes his or her own potential,
can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and
is able to make a contribution to her or his community” (World Health
Organization (WHO; 2014, para. 1). This was measured using the Stress subscale
of Fogarty’s MES as well as Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ). The Stress subscale measured participants’ feelings and
consequences about their stress and what contributes to it; the GHQ was used to
identify psychological distress such as depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and
psychosomatic symptoms. Maintenance Errors were defined as any violation of an
organization’s safety policies committed by maintenance workers, including those
detected by the workers themselves or their supervisors, and were measured using a
subscale of Fogarty’s MES.

8

Because Fogarty (2004) initially validated his model using data acquired
from personnel who were responsible for maintaining a large major military
helicopter fleet in Australia, he observed that a limitation to the model was that it is
reflective of a military environment: “Maintenance engineers working in this
setting face some challenges…that are not faced by those working in commercial
settings. The converse also holds true. The model therefore needs to be tested in
different organizational settings” (p. 87). As a result, the current study replicated
Fogarty’s to U.S. based civilian MROs. The primary objective was to determine
how well the sample data acquired would fit his model. With respect to Bandura’s
(1977) model, in the context of the current study, Bandura’s Environment
dimension corresponded to Fogarty’s (2005) Safety Climate, Person corresponded
to Psychological Strain, and Behavior corresponded to Maintenance Errors.
The reader will note there are two primary differences between Fogarty’s
(data-validated) model and Bandura’s (theoretical) model: (a) Fogarty’s model does
not reflect the reciprocal nature of the relationships among the three dimensions as
posited by Bandura; and (b) Fogarty’s model does not reflect the direct relationship
between Person and Behavior, but instead hypothesizes that the Person dimension
mediates the relationship between Environment and Behavior.
Definition of Terms
The key terms or phrases relative to the current study were operationally
defined as follows:
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1.

Behavior, as referenced in Bandura’s (1977) model, corresponded to
Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance Errors construct. This was measured by
participants’ self-reported responses to a set of Likert-scaled items that
asked participants to reflect on the maintenance errors they made on the
job, including errors they detected themselves and errors identified by
their supervisors. The items associated with this factor were from
Fogarty’s MES, which was incorporated into the researcher-prepared
Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (Items A36–A48).

2.

Environment, as referenced in Bandura’s (1977) model, corresponded
to Fogarty’s (2005) Safety Climate construct and comprised five
factors: Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and
Training. These factors were measured by participants’ self-reported
responses to a set of Likert-scaled items from the MES. Each of these
factors is defined separately in this section.

3.

Errors was a latent variable in Fogarty’s (2005) causal model and was
defined by Maintenance Errors, which was measured using Fogarty’s
MES. This scale was incorporated into the researcher-prepared
Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (Items A36–A48).

4.

Feedback was a measured variable of the latent construct Safety
Climate. It also was used as a measure of Bandura’s (1977)
Environment dimension. Feedback referred to participants’ perceptions
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of the amount and quality of feedback they receive relative to their
work performance (Fogarty (2005, p. 7). This was measured by
participants’ self-reported responses to a set of Likert-scaled items from
Fogarty’s (2005) MES, which was incorporated into the researcherprepared Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (Items A18–
A21).
5.

Maintenance referred to the inspection, overhaul, repair, preservation,
and the replacement of parts (FAA, 2012).

6. Maintenance errors was a measured variable of the latent construct
Errors (Figure 1.2). It also was used as a measure of Bandura’s (1977)
Behavior dimension. Maintenance errors were defined as participants’
reflection on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the
job (both self-detected and those identified by their supervisors). This
was measured by participants’ self-reported responses to a set of
Likert-scaled items. The items associated with this factor were from
Fogarty’s (2005) MES, which was incorporated into the researcherprepared Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (Items A36–
A48).
7.

Maintenance personnel referred to the entire class of aircraft
mechanics, helpers, workers, and service laborers who are involved in
the inspection, repair, overhaul, servicing, and marshaling of aircraft
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ground handling activities. Maintenance personnel also included
support staff such as administrative personnel, schedulers, planners,
supervisors, and managers whose duties included decision-making,
analysis, or record keeping during the planning or execution of
maintenance (FAA, 2012).
8.

Maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) was defined as any
organization engaged in the inspection, maintenance, preventive
maintenance, modification, alteration, repair, overhaul, ground
handling, or servicing of aircraft systems or components. This
definition combines the U.S. Federal Aviation Regulation 145
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 2016) concept of repair
station and air operator maintenance. Because personnel in both types
of organizations have the capacity to commit maintenance errors and
contribute to a maintenance related event, this definition also conforms
to the U.K. JAR 145 specification (Civil Aviation Authority, 2003). In
the context of the current study, the MROs that were targeted
specialized in business jets and transport aircraft.

9.

Person, as referenced in Bandura’s (1977) model, corresponded to
Fogarty’s (2005) Psychological Strain construct and comprised two
factors Stress and Psychological Distress. These factors were measured
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by participants’ self-reported responses to a set of Likert- or Likert-type
scaled items. Each of these factors is defined separately in this section.
10. Psychological distress was a measured variable of the latent construct
Psychological Strain (Figure 1.2). It also was used as a measure of
Bandura’s (1977) Person dimension. Psychological distress referred to
participants’ general psychological health, including psychosomatic
symptoms, anxiety and insomnia, social dysfunction, and severe
depression (Fogarty, 2005, p. 8). This factor was measured using
Goldberg and Williams’ (1998) General Health Questionnaire (GHQ),
which was incorporated into the researcher-prepared Aviation
Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (Items B1–B12).
11. Psychological strain was a latent variable in Fogarty’s (2005) causal
model (Figure 1.2) and was defined by two factors: Stress and
Psychological Distress. These scales were incorporated into the
researcher-prepared Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey
(Items A27–A35, B1–B12). Each of these factors is defined separately
in this section. Psychological strain also was used as a measure of
Bandura’s (1977) Person dimension (Figure 1.1).
12. Recognition was a measured variable of the latent construct Safety
Climate (Figure 1.2). It also was used as a measure of Bandura’s (1977)
Environment dimension. Recognition referred to participants’
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assessment of the extent to which they feel they are rewarded and
recognized for doing good work (Fogarty, 2005, p. 7). This was
measured by participants’ self-reported responses to a set of Likertscaled items from Fogarty’s (2005) MES, which was incorporated into
the researcher-prepared Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey
(Items A1–A5).
13. Safety climate was a latent variable in Fogarty’s (2005) casual model
(Figure 1.2) and was defined by five factors: Recognition, Safety
Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training. These factors were
incorporated into the researcher-prepared Aviation Maintenance Safety
Climate Survey (Items A1–A26). Each of these factors is defined
separately in this section Safety climate also represented the
Environment dimension in Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model (Figure 1.1).
14. Safety concern was a measured variable of the latent construct Safety
Climate (Figure 1.2). It also was a measure of Bandura’s (1977)
Environment dimension (Figure 1.1). Safety concern referred to
participants’ perceptions that their organization has a strong concern for
safety issues (Fogarty, 2005, p. 7). This was measured by participants’
self-reported responses to a set of Likert-scaled items from Fogarty’s
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(2005) MES, which was incorporated into the researcher-prepared
Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (Items A6–A10).
15. Safety culture was defined as “the enduring value and priority placed
on worker and public safety by every one in every group at every level
of an organization” (Zhang, Wiegmann, von Thaden, Sharma, &
Mitchell, 2002, p. 2). It represents the level of commitment by
individuals and groups within an organization to: (a) personal
responsibility for safety; (b) act to preserve, enhance, and communicate
safety concerns; and (c) strive to learn, adapt, and modify behavior
based on lessons learned from mistakes and receive rewards in a
manner, consistent with these values (Zhang et al., 2002).
16. Stress was a measured variable of the latent construct Psychological
Strain (Figure 1.2). It also was used as a measure of Bandura’s (1977)
Person dimension (Figure 1.1). Stress referred to participants’
perceptions of their exposure to workplace stressors and represented
participants’ “actual feelings and consequences of stress, rather than the
background factors that might be causing the strain” (Fogarty, 2005, p.
7). This was measured by participants’ self-reported responses to a set
of Likert-scaled items from Fogarty’s (2005) MES, which was
incorporated into the researcher-prepared Aviation Maintenance Safety
Climate Survey (Items A27–A35).
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17. Supervision was a measured variable of the latent construct Safety
Climate. It also was used as a measure of Bandura’s (1977)
Environment dimension (Figure 1.1). Supervision referred to
participants’ perceptions of their supervisor’s expertise and the extent
to which their supervisor provides them with assistance (Fogarty, 2005,
p. 7). This was measured by participants’ self-reported responses to a
set of Likert-scaled items from Fogarty’s (2005) MES, which was
incorporated into the researcher-prepared Aviation Maintenance Safety
Climate Survey (Items A11–A17).
18. Training was a measured variable of the latent construct Safety
Climate. It also was used as a measure of Bandura’s (1977)
Environment dimension (Figure 1.1). Training referred to several
“different aspects of training, including adequacy of training for the
job, encouragement to undertake further training, and opportunities for
on-the-job training” (Fogarty, 2005, p. 7). This was measured by
participants’ self-reported responses to a set of Likert-scaled items from
Fogarty’s (2005) MES, which was incorporated into the researcherprepared Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (Items A22–
A26).
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research questions. Two primary research questions guided the current
study:
Research question 1. What is the relationship between the current study’s
sample data and Fogarty’s (2005) model (Figure 1.2)?
Research question 2. What is the relationship between the current study’s
sample data and Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model (Figure 1.1)?
Research hypotheses. The corresponding research hypotheses, which were
grounded in Fogarty’s (2005) hypothesized causal model (Figure 1.2) and
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model (Figure 1.1), were as follows:
Hypothesis 1a. The current study’s sample data will be consistent with
Fogarty’s (2005) model as depicted in Figure 1.2.
Hypothesis 1b. The current study’s sample data will confirm that
Psychological Strain mediates the effect of Safety Climate on Maintenance
Errors.
Hypothesis 2a. The Person dimension in Bandura’s (1977) model will
influence both the Environment and Behavior dimensions.
Hypothesis 2b. The Environment dimension in Bandura’s (1977) model
will influence both the Person and Behavior dimensions.
Hypothesis 2c. The Behavior dimension in Bandura’s (1977) model will be
influence both the Person and Environment dimensions.
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Study Design
The research methodology/design that best fit the study was explanatory
correlational because it involved a single group (U.S. based civilian MRO workers)
and multiple measures collected from this group. According to Iacobucci,
Churchill, and Churchill (2015), a correlational research design is used to measure
the closeness of the relationship between two or more variables. It provides the
rigor needed to produce a picture of the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of a
group of people at a given time in an organization (Stangor, 2004). It describes in
quantitative terms the degree to which variables are related and helps to examine
the nature of the relationship between and among variables (Locks, Silverman, &
Spirduso, 2010). The primary inferential statistical procedures used were structural
equation modeling (SEM) and multiple regression. The methodology and data
analysis strategies were appropriate because I examined how a set of variables fit
two different hypothesized causal models.
Significance of the Study
With the exception of Fogarty (2004, 2005, 2010), few published studies to
date have focused on aviation safety climate within aviation maintenance
organizations, or MROs. Fogarty’s studies, however, targeted military aviation
MROs in Australia. Thus, the primary contribution of the current study is that it
adds to the current body of research on MRO safety climate by replicating Fogarty
(2005) in U.S. based civilian MROs. A second contribution of the current study is
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that it is the first study to apply Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model to
aviation MROs as a means of measuring safety climate. As a result, the findings
from the current study can help inform aviation MRO personnel about the
relationship among Environment, Person, and Behavior relative to the
organization’s safety climate. For example, one of the findings of the current study
demonstrated that participants’ safety concern had a negative relationship with
participants’ perceived stress level, and an increase in participants’ perceived stress
levels also had a direct relationship with maintenance errors. MRO managers could
use these findings to improve their maintenance workers’ perceptions of the extent
to which they feel management has a strong concern for safety issues. Thus,
improving workers’ perceptions of management’s concern for safety could lead to a
reduction in workers’ perceived stress levels and concomitantly a reduction in
maintenance errors. This also could potentially lead to an increase in worker
productivity, reduce cost, save billions in accident related costs, reduce
catastrophes in aviation industries, and possibly increase levels of professionalism.
Study Limitation and Delimitations
Limitations. The limitations of a study are conditions, events, or
circumstances over which a researcher has no control. These conditions, events, or
circumstances have the potential to limit the generalizability of the study’s results.
The limitations of the current study are given here and the reader is advised to
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consider any conclusions or inferences emanating from the study’s results with
respect to these limitations.
1. Sample demographics. Although I targeted U.S. based civilian MROs, I
did not have any control over the individuals who volunteered to participate in the
current study. For example, because 114 of 134 participants were males, the study’s
results would not be generalizable to female MRO employees. As a result, similar
studies that have different sample demographics might get different results.
2. Honesty of participants’ responses. Given the manner in which data
were collected in the current study—a questionnaire hosted by an online Web
site—I had no control over how truthful the participants responded to the
questionnaire items, and I had no control if those who responded were actual
employees of the targeted MROs. Although I followed all the proper protocols
related to privacy and confidentiality issues, the current study’s findings,
inferences, and conclusions might be limited due to the possibility of inaccurate
responses from participants.
3. Research support. The current study benefited from the outside support
of a nationally based MRO. This support included announcing the study and
encouraging employees to participate. This support was performed as a courtesy
and was not something I incorporated into the study. As a result, similar studies
that do not have this same type and level of support might get different results.
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4. Excluded cases. As noted in Chapter 4, 54 of 188 cases (29%) were
eliminated from the analyses because they had either no or partially completed
responses. As a result, similar studies that do not exclude any cases might get
different results.
5. Missing subscales. As noted in Chapter 4, of Fogarty’s (2005) five
Safety Climate subscales, Feedback and Training were not included in the final
analyses because the former was not correctly specified and the latter had a
reliability coefficient of  = .60, which was lower than Cohen, Cohen, West, and
Aiken’s (2003) recommended threshold of  = .70. As a result, similar studies that
incorporate all five of Fogarty’s Safety Climate subscales or include a different set
of these subscales might get different results.
Delimitations. The delimitations of a study are conditions, events, or
circumstances that a researcher imposes to make the study feasible to implement.
These additional restrictions are needed from a practical perspective but have the
potential to further limit the generalizability of the results. The delimitations of the
current study are given here, and the reader is advised to consider any conclusions
or inferences emanating from the study’s results with respect to these delimitations.
1. Study design. The current study was a replication of Fogarty (2005)
applied to U.S. based MROs. It was designed to test the hypothesized causal model
given in Figure 1.2 and to determine the extent to which the data supported
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. As a result, a similar study that uses
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a different hypothesized causal model or uses different variables to define
Fogarty’s latent constructs or Bandura’s dimensions might get different results.
2. Sample. The current study targeted two specific types of MROs: one
specialized in business jets and the other specialized in transport aircraft. As a
result, similar studies that target different MROs might get different results.
3. Data collection period. The current study was implemented during a 4month period that ended October 24, 2016. Although unlikely, similar studies that
are implemented for a shorter or longer time period or during a different time of the
year might get different results.
4. Data collection instruments. The current study employed a data
collection instrument comprised of both standardized and researcher-prepared
instruments. The standardized instruments included Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance
Environment Survey (MES) and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ). These two instruments were packaged into the researcherprepared Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), which also
included a Background Information section to collect participant demographics. As
a result, similar studies that use different instruments might get different results.
5. Type of data. Although past studies have collected qualitative data for the
Environment and Behavior dimensions and used content analysis to analyze these
data, the current study was designed to collect quantitative data across all three
dimensions of Environment, Person, and Behavior. As a result, similar studies that
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use a mixed methods approach that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative
methodologies, or that are exclusively qualitative in nature, might get different
results.
6. Data analysis approach. The current study used SEM and multiple
regression statistical procedures to test the study’s hypotheses and answer the
corresponding research questions. Thus, a similar study that uses different
statistical procedures might get different results.
7. Outliers. Of the 134 cases on which the results of the current study were
based, 13 cases were flagged as outliers via Jackknife distances but remained in the
final dataset because they were rare cases (not contaminants) and their presence
neither inflated nor masked significance. As a result, similar studies that do not
include outliers in the final analysis or use a different outlier analysis procedure
might get different results.
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Literature
Introduction
This chapter contains three sections. The first section provides a discussion
of the theoretical foundation on which the current study was grounded. The second
section is a review of past research relevant to the current study. The last section is
a summary of the major findings of these prior studies and their implication to the
current study.
Overview of Underlying Theoretical Framework
The primary purpose of the current study was to assess the safety climate of
U.S. based aviation maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) organizations. As
noted in Chapter 1, safety climate provides a window to an organization’s safety
culture, and it is thought to predict the way employees behave with respect to safety
in the workplace (Williamson, Feyer, Cairns, & Biancotti, 1997). The primary
underlying theory for the study was social cognitive theory. Prior to presenting this
theory and its application to the current study, a discussion of the primary
differences between safety culture and safety climate is warranted.
Concepts of safety culture and safety climate. As noted in Chapter 1, the
concepts of safety culture and safety climate are complex (Guldenmund, 2000, pp.
225). They also are often used (incorrectly) interchangeably. Because the current
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study’s focus was safety climate and not safety culture, it is important for the reader
to have a working understanding of the key distinctions between these concepts.
Safety culture. From a general perspective, Deal and Kennedy (1982, 2000)
loosely defined organizational culture as “the way we do things around here” (p. 4).
It was what Uttal and Frieman (as cited in Sun, 2008, p. 137) referred to “as a
system of shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that
interact with a company’s people, organization structures, and control systems to
produce behavioral norms (the way we do things around here).” When examined
from the context of safety in the workplace, and paraphrasing Deal and Kennedy, a
safety culture, then, may be loosely defined as “how we do safety around here.”
The concept of safety culture first emerged from the investigation of the
1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident (Taylor, 2010). In the revision of its
original report from 1988, the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
(INSAG, 1999, p. 2) wrote:
The objective of achieving safety must permeate each activity performed in
generating electricity at a nuclear power plant. There must be pervasive
safety thinking on the part of those concerned in each phase, from siting and
design to construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance, upgrades or
modifications, training, decommissioning, and all related activities. This
pervasive safety thinking is a key element in the ‘safety culture’ that is
emphasized strongly in this report.
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INSAG also reported that the concept of safety culture imposes requirements on
three levels: policy, managers, and individuals.
• With respect to policy, INSAG (1999) indicated, “…the manner in which
people act is conditioned by the requirements set at a high level” (p. 13).
Within the nuclear industry, this would be the federal (or legislative)
level, which would set national policy requirements for nuclear safety.
Within private organizations, this would be the upper administration of a
corporation.
• With respect to managers, INSAG (1999) indicated that the working
environment has a pronounced influence on individuals’ attitudes about
workplace safety: “The key to an effective safety culture in individuals is
found in the practices moulding the environment and fostering attitudes
conducive to safety” (p. 13). As a result, to promote a proper safety
culture in individuals, it is incumbent for managers to ensure that such
practices are effected in a manner that is consistent with their
organization’s safety policy and objectives.
• With respect to individuals, INSAG (1999, pp. 13–14) indicated, “The
desired results are achieved only if the attitudes of individuals at all levels
are responsive to the safety culture framework established by
management.” This requires individuals to adopt a “questioning attitude,
plus a rigorous and prudent approach, plus communication.”
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In reviewing INSAG’s (1999) levels for managers and individuals, the
reader will note that a critical aspect of safety culture is attitudes. This is consistent
with the literature, which is replete with various definitions of safety culture (e.g.,
Carnino, 1989; Confederation of British Industry, 1991; Health and Safety
Executive, 1993; INSAG, 1999; Lee, 1993; Lucas, 1990; Turner, Pidgeon,
Blockley, & Toft, 1989; and Uttal & Frieman, 1983). A common thread among
these definitions is they are directed toward people’s attitudes and behavior toward
safety. Of note is Health and Safety Executive’s (1993) definition, which,
according to Cooper (2000, p. 114), “…takes the view that safety culture is a
product emerging from values, attitudes, competencies, patterns of behavior, etc.”
In addition to the various definitions of safety culture, there also is a
considerable amount of past research on accident causation, prevention, and safety
management. Concomitant with this literature are several models or frameworks of
accident causation (e.g., Adams, 1976; Cohen, 1977; Heinrich, Petersen, & Roos,
1980; Reason, 1990; and Smith, Cohen, Cohen, & Cleveland, 1978). Common
among these different models/frameworks is recognition of an interactive
relationship among employees’ affective domain (psychological), an organization’s
environment (situational), and behavioral factors (Cooper, 2000, p. 117). These
three factors suggest that an organization’s safety culture may be “reflected in the
dynamic reciprocal relationships between members’ perceptions about, and
attitudes towards, the operationalization of organizational goals; members’ day-to-
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day goal-directed behavior; and the presence and quality of the organization’s
systems and sub-systems to support the goal-directed behavior” (Cooper, 2000, p.
118). These three factors also reflect, respectively, the three dimensions of Person,
Environment, and Behavior of Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model as
depicted in Figure 1.1 (Chapter 1), and imply that an organization’s safety culture
may be examined from this perspective. This examination, however, would involve
more than simply polling employees for their perceptions of “how safety is done
around here.” It would require a “dynamic, multi-faceted, holistic (assessment) at
many different levels of an organization (Cooper, 2000, p. 131). This would require
a mixed methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The
former would be used to assess employees’ perceptions via a quantitatively based
questionnaire; the latter would employ methodologies such as phenomenology and
case studies to assess actual practices and review accident records.
Safety climate. In contrast to safety culture, the concept of safety climate
represents “the context in which behavior occurs and the basis of people’s
expectations; it provides a frame of reference to guide behavior” (Guldenmund,
2000, p. 218). “Safety climate provides a link between attributes occurring at the
individual (workers and supervisors) level and the organizational level and may be
induced by the policies and practices that organizations impose upon their workers
and supervisors” (Niskanen, 1994, as cited by Cooper, 2000, p. 218).
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Zohar (1980) reported that a common trend found in the safety climate
literature was organizations with successful safety programs had a strong
management commitment to safety. This commitment to safety was manifested in
many ways, including (a) upper level management being actively involved in safety
activities on a regular basis, (b) an emphasis in safety training, (c) an open line of
communications between management and workers with frequent safety
inspections, (d) general environmental control that involved orderly operations and
the frequent use of safety devices, and (e) a stable work force. Collectively, these
characteristics comprise a safety climate that “results in increased performance
reliability of workers, good housekeeping, and high design and maintenance
standards for work environments” (Zohar, 1980, p. 97).
These characteristics also reflect key dimensions of employees’ perceptions
regarding safety. Thus, the concept of safety climate may be operationalized as
employees’ perceptions of management’s commitment to safety. It also implies that
employees “…have a unified set of cognitions regarding the safety aspects of their
organization…(and) such perceptions and behavior-outcome expectations can
guide and direct behaviors accordingly” (p. 101). In other words, employees’
behavior is based on their perceptions of how management “does safety around
here.” When considered from this perspective, safety climate is the manifestation of
safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000). Because the focus of safety climate is solely on
employees’ perceptions of how management does safety—that is, an
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“organization’s policies, procedures, and rewards relevant to safety in the
organization” (Fogarty, 2004, p. 85)—safety climate may be assessed using selfreported questionnaires.
Social cognitive theory and Bandura’s reciprocal causation model. The
primary theoretical basis for the current study was social cognitive theory (SCT),
which emerged largely from research conducted by Bandura (1969, 1973, 1977,
1986, 1989). SCT is grounded in the notion that learning (or behavior) occurs by
observation and modeling. Unlike behaviorism, which focuses on stimuli-responses
and relies on observing events in an objective, empirical, and tangible manner, SCT
recognizes that people can control their own behavior and interpret observations
from a cognitive psychology perspective, which focuses on mental processes. Some
of the underlying principles of SCT include: (a) people are capable of learning by
observing the behaviors of others and by observing the outcomes of those
behaviors; (b) people can learn something without changing their behavior; (c)
cognition is central to learning in that people may be aware of the consequences of
their behavior, have expectations for their behavior, and incorporate mental
processes such as paying attention to their or others’ behaviors; and (d) people are
capable of creating or modifying their environments, which Bandura (1989)
referred to as human agency.
The key cognitive factors inherent within SCT applied to the current study
are as follows (Ormrod, 2012, pp. 116–117):

30

• Instead of demonstrating a learned behavior by performing it, learning
can be acquired vicariously, which involves a mental change instead of a
behavioral change. As an example, consider the situation where an
aviation mechanic observes a fellow coworker conducting an inspection
of an engine part. Although the mechanic would be able to describe what
the coworker did, the mechanic might not demonstrate that behavior until
some time later when there is a reason for doing so.
• Learning a new behavior requires paying attention to an observed
performance, rehearsing aspects of that performance, and forming mental
representations of the performance. All of these cognitive processes are
essential for learning to take place. Applying the previous example, the
mechanic would have to pay attention to how the inspection was
conducted, mentally rehearse aspects of the inspection, and form a mental
picture of the inspection.
• Learning a new behavior requires knowing the corresponding responseconsequence contingencies. This includes being aware of what behavior
leads to reinforcement and what behavior leads to punishment.
Continuing with the running example, suppose the coworker violates
various safety regulations as part of the inspection process and the
mechanic observes the coworker being reprimanded by his supervisor
who places a notice in the coworker’s personnel folder. By being aware
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of the consequences of his coworker’s behavior, the mechanic would be
less likely to perform this behavior. However, if the coworker followed
all the safety protocols and was recognized for his “clean” safety record,
the mechanic would be more likely to also follow all safety protocols.
• Learning a new behavior requires forming outcome expectations about
the consequences future behaviors are likely to bring. This provides an
incentive to learn a behavior if there is anticipation of reinforcement after
learning the behavior, and a disincentive if there is anticipation of
punishment after learning the behavior. Thus, the expectation of future
reinforcement or punishment influences whether or not someone will
learn a particular behavior it precedes. For example, if management offers
a paid dinner for two at the end of each quarter for the mechanic who
satisfies a set of safety criteria, employees would be more likely to
engage in behavior that is consistent with these criteria.
• In addition to forming outcome expectations, learning also involves
forming efficacy expectations, which represent individuals’ selfperceptions of how successful they believe they would be in performing a
behavior. Continuing with the previous example, if a mechanic believes
he does not have the knowledge and/or skills to meet the safety criteria,
the mechanic is less likely to participate in the “contest.”
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• The cognitive processes needed for learning, which include paying
attention, mentally rehearsing, and forming mental representations, are
influenced by outcome and efficacy expectations. For example, the extent
to which a mechanic pays attention to or mentally rehearses a coworker’s
safety related behavior would depend on what the mechanic believes he
would get from performing this behavior (reinforcement vs. punishment)
and his corresponding level of self-efficacy.
• The nonoccurrence of an expected consequence can be as influential as
the expected consequence. As an example, consider the case where a
mechanic’s coworker violates a safety regulation but management does
not reprimand the coworker as the mechanic expected would happen.
This nonoccurrence of an expected consequence (being reprimanded)
could influence the mechanic to also violate a safety regulation.
In the discussion above, the reader will note that the examples presented
demonstrate how a person’s (P) internal mental processes influence his or her
behavior (B), and how a person’s outside environment (E) also influences his or her
behavior. Although on the surface these relationships appear to be unidirectional—
that is, behavior is a function of person and environment—Bandura (1978)
affirmed that SCT “analyzes behavior in terms of reciprocal determinism” (p. 345).
It is true that behavior is influenced by the environment, but the
environment is partly of a person’s own making. By their actions, people
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play a roll in creating social milieu and other circumstances that arise in
their daily transactions. Thus, from the social learning perspective,
psychological functioning involves a continuous reciprocal interaction
between behavioral, cognitive, and environmental influences. (p. 345)
A schematic of this triadic reciprocal causation relationship was presented in Figure
1.1 (Chapter 1) and is reintroduced in Figure 2.1(a) with greater detail for the
convenience of the reader. In the model, the Person dimension represents the
cognitive and other internal events that can affect a person’s perceptions and
actions, and the Environment dimension represents the external environment
(Bandura, 1978, p. 345). As noted by Bandura (1988), “In this causal model,
behavior, cognitive and other personal factors and environmental events all operate
as interacting determinants that influence each other bidirectionally” (p. 275).
Cooper (2000, p. 119) acknowledged that “Bandura's reciprocal model
appears to offer the perfect framework with which to analyze organizational
(safety) ‘culture’…,” and adapted it to reflect the concept of safety culture. His
model is presented in Figure 2.1(b). In his adaptation, the Person dimension reflects
“safety climate” and is assessed using self-reported questionnaires, the Behavior
dimension is assessed using safety checklists, and the Environment dimension,
which Cooper refers to as the “Situation” dimension,” is assessed through an
organization’s safety management system audits and inspections. Cooper (p. 121)
also observed that because “each of these safety culture components can be directly
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Figure 2.1. (a) Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model, derived from social cognitive theory,
posits that each dimension influences the other two. This reciprocal causal relationship among the
dimensions generally is illustrated as given in the boxed central figure with bidirectional arrows.
(b) Cooper’s (2000, p. 120) reciprocal safety culture model, which is based on Bandura’s model.

measured in their own right, or in combination, it becomes possible to quantify
safety culture in a meaningful way at many different organizational levels, which
hitherto has been somewhat difficult.” In the literature review section of this
chapter, Jin and Chen (2013) provide an example of how safety culture may be
grounded in Bandura’s model.
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Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model also is an appropriate
framework to assess an organization’s safety climate. As noted earlier, SCT posits
that behavior is influenced by people being cognizant of corresponding responseconsequence contingencies—that is, people are aware of the consequences of their
behavior and have expectations for their behavior. Thus, the focus of this
application would be on the Person dimension. More specifically, employees’
perceptions of management’s safety policies—including how these policies are
designed and implemented, how they are enforced, and the extent to which
employees are held accountable—would influence employees’ safety related
behavior. In the literature review, Cui, Fan, Fu, and Zhu (2013) and Fogarty (2004,
2005) demonstrate the application of Bandura’s model to safety climate studies.
Geller’s safety triad. Extending Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model, Geller (2001) developed the total safety culture (TSC) framework directly
for the occupational safety field. As depicted in Figure 2.2, the TSC model—also
called The Safety Triad (Geller, 1989)—is patterned in the shape of a triangle with
each side representing the same dimensions (domains) as Bandura’s but applied to
safety (Geller, 2001, p. 25):
• The Environment domain represents environmental factors such as
equipment, tools, physical layout, procedures, standards, and temperature.
• The Person domain represents affective factors such as people’s attitudes,
beliefs, and personalities.
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• The Behavior domain represents behavioral factors such as safe work
practices (e.g., recognizing, complying with, and communicating safety
procedures), at-risk work practices (e.g., not complying with safety
policies), and demonstrating a “call of duty (by intervening) on behalf of
another person’s safety (Geller, 2001, p. 25).
Similar to Bandura’s model, the three domains of The Safety Triad are dynamic
and interactive. Thus, any change in one domain eventually will impact the other
two domains. In presenting his model, Geller stressed, “The behavior and person
factors represent the human dynamics of occupational safety … (and) … both
factors need to be addressed in order to achieve a Total Safety Culture” (p. 26).
Although Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model and Geller’s (2001)
TSC model acknowledge the dynamic and interactive relationships among the three
dimensions of Person, Behavior, and Environment, Cooper (2000, p. 123) cited one

37

main difference: Geller’s perspective of the Environment dimension is restricted to
factors present on the shop floor such as equipment tools and machines. It “does
not address the wider aspects of organizations (e.g., policies, strategies, etc.).
Nonetheless, it is self-evident that the reciprocal model encompasses the ‘Total
Safety Culture’ model.”
Application to the current study: Safety culture vs. safety climate. To
date, there has been little empirical evidence supporting the theoretical framework
of social cognitive theory in the occupational safety literature. Cooper (2000) in
particular has recognized the need for studies that fully examine the holistic nature
of Bandura's (1986) social cognitive theory applied to safety culture. However, as
noted by Fogarty (2004), to assess the safety culture of an organization “requires
tangible means of measurement such as in-depth interviews and analysis of stated
safety goals and polices” (p. 75). For example, assessing the aspects of the
Environment dimension would involve auditing and inspecting an organization’s
safety management system (Cooper, 2000). In the case of Jin and Chen’s (2013)
study, this entailed reviewing “safety documents, educational materials and videos
about the company’s safety policies, requirements, procedures, management
techniques and accountability” (p. 61). Similarly, the Behavior dimension would
involve reviewing an organization’s safety violation reports and establishing a
quantitative metric such as a safety violation rate. Given the proprietary nature of
this information and the lack of cooperation from the MROs in providing access to
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these types of documents, the current study was focused on examining the targeted
MROs’ safety climate. In particular, the study replicated Fogarty’s (2005) safety
climate study by applying it to civilian aviation mechanics working in U.S. based
MROs, and tested Fogarty’s (2005) causal model as depicted in Figure 1.2 (Chapter
1). The study also applied the study data to Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation
model to determine the reciprocal relationships among the Person, Environment,
and Behavior dimensions relative to safety climate in MROs.
Review of Past Research Studies
The current safety culture/climate literature is “fragmented,” and difficult to
understand how one study relates to another, and “the scope, depth, terminology
and perspectives vary widely from one study to the next” (Sorensen, 2002, p. 200).
It was not until after Sorensen’s (2002) literature review when more rigorous
studies were conducted that tested for relationships between safety culture/climate
and safety performance. Since then, safety culture/climate has been examined in
many industries outside of nuclear power plant operations. Although not
exhaustive, the studies reviewed in this section of the chapter are representative of
recent safety culture/climate studies that helped inform the current study. The
review is organized in two parts: studies from non-aviation contexts and studies
within the aviation profession.
Safety culture/climate studies in non-aviation contexts. Safety
culture/climate research outside of the aviation profession is quite varied and is
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found in many high reliability industries, including the nuclear, building
construction, mining, and health care professions. Of the many studies reviewed,
three were instrumental in informing the current study.
Nuclear power industry. Morrow, Koves, and Barnes (2014) examined the
safety culture of nuclear power plants in the United States. The primary purpose of
their study was twofold: (a) to examine factors that were related to the concept of
safety culture in the nuclear power industry and (b) to examine the relationship
between the factors found in (a) and other measures of safety performance.
With respect to the first objective, Morrow et al. (2014) developed a 110item questionnaire to measure safety culture. The items were constructed from
various sources including the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the National Regulator Commission’s
inspection program, and the safety culture research literature. The items were
measured on a 7-item Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 =
Strongly Agree. Of the 6,333 people who were administered the questionnaire,
3,031 individuals responded and 2,876 participants provided useable data (a 48%
return rate). The final sample consisted of an average of 46 participants from each
of the 63 nuclear power plant sites, which represented 97% of the nuclear power
plants in the U.S. The results of a factor analysis reduced the number of items to
60, which were comprised of a nine-factor solution. Morrow et al. identified these
factors as follows (number of items and corresponding Cronbach alphas in
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parentheses): management commitment to safety (N = 20,  = .96), willingness to
raise safety concerns (N = 6,  = .90), decision making (N = 5,  = .88),
supervisory responsibility for safety (N = 6,  = .88), questioning attitude (N = 6,
 = .85), safety communication (N = 7,  = .87), personal responsibility for safety
(N = 3,  = .77), prioritizing safety (N = 4,  = .83), and training quality (N = 3,
 = .78). The overall Cronbach’s alpha was .98.
With respect to the second objective, Morrow et al. (2014) used the mean
scores from the safety culture survey from each site as the numerical index for
safety culture. They then compared this index to 11 independent safety
performance measures, including: the number of unplanned immediate shutdowns
of a nuclear reactor in response to an unexpected or emergency condition
(unplanned scrams); the number of allegations reported to the nuclear regulatory
commission (NRC); the chemistry performance index, which “indicates the
concentration of selected chemical impurities and corrosion products within power
plant systems” (p. 42); and the human performance error rate, which “measures the
rate of negative events per month over the course of the year when an event occurs
as a result of a human performance error” (p. 42). Morrow et al. examined the
relationship between the safety culture index and the targeted performance
measures from both concurrent and predictive validity perspectives. Morrow et al.
used safety performance data from 2010, the year the instrument was administered,
for the former, and safety performance data for 2011 for the latter.
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Morrow et al. (2014) reported that the concurrent validity analysis resulted
in a significant negative relationship between the safety culture index and 5 of the
11 targeted safety performance measures. The negative direction of these
relationships was expected. As for the predictive validity analysis, Morrow et al.
reported significant negative relationships between the safety culture index and 7 of
the 11 targeted safety performance measures; three of these seven measures were
the same from the concurrent validity analysis. Once again, the negative direction
of these relationships was expected. Morrow et al. indicated that safety culture
accounted for 7% to 21% of the variance in most of the targeted safety performance
measures. However, in a follow-up analysis relative to only NRC safety
performance measures, “the safety culture factors accounted for 23–52% of the
variance in concurrent safety performance measures” (p. 44).
Morrow et al.’s (2014) study was beneficial to the current study in two
ways. First, when viewed from the perspective of the earlier discussion involving
the concept of safety culture/climate, the study actually was a safety climate study.
This is because their measure of safety culture was scores from the administration
of a questionnaire that assessed employees’ perceptions related to several aspects
of safety within their work environment. In a way, Morrow et al. recognized this
when they concluded, “a survey is only one potential indicator of safety culture and
does not constitute a full assessment of an organization’s safety culture” (p. 46).
Although Morrow et al. also examined various safety performance measures such
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as unplanned scrams and the number of allegations reported to NRC, these
measures were not used as part of the assessment of culture. Instead, they were
used to determine the relationship between what Morrow et al. referred to as
“culture” and performance. This expression of culture yielded two lessons: (a)
There must be a clear distinction between climate and culture; and (b) because
there was a significant relationship between perceptions and some of the
performance measures, safety climate (perceptions of an organization’s safety
policies) may be used as an indicator of performance. Second, Morrow et al.’s
study was exploratory in nature and represented “a first step in the empirical
exploration of relationships between safety culture and other measures of nuclear
power plant performance” (p. 46). The current study was similar in this nature
because of the dearth of safety climate studies applied to MROs.
Building construction industry. Jin and Chen (2013) examined the
effectiveness of a safety program that was implemented by a regional general
contractor in the U.S. building construction industry. The program was designed to
develop a positive corporate safety culture among its employees and throughout the
organization. Jin and Chen measured the effectiveness of the contractor’s safety
program from the perspective of Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model of
Person-Behavior-Environment. In the context of their study, the Person dimension
represented employees’ perceptions and attitudes about safety, the Behavior
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dimension represented actual safety-related behaviors, and the Environment
dimension represented all aspects of the organization’s safety management system.
The Person dimension was measured by administering questionnaires to the
contractor’s top executives, middle managers, and line people (workers). The 66item questionnaire, which contained a mix of multiple-choice, Likert scale, and
open-ended questions, focused on employees’ safety awareness, accountability,
program acceptance, general perceptions on safety risks, and safety attitudes and
involvement. Content validity was addressed by having the contractor’s safety
director review the items for relevancy and accuracy, but no reliability coefficients
were reported. The Behavior dimension was measured by reviewing the
contractor’s violation reports and establishing a violation rate that was used to
quantify the contractor’s “yearly safety behavioral violation, subcontractors
working on the (contractor’s) job sites and the combined rate since the (safety)
program’s launch” (p. 62). The Environment dimension was measured by auditing
the contractor’s “safety documents, educational materials and videos about the
company’s safety policies, requirement procedures, management techniques and
accountability systems” (p. 61).
With respect to the Person dimension, Jin and Chen (2013) reported they
collected 650 completed questionnaires: 71 from top executives, 229 from middle
managers (site management personnel), and 350 from workers. Of the workers
surveyed, 99% were aware of the contractor’s safety program, but their level of

44

awareness significantly decreased (p < .05) from 74% to 33%, respectively, for the
three basic elements of safety and the 20 nonnegotiable behaviors established by
the company. More than 50% of the participants also reported having a positive
view of the company’s safety program, with top executives (81% to 100%) and
middle managers (72% to 96%) having more consistent perceptions relative to all
the items that measured program acceptance when compared to workers (51% to
96%). Jin and Chen also reported there was increased safety accountability among
the three group of participants: 94% of top executives claimed they held their
managers accountable for safety enforcement, 56% of site managers felt increased
safety accountability, and 99% of workers knew they would be accountable for
their safety, but only 59% and 30% of workers were able to correctly describe the
consequences for first- and second-time violations, respectively.
With respect to the Behavior dimension, Jin and Chen (2013) reported that
during the 44-month study period, there were 1,113 documented violations. The top
four violations, which accounted for 81% of all violations, were related to a fall
hazard. Jin and Chen also reported that the overall trend of the safety violation
rate—which was calculated number of violations per annual working hours of 100
full-time workers—dropped during the study period from 2.69 to 0.90. With
respect to the Environment dimension, Jin and Chen reported that the contractor’s
safety management system (SMS) was consistent with what the literature
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recommended, and that the safety program strengthened the SMS with respect to
safety rules, safety meetings, and other safety-related communications.
The contribution of Jin and Chen’s (2013) study to the current study was
manifold. First, when viewed from the perspective of the safety culture/climate
discussion presented earlier, their study was indeed a safety culture study. Jin and
Chen measured employees’ perceptions and attitudes about safety via a
questionnaire (safety climate), collected and analyzed data from the organization’s
safety database that contained information about all its safety-related accidents, and
audited the organization’s safety management system and interviewed employees at
different levels of the company. Jin and Chen then examined the relationship
among all three components as an assessment of the overall safety culture of the
organization. Second, Jin and Chen’s (2013) study demonstrated the applicability
of using Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model for assessing an
organization’s safety program. Although this was not the objective of the current
study, Jin and Chen showed how useful Bandura’s model is in examining the
relationship among Person, Behavior, and Environment with respect to safety
culture. Jin and Chen also confirmed the use of questionnaires as an acceptable
practice for measuring the Person dimension. Finally, Jin and Chen clearly showed
that without the expressed cooperation of upper management, it would be difficult
to review an organization’s safety records, SMS, and interview personnel to help
understand the Behavior and Environment dimensions. Although the absence of
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these latter two dimensions would make research of an organization’s safety culture
incomplete, it is still possible to gain some insight of an organization’s safety
culture by examining its safety climate.
Coal mining industry. Cui et al. (2013) developed an integrative model of
safety management applied to China’s coal mining industry and grounded it in both
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model and Geller’s (2001) total safety
culture triad. With respect to Bandura, the integrative model was based on the
premise that “the safety behaviors of individual employees are influenced by the
organization's safety climate, which shapes individual cognitions; and that the
safety climate of an organization necessarily reflects its environmental context” (p.
38). With respect to Geller’s TSC triad, the integrative model was based on the
premise that “the human interaction which forms the safety climate of an
organization is considered to play a mediating role in bridging the relationship
between environmental context and employee behaviors” (p. 38). This
hypothesized model was tested using data acquired from employees of a stateowned Chinese coal mining company that was representative of China’s mining
industry. Cui et al. administered a questionnaire in which employees were asked to
respond to items that assessed the “perception of their work environment and
management attributes, their attitudes toward occupational safety, and their safety
related behaviors” (p. 40). Three hundred questionnaires were administered face-toface to front line employees and 209 contained usable data. Structural equation
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modeling (SEM) was then used to validate the hypothesized model using data from
the questionnaire.
Cui et al. (2013) reported that the results of the SEM analysis showed there
was a good fit of the data to the hypothesized model: “The chi-square test returned
an insignificant result (2 = 112.18, df = 96, p = .1240), and the CFI (.984), TLI
(.980), and RMSEA (.028) were all in desired territory” (p. 41). With respect to the
hypothesized paths, Cui et al. reported that (a) hazardous environment had a
positive relationship with employees’ beliefs toward safety, but this was not
significant (p = .228); (b) hazardous environment also had a positive relationship
with management commitment to safety, which was significant (p = .000); and (c)
there was a positive relationship between management commitment to safety and
employees’ beliefs toward safety, which was significant (p = .000). Cui et al. also
noted the results “suggested that the influence of hazardous environment on
employees’ beliefs toward safety was fully mediated by management commitment
to safety. Hazardous environments promoted individual employee safety
consciousness because the perceived management commitment to safety procedure
was high” (p. 41). The results also demonstrated that “the influences of
management commitment to safety on employee safety-specific behavior and
employee safety involvement were fully mediated by employees’ beliefs toward
safety” (p. 42).
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Cui et al.’s (2013) findings supported the theoretical models of Bandura
(1977) and Geller (2001). Key among these findings was the role cognition plays in
safety behaviors. As Cui et al. observed: “The findings demonstrate that a
psychological perspective is instrumental in understanding employee safety
behavior...” (p. 45). More specifically, employees’ perception of a hazardous
environment significantly influenced employees’ safety behaviors, which were
mediated by employees’ perception of management’s commitment to safety and
individual beliefs about safety.
Cui et al. (2013) was beneficial to the current study in one critical way: It
demonstrated how a study on safety climate could be grounded in Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model and Geller’s (2001) total safety culture model. Cui et al.
also demonstrated the utility of Bandura’s model in that it could serve as the
theoretical foundation for safety culture studies (e.g., Jin & Chen, 2013) as well as
an organization’s safety climate. Similar to Cui et al. (2013), the current study
endeavored to examine safety climate from the perspective of Bandura’s model,
and tested Fogarty’s (2005) hypothesized causal model presented in Figure 1.2
(Chapter 1) and applied to the aviation MRO profession. In this regard, the current
study heeded Cui et al.’s concluding remark that “future research from this
perspective is warranted to further its contribution to the OH&S (occupational
health and safety) literature” (p. 45).
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Safety culture/climate studies in the aviation profession. The literature
has several aviation safety culture/climate studies. For example, O’Connor, O’Dea,
Kennedy, and Buttrey (2011) examined 23 studies that developed and/or evaluated
safety culture/climate instruments for aviation to determine the extent to which
these instruments were construct and discriminate valid. O’Connor et al. concluded
the instruments they reviewed “have some construct validity to the extent to which
factors identified were consistent with theory, (but) there was a lack of convergence
upon a common set of safety climate constructs that were consistent across all of
the questionnaires” (p. 136). They also suggested that given the lack of support for
discriminate validity, attention should be given to this dimension. Gill and Shergill
(2004) assessed employee’s perception of safety management and culture in the
New Zealand aviation industry. They reported that “luck and safety” were the most
important factors, which suggest that “attitudes and beliefs play a vital role in
safety in the aviation industry” (p. 237). Gill and Shergill also noted the airport
sector, air traffic control, and the general aviation sector “perceived to regard
individual’s responsibility to safety more important than safety education, positive
safety practices, and implementation of safety policies and procedures” (p. 239).
Other studies included: Antonovsky, Pollock, and Straker (2014); Atak and
Kingma (2011); Chen and Huang (2013); Ek, Akselsson, Arvidsson, and Johansson
(2007); Liang, Lin, Hwang, Wang, and Patterson (2010); Lin (2012); Mearns et al.
(2013); and Rashid, Place, and Braithwaite (2013).

50

Although these studies were conducted in the context of the aviation
profession, they were not informative to the current study for various reasons.
Several were focused on developing instruments to measure safety culture/climate,
others did not take into account the psychological aspect of employee behavior, and
all were absent of a corresponding theoretical basis, which makes it difficult to
advance a unified explanation of employee attitudes toward safety (Carder &
Ragan 2003; Clarke, 1999). Cooper (2000), who was critical of most contemporary
safety research because it tended to ignore environmental issues and people's
behavior, called for studies that were grounded in theory and/or examined the
holistic nature of Bandura's (1977) reciprocal causation model. Two such studies
that were both consistent with this challenge and informative to the current study
were Fogarty (2004) and Fogarty (2005).
Fogarty (2004, 2005). Fogarty’s (2004) purpose was to first develop and
validate an instrument to measure safety climate within the aviation maintenance
profession, and to develop and validate a causal model that hypothesized the
relationship between the factors measured by the instrument and maintenance
errors. With respect to the first task, Fogarty engaged in a systematic triangulation
process to get an idea of what factors he should consider that would be appropriate
for assessing safety climate in the aviation maintenance profession (p. 76). He first
consulted both the general safety climate literature and studies that assessed safety
climate in aviation. The first set of sources provided him with insight about what
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constructs should be considered for research in maintenance errors, and the second
set of sources helped him identify specific safety climate factors, constructs, or
dimensions. Fogarty then examined a maintenance database and corresponding
incident investigation reports. The information he culled from these sources
revealed “the relevance of factors such as inadequate training, poor supervision,
and individual factors such as stress and fatigue as causes of maintenance-related
incidents” (p. 76). Lastly, Fogarty conducted several focus group interviews
involving maintenance personnel and their supervisors to flesh out their perceptions
of what impacts their job performance. Using the information he acquired from
these multiple sources, Fogarty developed the Maintenance Environment Survey
(MES) and administered it to 240 personnel responsible for maintaining a large
military helicopter fleet in Australia. Five scales emerged from factor analysis:
safety climate, morale, mental health (stress, fatigue, psychological health),
outcome variables (turnover and errors), and affectivity.
With respect to the second task, Fogarty consulted two sets of past studies
that examined the relationship between safety climate and maintenance errors. The
first set of studies derived relationships from regression and bivariate correlation
analyses. The second set of studies derived relationships from path analysis and
structural equation modeling (SEM). Fogarty used the findings from these studies
to inform a hypothesized causal model that showed the relationships among safety
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climate, morale, health, turnover, and errors (outcome measure). Fogarty reported
that SEM results based on the sample data yielded acceptable fit indices, and
the model predicted 47% of the variance in (psychological) Health, 65% of
the variance in Morale, 27% of the variance in Turnover, and 39% of the
variance in Errors. However, none of the direct paths from Climate,
Turnover, and Morale to Errors were significant. (p. 83)
The final model demonstrated that safety climate influenced health, fatigue,
turnover, and morale. More specifically, as safety climate improved, psychological
health, morale, fatigue, and turnover also improved with the latter two factors
having a negative relationship with climate, which indicates a decrease in each
factor. With respect to the outcome variable, errors, Fogarty (2004) reported that
high morale led to less error rates, but the major predictor of errors was
psychological health, which when examined from a zero-order perspective with
errors accounted for 30% of the variance.
In addition to these direct links, Fogarty (2004) also reported that the causal
model supported the literature relative to the indirect relationship organizational
factors have with errors via health: “…organizational factors influence individuals,
who in turn make errors” (p. 85). When presented from the perspective of
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model, this indirect path represents the
relationship between Environment (safety climate), Person (psychological health),
and Behavior (errors). This link also suggests that Environment does not have a
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direct influence on Behavior—for example, having a low perception of
organizational factors did not lead to errors—but instead is mediated by Person,
which is counter to Bandura’s model.
Given the indirect path of climate–health–errors that emerged from his
earlier study (Fogarty, 2004), Fogarty (2005) conducted a follow-up study that
focused primarily on the impact of the psychological health construct. His intent
was to validate a causal model that posited psychological health having a direct
relationship with errors and serving as a mediator between safety climate and
errors. This model is depicted in Figure 1.2 (Chapter 1). Absent from this model is
a direct path between safety climate and errors. As noted in the foregoing
paragraphs and in Chapter 1, this model is inconsistent with Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model from two perspectives: (a) the absence of the
Environment (safety climate)–Behavior (errors) path, and (b) the paths are
unidirectional and not bidirectional.
To validate this model, Fogarty (2005) administered a slightly modified
version of the MES (MES 2nd edition) to 150 personnel responsible for
maintaining a large military helicopter fleet in Australia. The procedure Fogarty
followed was identical to what he did in his earlier study (Fogarty, 2004). Fogarty
reported (p. 11) that SEM results “yielded acceptable fit indices…. The model
predicted 39% of the variance on Psychological Strain (and) 15% of the variance in
Errors. All factor loadings and regression pathways were significant.” The results
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confirmed the role psychological health has on errors in an aviation maintenance
context: There was a “significant association between safety climate and
psychological strain and a further significant association between psychological
strain and maintenance errors. The path model establishes that the linkage between
safety climate and errors is a mediated one” (p. 14). The practical implications of
these findings suggest that it is important for management to monitor the safety
climate as well as employees’ psychological health.
Fogarty’s (2004, 2005) studies were instrumental to the current study in
several ways. First, they provided a quantitative scale that was validated within an
aviation maintenance context and used to assess the relationship among the three
dimensions of Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. Second, they validated
a hypothesized causal model that involved constructs corresponding to Bandura’s
three dimensions of Environment, Person, and Behavior. Third, unlike Fogarty and
Shaw (2010), which tested a hypothesized causal model against Ajzen’s (2002)
theory of planned behavior, Fogarty did not examine the validity of his model to
theory, which enables me to extend his study from a theoretical perspective by
grounding it in social cognitive theory. Finally, the focus of Fogarty’s studies was
relative to safety climate, which makes the current study more feasible to
implement.
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Summary and Study Implications
Most of the past safety related literature has focused on the development of
instruments to measure safety climate/culture but have not taken into account the
psychological aspect of employee behavior. This lack of a cognitive perspective—
coupled with the absence of a corresponding theoretical basis—makes it difficult to
advance a unified explanation of employee attitudes toward safety (Carder &
Ragan 2003, Clarke 1999). Past studies within the aviation context also have
focused on pilots and air traffic controllers, but there is a dearth of research focused
specifically on maintenance personnel working in maintenance, repair, and
overhaul (MRO) facilities.
As indicated in Chapter 1, the primary purpose of the current study was to
replicate Fogarty (2005) and to validate his causal model (Figure 1.1) using data
from U.S. based civilian MROs. The current study was grounded in social
cognitive theory and Bandura’s (1977) and Geller’s (2001) respective models. As
demonstrated by Cui et al. (2013) and by Jin and Chen (2013), these models may
be used as the theoretical basis for both safety culture and safety climate studies.
This grounding within a theoretical framework will help advance a unified
explanation of employee attitudes toward safety.
Similar to Cui et al. (2013) and Fogarty (2004, 2005), the focus of the
current study was on safety climate and not safety culture. It is concerned more
about understanding employees’ psychological health and how it relates to safety
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behavior and perceptions of an MRO’s safety climate than the overall safety culture
of the organization. This focus does not permit “the dynamic, multi-faceted,
holistic nature of the safety culture construct to be more fully examined” as called
for by Cooper (2000, p. 131). However, as Guldenmund (2000) observed, safety
climate is the manifestation of safety culture (p. 221) and may be considered “an
alternative safety performance indicator” (p. 215). This latter observation was
demonstrated empirically by Morrow et al. (2014). The focus on safety climate also
provides a window into an organization’s safety health (Reason, 1977).
Workers’ perceptions of such things as management’s commitment to
safety, appropriateness of training, availability of resources, and possibly
many other variables not measured here, do have links with safety
outcomes. Whether the perceptions are justified is irrelevant because the
effect of the perceptions is felt on morale and psychological health whether
there is justification for the perceptions or not. (Fogarty, 2004, p. 85)
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Population and Sample
Population. The target population consisted of approximately 200
maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities in the United States that
perform base, engine, component, corporate, and line maintenance. MROs in the
U.S. contribute $17.8 billion of the world MRO market (Yumakogullari, Ayde Mir,
& Guloglu, 2015).
The accessible population consisted of one national MRO and other smaller
MRO facilities in the U.S. The national MRO has multiple repair stations with
major maintenance facilities across the U.S. and provides world class maintenance,
repair, and overhaul services for wide-body, narrow-body, and regional transport
jets including the world’s most commonly used Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, and
Embraer aircraft. It has an annual airframe man-hour capacity of $460 million and
employs approximately 6,000 personnel (AAR, 2014). The smaller MROs have
multiple locations and are certified repair stations with Airframe classes 1, 3, and 4
ratings. They offer maintenance services for private business jets including
Citation, Dassault Falcon, Embraer Legacy, Bombardier Challenger, and Lear jets.
They also provide airframe and engine inspection and maintenance, avionics and
instrumentation, overhaul and repair, painting services, interior completion, and
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retrofits for the cabin, cockpit, and systems. The revenue base of these
organizations is approximately $17,720,775 (ARSA, 2014, p. 43).
Sample. The sampling strategy used for the current study was convenience
sampling. The final sample size was N = 134 of which N = 99 were employees
from the national MRO, and N = 35 were employees from the smaller MROs. All
participants volunteered to complete the researcher-prepared questionnaire,
Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), which was accessible
electronically. Contact persons at each MRO announced the study to their
workforce with an invitation to participate.
As reported in Table 3.1, the sample was comprised of 114 males and 17
females. Participants’ ages ranged from 20–72 years, with males having a much
broader age range (20–72 years) than females (22–58 years). The majority of males
were married (64 vs. 41) whereas a minority of females was married (5 vs. 12).
As summarized in Table 3.2, the participants’ educational background had a
nearly rectangular distribution. Among the highest levels of education participants
identified as having completed, was the most frequent was 2 years of college (N =
41), followed by high school (N = 26), technical school (N = 25), 4 years of college
(N = 23), and graduate degree (N = 15). The mean total years experience overall
was M = 16.8 (SD = 12.2) and ranged from 0 years to 45 years, and the mean total
years experience working at their current MRO was M = 9.5 (SD = 7.6) and ranged
from 0–37 years. Across the different levels of education, participants with a high
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Table 3.1
Summary of Participants’ for Age and Marital Status by Gender
Marital Statusa

Age
Group
Male

N

N

M

Range

N

M

NM

O

114

102

43.6

20–72

114

64

41

9

Female

17

17

41.1

22–58

17

5

12

0

Overall

131

119

43.2

20–72

131

69

53

9

Note. N = 134.
aMarital Status entries represent total number of participants corresponding to each marital
category. M = Married; NM = Not married: Single (n = 38), Divorced (n = 12), and
Widowed (n = 3); O = Other: Separated (n = 7), “Other” (n = 1), and No reply (n = 4).

Table 3.2
Summary of Participants’ Education Level and Years Experience
Total Years of Experience
Overalla

Highest Level
of Education

Nb

High school

26

2-yr college
4-yr college
Graduate
Technical school
Overall

e

Nc

Total Years of Experience
at Current MROa

M

SD

Range

Nd

M

SD

Range

21

18.6

14.6

1–45

25

10.5

10.3

0–37

41

30

17.8

12.9

0–45

39

9.3

7.1

1–27

23

19

16.4

10.0

1–36

21

8.9

6.6

0–22

15

13

13.2

10.3

1–40

14

9.0

6.9

1–28

25

12

15.5

11.5

1–36

22

9.5

7.0

0–23

130

121

16.8

12.2

0–45

95

9.5

7.6

0–37

Note. N = 134.
a0 = less than 1 year experience. bFour participants did not report their highest level of education. c13
participants did not report their total years of experience overall. d39 participants did not report their total
years experience at their current MRO. eTechnical school represents a specialized 2-year post high school
program in aircraft maintenance.

school diploma had the most years experience overall (M = 18.6) and working at
their current MRO (M = 10.5), and participants with a graduate degree and a 4-year
degree, respectively, had the fewest years of experience overall (M = 13.2) and
working at their current MRO (M = 8.9).
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Table 3.3
Summary of Participants’ Aircraft Mechanic Ratings
Ratinga
Airframe
with Avionics
with Powerplant
with Powerplant and Inspection Authorization
with Powerplant and Inspection Authorization and Other
with Powerplant and Inspection Authorization and Avionics
with Powerplant and Inspection Authorization and Avionics and Other
with Powerplant and Inspection Authorization and Unlicensed and Other
with Powerplant and Avionics
with Powerplant and Avionics and Unlicensed and Other
with Powerplant and Other
with Unlicensed and Other
Powerplant
Inspection Authorization
with Avionics
with Unlicensed
with Other
Avionics
Unlicensed
Unlicensed
with Other
Other
Total

N
3
1
22
10
2
3
1
2
4
1
1
1
2
14
1
3
2
8
1
21
8
12
123

Note. N = 134; 11 participants did not report their ratings.
a
Other included repairman certificate, quality control inspector, technician, FAA representative,
auditor,

With regard to aircraft mechanic ratings, as summarized in Table 3.3, a total
of N = 123 participants reported this information. Of this group, the most frequently
reported rating was Airframe with Powerplant (N = 22), followed by Unlicensed
Avionics (N = 21) and Inspection Authorization (N = 14).
Lastly, with respect to race/ethnicity, as reported in Table 3.4, of the N =
129 participants who reported their race/ethnicity, the breakdown was follows:
Hispanic (N = 49), Caucasian (N = 35), African American (N = 26), Asian
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Table 3.4
Summary of Participants’ Race/Ethnicity and Primary Language
Primary Language English?
Race/Ethnicity

N

Caucasian
African American
a

Asian American
Hispanic
Other

c

Overall

b

Yes

No

35

33

2

26

26

0

16

10

6

49

20

29

3

2

1

129

91

38

Note. N = 134. Five participants did not report their race/ethnicity or if
English was their primary language.
aAsian American included Chinese (1), Filipino (5), Indian (1), Nepalese
(1), and Vietnamese (1); seven participants who identified themselves
Asian American did not qualify their ethnicity. bHispanic included
Belizean (1), Colombian (1), Cuban (4), Latino (2), Mexican (2),
Nicaraguan (4), Puerto Rican (2); 33 participants who identified
themselves Hispanic did not qualify their ethnicity. cOther included
American Indian: Cheyene (1) and Navajo (1).

American (N = 16), and American Indian (N = 3). Overall, N = 91 participants also
reported that English was their primary language. When this last demographic was
compared across race/ethnicity, the majority of participants (29 of 38) who reported
that English was not their primary language was Hispanics. In contrast, fewer than
six participants from each of the other race/ethnicity groups reported English as not
being their primary language (Caucasians, 2 of 33; African Americans, 0 of 26;
Asian Americans, 6 of 10).
Power analysis. The current study employed two different statistical
strategies to test the study’s hypotheses: structural equation modeling (SEM) was
used to test Fogarty’s (2005) model, and multiple regression was used to test
Bandura’s (1977) model. As a result two separate power analyses were conducted.
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Testing Fogarty’s (2005) model. Before conducting the current study, I
consulted the literature to determine an appropriate sample size for the SEM
analysis. According to Kline (2011, p. 11), SEM requires large samples but “It is
difficult to give a single answer because several factors affect sample size
requirements.” One approach Kline presented was to think of “minimum sample
size in terms of the ratio of cases (N) to the number of model parameters that
require statistical estimates (q). An ideal sample size-to-parameters ratio would be
20:1 (p. 12).
In the context of the current study, there were q = 7 parameters that required
statistical estimates. Referencing Fogarty’s model (Figure 1.2), these parameters
included the five subscales that defined Safety Climate (Recognition, Safety
Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training) and the two subscales that defined
Psychological Strain (Stress and Psychological Distress). Thus, an ideal sample
size was 20  7 = 140. Kline also suggested to think of sample size in absolute
terms and wrote, “A ‘typical’ sample size in studies where SEM is used is about
200 cases” (p. 12), and therefore this was a good estimate for most SEM studies.
Kline cautioned, though, that N = 200 “may be too small when analyzing a
complex model, using an estimation method other than (maximum likelihood), or
(when) distributions are severely non-normal” (p. 12). He also indicated that most
types of SEM analyses—except those involving very simple models—might be
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flawed if the sample size is less than 100. Such a small sample size also will reduce
the trustworthiness of the study’s findings.
For the current study, the final sample size was (N = 134). So there were six
fewer cases than the minimum needed and 66 fewer cases than the recommended
200. The current study also had three fewer parameters (four instead of seven). One
parameter was eliminated based on the results of preliminary data screening (it had
a low reliability coefficient); two other parameters were eliminated as part of the
process in revising the initial model to fit the data (see Chapter 4). To determine the
actual power of the current study, I consulted MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara
(1996). According to MacCallum et al., the actual power of the study relative to an
“exact fit” with df = 5 and N between 100 and 200 was approximately .15.
Following Kline (2011, p. 224), the minimum sample I would have needed to
achieve a power of at least .80 was 1,490. Consequently, the power of the results
from the SEM analysis reflects an inadequate sample size, and the reader is
cautioned to consider this when interpreting the study’s SEM findings.
Testing Bandura’s (1977) model. To test Bandura’s model, several
multiple regression analyses were performed that examined the effect, or influence,
of one dimension on the other two. Each dimension also consisted of a set of
variables and each test involved a different dependent measure. For example, the
Person dimension consisted of Stress and Distress scores, the Environment
dimension consisted of Recognition, Safety Concern, and Supervision scores, and
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the Behavior dimension consisted of Maintenance Error scores. To examine the
influence Person had on the other two dimensions, the independent variables were
Stress and Psychological Distress, and the corresponding dependent measures were
the variables that comprised the other two dimensions. Furthermore, in the case of a
dimension having more than one dependent measure, a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) was initially performed as an omnibus test to protect against
the possibility of inflated Type I and Type II errors.
A summary of the corresponding power analyses is provided in Table 3.5.
As reported in Table 3.5, for all analyses that were significant, which resulted in a
decision to reject the null hypothesis, the corresponding approximate powers
ranged from .75 to > .99. This implies that the probability a null hypothesis that is
false in the population was correctly rejected based on sample data was at worst
75% and at best greater than 99%. Similarly, there is at least a 75% chance that the
significant effects found in the current study’s sample truly exist in the parent
population.
Instrumentation: The Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey
The current study used a single data collection instrument, the Aviation
Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), partitioned into three sections:
Section A = Maintenance Environment Survey, Section B = General Health
Questionnaire, and Section C = Background Information. A copy of the AMSCS is
provided in Appendix A, and a description of each section follows.
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Table 3.5
Summary of Power Analyses for Testing Bandura’s Model
ka

Outcome Variable

R2

ESb

Power

.020

.28

.190

> .99

Person Dimension
Influence of Person on Environment
•

Y = Recognition

2

.02
c

•

Y = Safety Concern

2

.16

•

Y = Supervision

2

.01

.010

.16

2

.22c

.282

> .99

3

.17c

.205

> .99

3

.07

c

.075

.75

3

.12c

.136

.96

Influence of Person on Behavior
•

Y = Maintenance Errors

Environment Dimension
Influence of Environment on Person
•
•

Y = Stress
Y = Psychological Distress

Influence of Environment on Behavior
•

Y = Maintenance Errors

Behavior Dimension
Influence of Behavior on Person
•
•

Y = Stress
Y = Psychological Distress

1

.17c

.205

> .99

1

.15

c

.176

> .99

1

.02

Influence of Behavior on Environment
•

Y = Recognition

c

•

Y = Safety Concern

1

.07

•

Y = Supervision

1

.001

.020

.37

.075

.88

.001

.06

Note. N = 134,  = .05.
ak = number of independent variables in the model being tested. bES = effect size.
cIndicates that the overall R2 was significant for the preset alpha level of  = .05.

Section A: Maintenance environment survey. This section of the AMSCS
consisted of Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance Environment Survey (MES), which was
used to measure the safety climate of an aviation maintenance setting. The MES is
comprised of seven dimensions, or subscales, as follows (Fogarty, 2005, p. 7):
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Recognition. This 5-item subscale assesses “the extent to which people feel
that they are rewarded or recognized for doing good work.” A sample item for this
subscale is, “In this job people are rewarded according to performance.”
Safety focus of the organization (”safety concern”). This 5-item subscale
assesses “the perception that the organization has a strong concern for safety
issues.” A sample item is, “This workplace regards safety as a major factor in
achieving its goals.”
Supervision standards. This 7-item subscale focuses on “the expertise of
the supervisor and the extent to which the supervisor assisted the worker.” A
sample item is, “My supervisor really understands the maintenance task.”
Feedback on work performance. This 4-item subscale assesses “workers’
perceptions of the amount and quality of feedback they received.” A sample item
is, “The quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequency.”
Training standards and appropriateness. This 5-item subscale covers “a
number of different aspects of training, including adequacy of training for the job,
encouragement to undertake further training, and opportunities for on-the-job
training.” A sample item is, “My training and experience have prepared me well for
duties in my current job.”
Exposure to workplace stressors (“stress”). This 9-item subscale represents
“the actual feelings and consequences of stress.” A sample item is, “The demands
of my work interfere with my home and family life.”
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Maintenance errors. This 13-item subscale asks participants to “indicate
whether they made maintenance errors on the job, including self-detected errors as
well as those flagged by their supervisors. A sample item is, “I make errors in my
job from time to time.”
The MES is scored using a traditional 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 =
Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. Thus, overall scores could range from 48
to 240, with higher aggregate scores reflecting a positive perception of an
organization’s safety climate. Similarly, higher subscale scores reflect a tendency
toward each targeted dimension. For example, scores on the 5-item Recognition
dimension could range from 5 to 25 with higher scores reflecting respondents’
belief that they are being rewarded or recognized for doing good work. Five of the
items—one from the Recognition, three from the Safety Concern, and one from the
Feedback subscales—were negatively worded and therefore were reverse-scored.
The MES was appropriate for the current study because (a) it provided
information relative to an aviation maintenance environment, (b) it was validated
using personnel responsible for the maintenance of a large military helicopter fleet,
and (c) it aligned directly to the Person, Environment, and Behavior constructs of
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. According to Fogarty (2005), the
MES has corresponding Cronbach's alpha of .78, .72, .86, .73, .62, .84, and .82 for
each of the subscales, respectively. Fogarty did not report an overall Cronabch
alpha, though. A comparison between the reliability coefficients Fogarty reported
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Table 3.6
AMSCS Reliability Information
Cronbach’s αe
Instrument

M

SD

AMSCS

Reported

166.22

17.07

.84

-

Recognition (n = 5)

14.34

4.09

.68

.78

Safety concern (n = 5)

17.96

3.62

.69

.36

Supervision (n = 7)

25.26

5.38

.89

.89

Feedback (n = 4)

13.06

3.06

.71

.51

Training (n = 5)

19.00

3.02

.60

.60

Stress (n = 9)

28.40

6.32

.85

.85

Maintenance errors (n = 13)

34.40
12.15

8.18
5.65

.84
.78

.84

Maintenance Environment Surveya
Overall

GHQ

c

.88

Note.N = 134.
aFogarty’s (2005) MES consisted of 48 items measured on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly
Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). Thus, aggregate scores could range from 48 to 240 with
higher scores reflecting a positive perception of an organization’s safety climate. The MES
also was partitioned into seven subscales (with number of items in parentheses). Higher
subscale scores reflect a tendency toward each targeted dimension. bGoldberg and Williams’
(1988) General Health Questionnaire consisted of 12 items measured on a Likert-type scale
with 0 = Not At All, 1 = No More Than Usual, 2 = Rather More Than Usual, and 3 = Much
More Than Usual. Thus, aggregate scores could range from 12 to 36 with lower scores
reflecting a lower general psychological health with respect to depression, anxiety, social
dysfunction, and psychosomatic symptoms.

in the literature and those calculated based on the current study’s data is provided
in Table 3.6. An analysis of each item, individually and relative to each dimension,
also is provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter 4.
Section B: General health questionnaire (GHQ). This section of the
AMSCS consisted of Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) General Health Questionnaire
(GHQ), which was designed to measure a person’s general psychological health. It
has been used extensively to assess elements of psychological distress such as
depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and psychosomatic symptoms (Goldberg &
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Williams, 1988). The GHQ consists of 12 items prefaced with the phrase, “Have
you recently...” Two sample items are: (a) “...been able to concentrate on whatever
you are doing?” and (b) “...lost much sleep over worry?” (Penninkilampi-Kerola,
Miettunen, & Ebeling, p. 433). Responses to these items are measured on a Likerttype scale with 0 = Not At All, 1 = No More Than Usual, 2 = Rather More Than
Usual, and 3 = Much More Than Usual. Thus, aggregate scores could range from
12 to 36 with lower scores reflecting lower levels of psychological distress. The
GHQ has a corresponding Cronbach alpha of  = .88. Based on the current study’s
data, the reliability coefficient for the GHQ was  = .78. An analysis of each of the
GHQ’s items is provided in Table 4.3 in Chapter 4.
Section C. Background information. The last section of the AMSCS
consisted of a set of researcher-constructed items that asked participants to selfreport specific personological characteristics, including age, gender, marital status,
race/ethnicity, ratings, total years experience as an aviation maintenance personnel,
and educational background. There also were three separate questions that asked
participants to specify and describe (a) the number of voluntary reports they
submitted to FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) related to a
maintenance error in the past 2 years, (b) the number of voluntary reports they
submitted that related to a maintenance hazard in the past 2 years, and (c) any
maintenance error circumstances in which you were involved. As a point of
information, these latter three questions yielded at most four responses.
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Procedures
Research methodology. The research methodology that best fit the current
study was correlation and the corresponding design was explanatory. This research
methodology-design was appropriate because I examined the relationship among a
set of variables relative to a single group, namely MRO personnel. According to
Ary, Jacobs, and Sorenson (2010), an explanatory study helps identify relationships
among variables, which then can be used to help clarify an understanding of the
phenomenon. In the current study, the phenomenon I studied was safety climate in
MROs relative to Fogarty’s (2005) causal model and Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model.
Human subject research. The nature of the current study involved
collecting data from individuals working in an MRO and therefore was considered
human subject research. As a result, I submitted an application to Florida Institute
of Technology’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Because the current study
involved the use of cognitive assessments via a questionnaire and did not have any
identifying codes, an exempt category was warranted and Florida Institute of
Technology’s Institutional Review Board approved the study’s protocol January
13, 2016. A copy of the application and approval is provided in Appendix B.
Study implementation. The AMSCS, as the primary data collection
instrument, was hosted by the Fluid Surveys website for the 4-month period June
20, 2016 to October 24, 2016. Based on my initial intention to allow accessibility to
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the questionnaire for 3 months, l had to extend further to ensure a minimum sample
size (N = 140) was realized. This targeted sample size was not realized, though,
because the host site was purchase by SurveyMonkey, which shut down the hosting
web site in October 2016. The study link was made available to key representatives
of the targeted MROs, and these representatives forwarded the link to their
members.
With the exception of the background section, the AMSCS consisted of two
standardized instruments, Fogarty’s (2005) MES and Goldberg and Williams’
(1988) GHQ. In fact, Fogarty used both instruments in his study, which the current
study replicated. Furthermore, because both instruments were reported in the
literature as being valid and reliable, I did not give strict attention to validity and
reliability other than from a face validity perspective and reporting corresponding
reliability coefficients from the sample data. With respect to the former, my
committee reviewed how I packaged the AMSCS, and I conducted a preliminary
study to gauge how long it would take to complete the instrument as well as its
accessibility from the host web site. With respect to the former, I reported the
reliability coefficients in Table 3.6 and found that the reliability coefficients were
comparable to their counterparts and in some cases were even stronger.
The implementation of the study was fairly straightforward: I prepared the
AMSCS and tested it on a preliminary basis. I placed a copy of the AMSCS on the
Fluid Surveys web site. I contacted the targeted MROs for support and provided
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each contact person with a copy of the AMSCS’ web site link. Every 2 or 3 weeks I
checked the number of responses and reported this information back to the MRO
representatives. At the conclusion of data collection, I downloaded the data from
the web site and placed it into JMP to begin data analysis.
Threats to internal validity. Internal validity refers to the extent to which
changes in an outcome variable (the DV) can be directly and solely attributed to the
treatment administered (the IV). The concept of internal validity is critical because
it provides an alternative explanation for the outcome of a study independent of
treatment. Ary et al. (2010) identified 12 threats—or alternative explanations—to
internal validity. If these threats are not controlled, then it is conceivable that they
could be what led to a study’s outcome and therefore could compromise any
relationship found between the DV and IVs. In this section I define each of these
threats, describe how they impacted the current study, and how l controlled for or
mitigated their effect.
History. History refers to any unanticipated event that is not related to the
study but occurs during a study that could impact the dependent variable (Ary et
al., 2010). For example, in the context of the current study, if the FAA were to start
a major campaign to increase awareness of safety climate in U.S. based MRO
facilities during the study period, maintenance personnel could be influenced in
their responses to the AMSCS items and the way they carried out their tasks. Thus,
their responses might be different as a result of increased sensitivity to safety
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climate than in the absence of such a campaign. Throughout the current study’s
duration, I did not observe any event that could have been inferred as a history
threat and as a result this threat was not pertinent to the current study.
Maturation. Maturation refers to the normal, ongoing developmental
process that occurs within a person over time. These include physiological,
biological, and psychological changes individuals normally undergo as part of the
aging process, and also include personal experiences such as wisdom, motivation,
and fatigue individuals acquire as a result of getting older. For example, if during
the course of the current study, participants acquired more ratings or returned to
school and earned a college degree, it is conceivable that their responses might be
different than what they would have been at the onset of the study. However, given
(a) the relatively short period of the study (4 months), (b) adult participants, and (c)
a one-time event (participants simply completed a questionnaire), it was highly
unlikely that maturation was a threat to the current study.
Testing. The testing threat refers to a situation in which participants are
administered an assessment prior to treatment, and then administered the same
assessment after the treatment. The concern here is that the pre-assessment could
have sensitized participants in unanticipated ways, and as a result, their
performance on the post-assessment might be due to their exposure to the items on
the pre-assessment. In other words, the pre-assessment cued participants about the
post-assessment by giving them a “sneak peak” to the post-assessment. Although
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participants in the current study were not administered any type of pre-assessment,
it is possible that the testing threat was still applicable. This is because the AMSCS
was hosted electronically on a web site, which made pre-exposure possible if
participants scrolled backwards and forwards to see the items more than one time.
To mitigate this possibility, a feature was enabled that prevented this from
occurring. In other words, participants were only able to progress forward as they
completed the questionnaire and were not able to return to a previous page.
Instrumentation. The instrumentation threat refers to changes in the
manner in which a dependent variable is measured throughout a study. “Changes
may involve the type of measuring instrument, the difficulty level, the scorers, the
way the tests are administered, using different observers for pre- and post
measures, and so on” (Ary et al., 2010, p. 275). Any change to the instrument or the
method administration of the instrument could affect the result of a study because it
becomes difficult to know if the observed outcome resulted from treatment or from
the changes carried out on the instrument. In the current study, this threat was not
applicable because I only used a single instrument, the instrument was administered
one time and it was done electronically via a host web site, and participants’
responses were electronically entered and scored.
Statistical regression. Statistical regression refers to the tendency for
extreme scores to move toward the mean on subsequent assessments. For example,
in the context of the current study, consider the case where maintenance workers
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are pre-assessed on their understanding of safety regulations and then grouped by
their scores: poor understanding vs. high understanding. Participants in the poorunderstanding group would tend to show greater gain in their understanding of
safety regulations on a post-assessment than the high understanding group. This
threat was not applicable to the current study because participants were not grouped
and no pre-assessments were administered.
Selection. The selection threat refers to the concept of group equivalency:
“Are the groups equivalent at the beginning of the study?” If the answer to this
question is no, then it is possible that the study’s outcome is a function of not
having equivalent groups. For example, if participants self-select into treatment and
control groups, then the results might be considerably different than if they were
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. In this current study, selection
was not a threat because l studied a single group of maintenance personnel and
there were no treatment or control groups.
Mortality. Mortality refers to the loss of participants (attrition) during the
implementation of a study and is a concern because the loss of specific types of
participants can impact the outcome of a study. For example, if younger, less
experienced, and less educated maintenance personnel who have only one or two
ratings decide to drop out of the current study, then the complexion of the group
that remains will be different from the group that started the study. This new
composition also might no longer be representative of the target population. As
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noted in various parts throughout this dissertation, the initial sample size was N =
188, but the final sample size used to for both descriptive and inferential statistics
was N = 134, a 28.7% loss. Thus, mortality was a possible threat to the current
study. My intent was to compare demographic data between participants who did
not complete all study protocols vs. those who did to see if the two groups
represented different populations. This was not possible, though, because the
“incomplete” group did not respond to any of the demographic items. As a result,
the possible presence of this threat is reflected as a limitation to the study.
Selection-maturation. The selection-maturation threat refers to the
interaction between group membership and the maturation rates of the participants
in the groups over the course of a study. If participants in treatment and control
groups are maturing at different rates, then it is possible that the observed outcome
is a function of these different maturation rates than treatment. As noted earlier,
neither the selection nor maturation threats applied to the current study. As a result,
the selection-maturation threat also was not be applicable to the study.
Experimenter effect. An experimenter effect refers to the unintended
influence that a researcher has on a study that results in an observable outcome.
This can result from the researcher’s personological characteristics such as age,
gender, and level of education, and could include the researcher’s attitude toward
the study or treatment. As an example, consider a study that compared differences
in maintenance workers’ attitudes toward safety between two different MROs. If
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the researcher implementing the study favored one MRO over the other, it is
possible that the attitudes of one group might be more positive than the other group.
Because the current study was implemented electronically via an online web site,
the experimenter effect was not applicable.
Subject effects. A subject effects threat refers to participants’ perception of
the study and how this perception could influence the results of the study. This
effect can be manifested either as a Hawthorne effect or as a John Henry effect. In
the case of the former, the observed study outcomes would not be due to treatment,
but instead would be the result of increased attention and recognition given to the
participants. In other words, it is possible that participants might want to respond to
the items on the questionnaire in a very positive manner because they feel honored
they have been recognized to provide input. With respect to the latter, a John Henry
effect refers to a situation in which members of a control group feel compelled to
“out perform” members of a treatment group. These individuals might feel
resentful or demoralized because of attention being given to the treatment group. In
the current study, a Hawthorne effect is possible because participants might feel
honored to help bring attention to the concept of a safety climate to MROs.
Because I was not able to control for this threat, I tried to mitigate its effect by not
presenting the current study as something special.
Diffusion. The diffusion threat refers to the concept of design
contamination, which occurs when members of a treatment group share with
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members of the control group the type of treatment they are receiving and both
groups then begin “comparing notes.” A diffusion threat was not applicable to the
current study because l used a single group and there was no any treatment.
Location. The location threat refers to the physical site at which
participants are administered study protocols. For example, if participants
responded to the questionnaire at a noisy, hot, and humid environment where they
were interrupted frequently, their results might be different than if they were in a
quiet, air-conditioned area with no distractions or interruptions. In the current study
the AMSCS was hosted online and participants completed the questionnaire at
various locations where they had Internet access. Although l did not have control
over the location at which participants chose to complete the AMSCS, l presumed
they completed it in an appropriate environment in which they were comfortable.
Therefore, I did not consider the location threat to impact the current study.
Treatment verification and fidelity. In the most general sense, the
concept of treatment verification and fidelity refers to what a researcher does to
ensure that a study’s protocols are implemented exactly as intended. It is a
“confirmation that the manipulation of the independent variable occurred as
planned” (Moncher & Prinz, 1991, p. 247). According to Shaver (1983),
confirming, or verifying, that the actual implementation of a study maintained
fidelity to what was proposed enhances the integrity of the independent variables
and helps promote the generalizability of a study’s results. For the current study,
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there was no treatment, per se, that was implemented and therefore the concern is
not with treatment verification and fidelity in the traditional sense. The focus
instead is on external validity and is concerned with three issues: complete
description of the variables, data collection procedures, and data analysis methods
(Shaver, 1983). To address these issues I have: (a) provided a detailed description
of the variables (see Tables 3.7 and 3.8), (b) documented the procedures in the
Study Implementation section of this chapter, and (c) reported validity and
reliability information about the data collection instruments I used (Table 3.6 and
Tables 4.1 and 4.2), and (d) described the appropriate statistical strategy (SEM and
multiple regression) to answer my research questions (see next section).
Data Analysis
Data analysis was performed using both descriptive and inferential
statistics. The descriptive statistics applied to the demographics of the sample and
are presented in Table 3.1, Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4. Inferential statistics
procedures included structural equation modeling (SEM), which was used to test
Fogarty’s (2005) model, and multiple regression, which was used to test Bandura’s
(1977) model. The results of these latter two analyses are present in Chapter 4.
Descriptions of the factors associated with the current study are summarized in
Tables 3.7 and 3.8. The reader should note that the demographical variables were
not included in the primary analyses used to test Fogarty’s and Bandura’s
respective models, but instead were used for the independent exploratory analysis.
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Table 3.7
Description of Latent Factors and Their Corresponding Measured Variables Relative to Fogarty’s
(2005) and Bandura’s (1977) Respective Models (See Also Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1)
Variable

Description
Safety Climate (Fogarty) and Environment Dimension (Bandura)

Recognition

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 5-item Recognition subscale.

Safety Concern

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 5-item Safety Concern subscale.

Supervision

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 7-item Supervision subscale.

Feedback

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 4-item Feedback subscale.

Training

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 5-item Training subscale.
Psychological Strain (Fogarty) and Person Dimension (Bandura)

Stress

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 9-item Stress subscale.

Psychological
Distress

A continuous variable measured via Goldberg and Williams’ 12-item General
Health Questionnaire (GHQ).
Errors (Fogarty) and Behavior Dimension (Bandura)

Maintenance
Errors

A continuous variable measured via Fogarty’s 13-item Errors subscale.

Table 3.8
Description of Demographic Variables
Variables

Description

Age

A continuous variable measured in years.

Gender

A categorical variable representing gender; dummy coded with
Males as the reference group.

Marital status

A categorical variable representing five marital categories: Single,
Married, Divorced, Separated, and Widowed. Due to disparate
sample sizes, this was reduced to two groups, Married vs. Not
Married, with the latter group encompassing all non-married
categories; dummy coded with Married as the reference group.

Race/Ethnicity

A categorical variable representing five race/ethnic categories:
Caucasian, African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and
Other; dummy coded with Caucasian as the reference group.

Highest level of education

A categorical variable representing five levels of formal
education: high school, technical school, 2-year college, 4-year
college, and graduate degree; dummy coded with 2-year college as
the reference group.

Total years experience

A continuous variable measured in years.

Totals years at current MRO

A continuous variable measured in years.

English as primary language

A categorical variable representing a yes or no response; dummy
coded with No as the reference group.
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
This chapter contains a discussion of the results from data analysis and is
organized into three main sections: descriptive statistics, inferential statistics, and
results of hypotheses testing. The first section provides a summary of the
descriptive statistics results related to the non-demographic sections of the Aviation
Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS). The inferential statistics section
contains three parts: (a) the results of the structural equation modeling (SEM)
analysis, which was used to test Fogarty’s (2005) model; (b) the results of several
multiple regression analyses, which were used to test Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal
causation model; and (c) the results of an exploratory analysis using stepwise
regression to help gain additional insight into the safety climate of MROs. The last
section contains a summary of the results of hypothesis testing that corresponds to
the research questions outlined in Chapter 1.
Descriptive Statistics
The AMSCS consisted of three main sections and was presented to
participants in the following order: Section A = Fogarty’s (2005) MES, Section B =
Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) GHQ, and Section C = Background Information.
The AMSCS was hosted by Fluid Surveys and accessible via the Internet for the 4month-period, June 20, 2016 to October 24, 2016. During this time period, 188
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participants responded to the survey, and 143 provided complete data (a 76%
return/completion rate). Following is a summary of the responses to the first two
sections of the AMSCS. (The reader is reminded that participants’ demographic
information is given in Chapter 3, Tables 3.1–3.4.)
Section A: Maintenance environment survey. As reported in Table 4.1,
responses to Fogarty’s (2005) 48-item MES were scored mostly around 3.00 on a
traditional 5-point Likert scale, which indicates that participants’ overall
perceptions of their respective MRO’s safety climate were neutral. One noteworthy
exception was participants agreed-to-strongly agreed with Item A22 = “My training
and experience have prepared me well for duties in my current job (M = 4.14, SD =
0.89). Participants also agreed with A7 = “This workplace regards safety as a major
factor in achieving its goals” (M = 3.96, SD = 0.90), and A24 = “I have found many
opportunities to use my training in my current job” (M = 3.94, SD = 0.93). On the
opposite side of the scale, participants disagreed with A41 = “Occasionally, I
forget to remove a tool at the completion of a task (M = 2.01, SD = 0.97), A39 =
“There are times I have deliberately acted contrary to written procedures” (M =
2.10, SD = 1.06), and A36 = “When performing a maintenance task, I sometimes
miss a step in a test sequence” (M = 2.14, SD = 0.97). Collectively, the results from
all of these highlighted statements infer that participants thought highly of the
training they received and the importance of safety within the workplace.
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Table 4.1
Summary of Descriptive Statistics Results from 48-Item Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
Itema

N

M

SD

A1. In this job the rewards and encouragement usually outweigh the threats
and the criticism.

132

3.18

1.23

A2. In this job people are rewarded according to performance.

133

2.84

1.25

A3. There is not enough reward and recognition for doing good work.

134

2.78

1.29

A4. In our promotion system, the best people generally rise to the top.

134

2.66

1.21

A5. I am satisfied with the recognition I get for doing good work.

134

2.95

1.18

A6. Personnel are well trained in the consequences of unsafe acts.

134

3.72

0.96

A7 This workplace regards safety as a major factor in achieving its goals.

134

3.96

0.90

A8. Lack of proper equipment sometimes forces us to cut corners in our
work.

134

3.07

1.17

A9. There is not always time to follow safe procedures.

134

3.56

1.14

A10. In high workload conditions, I am prepared to take a few shortcuts to get
jobs done on time.

134

3.64

1.19

A11. My immediate supervisor has had many years experience in aviation
maintenance.

134

3.67

1.07

A12. My supervisor really understands the maintenance task.

134

3.78

0.90

A13. I trust my supervisor.

133

3.76

0.94

A14. My supervisor sets clear goals and objectives for the team.

133

3.71

0.92

A15. My supervisor actively encourages team members to lift their level of
performance.

133

3.65

0.99

A16. When I make an error, my supervisor will support me.

134

3.40

0.97

A17. My immediate supervisor checks my work very carefully.

134

3.37

1.07

A18. The quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequently.

133

3.54

1.03

A19. It is difficult for me to find out how well I am doing my job.

134

3.14

1.03

A20. My supervisor keeps me regularly informed of my progress.

134

3.21

1.03

A21. My work group receives detailed feedback regarding overall
performance.

133

3.22

1.08

A22. My training and experience have prepared me well for duties in my
current job.

134

4.14

0.89

A23. I have been encouraged to improve myself through continued training.

134

3.83

0.98

A24. I have found many opportunities to use my training in my current job.

134

3.94

0.93

Note. N = 134. The MES is from Fogarty (2005). All items were measured on a traditional 5-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The MES also was partitioned into seven subscales,
or dimensions: A1–A5 represented Recognition, A6–A10 represented Safety Concern, A11–A17 represented
Supervision, A18–A21 represented Feedback, A22–A26 represented Training, A27–A35 represented Stress,
and A36–A48 represented Maintenance Errors. See Table 4.2 for additional information about these scales,
including the meaning of each subscale.
aA3, A8, A9, A10, and A19 (denoted in bold type) are negatively worded items and were reverse-scored. The
means and standard deviations for these items reflect the reverse scoring.
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Summary of Descriptive Statistics Results from 48-Item Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
Item

N

M

SD

A25. I am not expected to perform tasks for which I have not been trained.

133

3.54

1.04

A26. Maintenance personnel receive a lot of "hands-on" training.

133

3.59

1.02

A27. I need to spend more time with my family and friends.

134

3.71

0.91

A28. The demands of my work interfere with my home and family life.

134

3.07

1.06

A29. I find it difficult to leave work concerns at work.

133

2.96

1.08

A30. I have sometimes felt unwell because of work pressures.

134

3.18

1.10

A31. My job here does not allow me enough time to relax.

134

2.95

1.01

A32. I often feel irritated by things that happen at work.

133

3.47

1.00

A33. Other workgroups don't appreciate the problems they cause by amending
their work schedules.

134

3.34

0.93

A34. A heavy workload makes me feel tense.

134

2.92

1.08

A35. I get anxious when I work to strict deadlines.

133

2.88

1.11

A36. When performing a maintenance task, I sometimes miss a step in a test
sequence.

134

2.14

0.97

A37. In a maintenance task, I sometimes do things I don't intend to do.

133

2.24

0.96

A38. Occasionally I plan an action that subsequently proves to be incorrect.

134

2.34

1.03

A39. There are times I have deliberately acted contrary to written procedures.

131

2.10

1.06

A40. When I return to a task sequence after an interruption, I sometimes don't
start at the right place.

134

2.27

1.06

A41. Occasionally, I forget to remove a tool at the completion of a task.

134

2.01

0.97

A42. I have been known to make a slip-up when I haven't been concentrating.

134

2.59

1.17

A43. Under pressure, it's easy to forget steps in a task sequence.

132

3.21

1.12

A44. I only depart from approved procedures with my supervisor's approval.

133

2.97

1.21

A45. I make errors in my job from time to time.

132

2.78

1.14

A46. There have been times when tiredness has affected my attention to
detail.

133

3.00

1.19

A47. I am pretty hard on myself when I make an error.

134

3.88

0.98

A48. I have made errors that have been detected by my supervisor.

134

3.06

1.01

Note. N = 134. The MES is from Fogarty (2005). All items were measured on a traditional 5-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The MES also was partitioned into seven subscales,
or dimensions: A1–A5 represented Recognition, A6–A10 represented Safety Concern, A11–A17 represented
Supervision, A18–A21 represented Feedback, A22–A26 represented Training, A27–A35 represented Stress,
and A36–A48 represented Maintenance Errors. See Table 4.2 for additional information about these scales,
including the meaning of each subscale.
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Table 4.2
Summary of Descriptive Statistics Results for the Subscales of the 48-Item Maintenance
Environment Survey (MES)
Possible
Range

Midrangeb

M

SD

Cronbach 

Recognition (A1–A5)

5–25

15.0

14.34

4.09

.68

Safety Concern (A6–A10)

5–25

15.0

17.96

3.62

.69

Supervision (A11–A17)

7–35

21.0

25.26

5.38

.89

Feedback (A18–A21)

4–20

12.0

13.06

3.06

.71

Training (A22–A26)

5–25

15.0

19.00

3.02

.60

Stress (A27–A35)

9–45

25.0

28.40

6.32

.85

Maintenance Errors (A36–A48)

13–65

35.0

34.40

8.18

.84

Overall (A1–A48)

48–240

144.0

166.22

17.07

.84

Subscalea (Item Numbers)

Note. N = 134. The MES is from Fogarty (2005). All items were measured on a traditional 5-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. (see also Table 4.1).
aRecognition assessed the extent to which participants felt they are rewarded or recognized for doing good
work. Item A3 was negatively worded and reverse-scored. Safety Concern assessed participants’ perceptions
that their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues. Items A8–A10 were negatively worded and reversescored. Supervision assessed participants’ perceptions of their supervisor’s expertise and the extent to which
their supervisor assisted them. Feedback assessed participants’ perceptions of the amount and quality of
feedback they received. Item A19 was negatively worded and reverse-scored. Training assessed participants’
perceptions related to their training, including if it was adequate for their job, if they were encouraged to
enhance their training, and whether there were opportunities for on-the-job training. Stress assessed
participants’ feelings and consequences about their stress and what contributes to it. Maintenance errors asked
participants to reflect on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both self-detected and
those identified by their supervisors). bThe midrange is calculated by adding the low and high values of the
possible range and dividing the sum by 2.

Fogarty’s (2005) 48-item MES also consisted of seven subscales, or
dimensions. A summary of the results relative to these subscales is provided in
Table 4.2 and a discussion of each subscale follows.
Recognition. Items A1–A5 of the MES were used to assess the extent to
which participants felt they are rewarded or recognized for doing good work. As
reported in Table 4.2, the overall mean was M = 14.34 (SD = 4.09), which was 0.66
points less than the midrange of 15.0. This indicates that participants’ perceptions
of being recognized for doing good work were slightly on the negative side. This is
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confirmed from Table 4.1, which shows that participants generally “disagreed”
with A2 = “In this job people are rewarded according to performance,” A4 = “In
our promotion system, the best people generally rise to the top,” and A5 = “I am
satisfied with the recognition I get for doing good work statements.” All had means
less than 3.0. Furthermore, because A3 = “There is not enough reward and
recognition for doing good work” was reverse-scored, the mean of this statement
prior to reverse scoring (M = 3.22) suggests a trend toward agreement with the
statement.
Safety concern. Items A6–A10 of the MES were used to assess
participants’ perceptions that their MRO has a high concern for safety issues. As
reported in Table 4.2, the overall mean was M = 17.96 (SD = 3.62), which was
nearly 3 points higher than the midrange of 15.0. This indicates participants’
overall perceptions of their MRO’s concern for safety was positive. This is
confirmed from Table 4.1, which shows that A6 = “Personnel are well trained in
the consequences of unsafe acts” and A7 = “This workplace regards safety as a
major factor in achieving its goals” had means approaching 4.0 (“agreed”).
Furthermore, the reverse-scored items—A8 = “Lack of proper equipment
sometimes forces us to cut corners in our work,” A9 = “There is not always time to
follow safe procedures,” and A10 = “In high workload conditions, I am prepared to
take a few shortcuts to get jobs done on time”—had means prior to reverse scoring
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approaching 2.0, which indicates participants “disagreed” with these three
statements.
Supervision. Items A11–A17 of the MES were used to assess participants’
perceptions of their supervisor’s expertise and the extent to which their supervisor
assists them. As reported in Table 4.2, the overall mean was M = 25.26 (SD =
5.38), which was 4.3 points higher than the midrange of 21.0. This indicates that
participants’ perceptions of their supervisors were positive. This is confirmed from
Table 4.1, which shows the mean scores for these items consistently have a
“neutral-to-agree” trend ranging from A17 = “My immediate supervisor checks my
work very carefully” (M = 3.37, SD = 1.07) to A12 = “My supervisor really
understands the maintenance task” (M = 3.78, SD = 0.90).
Feedback. Items A18–A21 of the MES were used to assess participants’
perceptions of the amount and quality of feedback they receive. As reported in
Table 4.2, the overall mean was M = 13.06 (SD = 3.06), which was 1.06 points
higher than the midrange of 12.0. This indicates that participants’ overall
perceptions of the amount and quality of feedback they receive were higher than
average. This is confirmed from Table 4.1, which shows that the means for these
four statements consistently have a “neutral-to-agree” trend ranging from A20 =
“My supervisor keeps me regularly informed of my progress (M = 3.21, SD = 1.03)
to A18 = “The quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequently” (M = 3.54,
SD = 1.03). With respect to the reverse-scored Item A19 = “It is difficult for me to
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find out how well I am doing my job,” the mean prior to reverse scoring was 2.86,
which indicates participants were mostly neutral with this statement.
Training. Items A22–A26 of the MES were used to assess participants’
perceptions related to their training, including if it was adequate for their job, if
they were encouraged to enhance their training, and whether there were
opportunities for on-the-job training. As reported in Table 4.2, the overall mean
was M = 19.0 (SD = 3.02), which was 4.0 points higher than the midrange of 15.0.
This result suggests that participants’ overall perceptions of the training they
received were very strong. This is confirmed from Table 4.1, which shows that the
means for these statements were nearly at or above the “agree” mark. For example,
three of the five statements—A22 = “My training and experience have prepared me
well for duties in my current job,” A23 = “I have been encouraged to improve
myself through continued training,” and A24 = “I have found many opportunities to
use my training in my current job”— had means of M = 4.14 (SD = 0.89), M = 3.83
(SD = 0.98), and M = 3.94 (SD = 0.93), respectively, and the remaining two
statements, A25 = “I am not expected to perform tasks for which I have not been
trained” and A26 = “Maintenance personnel receive a lot of ‘hands-on’ training,”
had means of M = 3.54 (SD = 1.04) and M = 3.59 (SD = 1.02), respectively.
Stress. Items A27–A35 of the MES were used to assess participants’
feelings and consequences about their stress and what contributes to it. As reported
in Table 4.2, the overall mean was M = 28.40 (SD = 6.32), which was 3.4 points
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higher than the midrange of 25.0. This indicates that participants’ perceptions of
their stress in the workplace were higher than average. This is confirmed from
Table 4.1, which shows that the means had a neutral-to-agree trend. For example,
participants generally agreed with A27 = “I need to spend more time with my
family and friends” (M = 3.71, SD = 0.91) and A32 = “I often feel irritated by
things that happen at work” (M = 3.47, SD = 1.00). However, participants also were
relatively neutral with A35 = “I get anxious when I work to strict deadlines” (M =
2.88, SD = 1.11), A34 = “A heavy workload makes me feel tense” (M = 2.92, SD =
1.08), and A31 = “My job here does not allow me enough time to relax” (M = 2.95,
SD = 1.01).
Maintenance errors. Items A36–A48 of the MES asked participants to
reflect on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job. As reported
in Table 4.2, the overall mean was M = 34.40 (SD = 8.18), which was 0.6 points
less than the midrange of 35.0. This indicates that participants’ reflections of
making maintenance errors on the job—either self-detected or those identified by
their supervisors—were relatively neutral when considered collectively. When the
items are considered individually, though, a slightly different picture emerges. For
example, as shown in Table 4.1 participants generally disagreed (means ranged
from M = 2.01 to 2.59) with Items A36–A42, which are statements that reflected
the possibility of committing a maintenance error that was of their doing. At the
same time, though, participants generally agreed with A43 = “Under pressure, it’s
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easy to forget steps in a task sequence” (M = 3.21, SD = 1.12) and A47 = “I am
pretty hard on myself when I make an error (M = 3.88, SD = 0.98), which suggests
participants have a sense of duty and obligation for their actions. Thus, on the one
hand, participants did not want to fault themselves for maintenance errors, but on
the other hand, they were upset with themselves for making an error.
Section B: General health questionnaire. This section of the AMSCS
consisted of Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) 12-item General Health Questionnaire
(GHQ), which is a self-reported instrument used to identify psychological distress
such as depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and psychosomatic symptoms. The
GHQ is measured on a 4-point Likert-type scale with 0 = Not at all, 1 = No more
than usual, 2 = Rather more than usual, and 3 = Much more than usual. Thus,
overall scores could range from 0 to 36, with higher scores indicating higher levels
of psychological distress.
As summarized in Table 4.3, the overall mean of the GHQ was M = 12.15
(SD = 5.65), which is approximately 6 points lower than the midrange of 18.0. This
indicates that participants’ self-reported level of psychological distress was
considerably low. When the items were examined individually, mean scores ranged
from M = 0.4 (SD = 0.74) to M = 1.5, (SD = 0.93), which suggests that participants’
responses reflected an absence of any psychological distress or at worst, no more
than usual.
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Table 4.3
Summary of Descriptive Statistics Results from 12-Item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ)a
Itemb

N

M

SD

B1. Have you recently been able to concentrate on whatever you are
doing?

131

1.34

0.83

B2. Have you recently felt capable of making decisions about things?

131

1.14

0.87

B3. Have you recently been able to face up to your problems?

130

1.16

0.83

B4. Have you recently lost much sleep over worry?

130

0.89

0.91

B5. Have you recently felt constantly under strain?

131

1.00

0.94

B6. Have you recently felt you could not overcome your difficulties?

131

0.69

0.82

B7. Have you recently been feeling unhappy and depressed?

131

0.79

0.99

B8. Have you recently been losing confidence in yourself?

131

0.48

0.82

B9. Have you recently been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?

130

0.40

0.74

B10. Have you recently felt that you are playing a useful part in things?

130

1.51

0.93

B11. Have you recently been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day
activities?

130

1.40

0.80

B12. Have you recently been feeling reasonably happy, all things
considered?

130

1.41

0.85

Note. N = 134. The GHQ is from Goldberg and Williams (1988). All items were measured on a 4-point Likerttype scale ranging from 0 = Not at all, 1 = Not more than usual, 2 = Rather more than usual, and 3 = Much
more than usual. Scores overall could range from 0 to 36 with higher scores reflecting higher levels of
psychological distress. The overall mean was M = 12.15 (SD = 5.65).
aThe overall Cronbach alpha for the 12-item GHQ was  = .78. bB1, B2, B3, B10, B11, and B12 (denoted in
bold type) are negatively worded items and were reverse-scored. The means and standard deviations for these
items reflect the reverse scoring.

Inferential Statistics
Overview. The primary purpose of the current study was two-fold: (a) to
replicate Fogarty (2005) by determining if the current study’s data were consistent
with Fogarty’s model involving the three constructs of Safety Climate,
Psychological Strain, and Maintenance Errors; and (b) to examine the extent to
which the sample data supported Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model
involving the three dimensions of Environment, People, and Behavior. Fogarty’s
and Bandura’s models initially were presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1.
92

They are reproduced here in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b for the reader’s convenience.
Independent of the two-fold primary purpose and corresponding research questions
and hypotheses, an auxiliary purpose was to explore the relationship the targeted
variables had with maintenance errors to help gain additional insight relative to the
safety climate of MROs.

(a)

Stress

Recognition

Psychological
Distress

Safety Concern
Supervision

Psychological
Strain

Safety Climate

Feedback

Training

Errors

Maintenance Errors

(b)
Person (P)

Behavior (B)

Environment (E)

Figure 4.1(a). Fogarty’s (2005) causal model, which was validated using data from maintenance
engineers working at a major helicopter repair base for the Australian army. (b) Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal casuation model. In the context of the current study, Bandura’s Environment dimension
corresponded to Fogarty’s Safety Climate, Person corresponded to Psychological Strain, and
Behavior corresponded to Errors.
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The research methodology/design that best fit the study was explanatory
correlational because it involved a single group (U.S. based civilian MRO workers)
and multiple measures collected from this group. According to Iacobucci,
Churchill, and Churchill (2015), a correlational research design is used to measure
the closeness of the relationship between two or more variables. It provides the
rigor needed to produce a picture of the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of a
group of people at a given time in an organization (Stangor, 2004). It describes in
quantitative terms the degree to which variables are related and helps to examine
the nature of the relationship between and among variables (Locks, Silverman, &
Spirduso, 2010). The primary inferential statistical procedures used were structural
equation modeling (SEM) and multiple regression.
Preliminary analyses. Prior to performing the primary analyses, I carried
out several preliminary data screening activities to confirm that the dataset was
“clean.” These activities included modifying the initial dataset to prepare it for
analysis, conducting outlier and missing data analyses, checking for
multicollinearity, and confirming that the dataset was complaint with the
assumptions of both SEM and multiple regression. The following discussion
summarizes these activities.
Dataset modifications. To prepare the dataset for analysis, I made several
modifications to the data I received from Fluid Surveys, which was the website that
hosted the AMSCS. The first modification involved sorting on the “status” field to
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separate complete cases from incomplete cases. Of the initial sample, 54 of 188
cases (29%) had either no or partially completed responses. As a result, these cases
were deleted, which reduced the sample size to N = 134. A second modification
involved reverse scoring five items of Fogarty’s (2005) MES and six items of
Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) GHQ. The third modification involved creating
columns that contained the aggregate sums for all of the items for each subscale.
The last modification focused on coding the categorical demographic
variables of gender, English as primary language, marital status, education level,
and race/ethnicity. Gender and English as primary language were both dummy
coded with “males” and “no” as the reference groups, respectively. Due to disparate
sample sizes, marital status was reduced to two groups, Married vs. Not Married,
where the latter group comprised single, divorced, widowed, separated, other, and
no response. This factor also was dummy coded with Married as the reference
group. Highest level of formal education, which consisted of high school, technical
school, 2-year college, 4-year college, and graduate, was dummy coded with 2-year
college as the reference group. Race/ethnicity, which consisted of Caucasian,
African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and Other, was dummy coded with
Caucasian as the reference group. The reader should note that these demographical
variables were not included in the two primary analyses used to test the study’s
hypotheses, but instead were used for the independent exploratory analysis.
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Missing data. Missing data occurs when respondents become recalcitrant or
opt not to respond to an item. Apart from the 54 incomplete cases that were noted
in the previous paragraph, data were missing from 19 cases across the seven
subscales of the MES (Items A1–A48), and from three cases across the GHQ
(Items B1–B12). No subscale had more than four missing cases, which represented
less than 3% per subscale. Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Atkins’ (2003)
guidelines, these cases were plugged with the means of each subscale after
confirming that the data were missing randomly and not systematically.
Outlier analysis. Outliers are extreme “scores” (either high or low) relative
to a given dataset and can involve either contaminated data or rare cases. The
former are the result of an error in recording or entering data; the latter are valid but
exceedingly rare observations in a sample. For example, in the context of the
current study, a rare case might be a respondent who has worked 0 years at his or
her current MRO because that person is in his/her first year of employment.
To determine if any outliers were present in the dataset, I examined the
using Jackknife distances of the targeted factors. This analysis flagged 13 outliers,
which reflected either relatively low or high scores on each of the subscales of
Fogarty’s (2005) MES. I then performed two separate simultaneous regression
analyses—one each in the presence and absence of the outliers—with Maintenance
Errors as the dependent variable. In each case, the results showed that both models
were nearly the same with respect to the overall R2, root mean square error, and F
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and p values. Because the outliers did not appear to either inflate or mask
significance, I retained them in the final model.
Multicollinearity. In any multivariate analysis, there is an assumption that
each predictor has the potential to make a contribution in explaining the variability
in the outcome variable. This assumption, however, will not be met if at least one
predictor is highly correlated (e.g., r > .8) with another predictor. This concept in
which two or more independent variables are highly correlated is referred to as
multicollinearity, and the presence of multicollinearity can (among others) result in
incorrect regression coefficients and large standard errors. To check for
multicollinearity in the current study’s dataset, I examined each predictor’s variable
inflation factor (VIF), which “provides an index of the amount that the variance of
each regression coefficient is increased relative to a situation in which all the IVs
are uncorrelated” (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 421–422). Furthermore, the square root of
the VIF indicates the amount of increase in the standard error of a regression
coefficient compared against what would be expected if all the predictors were not
correlated. For example, if an independent variable’s VIF = 4, then this indicates
that the corresponding standard error would be twice as high than it would be if the
predictor was not correlated with any of the other predictors in the model. In the
current study, all VIFs were less than 1.5 and hence multicollinearity was not an
issue.
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SEM and multiple regression assumptions. As noted earlier, the two
statistical procedures used to test the study’s hypotheses were SEM and multiple
regression. According to Kline (2012, p. 121), the data related assumptions of SEM
include: (a) no missing data, which was addressed earlier; (b) independence of the
residuals; (c) multivariate normality; and (d) exogenous variables are measured
with perfect reliability. Other assumptions of SEM include multivariate linearity
and homescedasticity of the residuals. Multiple regression also includes these
assumptions but adds one more, namely, correct specification of the independent
variables. Following is a brief discussion of these assumptions and the methods
used to confirm compliance.
Multivariate linearity. Both SEM and multiple regression examine linear
relationships among variables. Hence, it is necessary to determine whether the form
of the relationship between IVs and DV is linear. The linearity assumption must be
met from a multivariate viewpoint. Violation of this assumption (i.e., a nonlinear
relationship among measured variables) could result in biased estimates of the
regression coefficient and standard errors. To verify that the respective datasets
were compliant with the linearity assumption, a residual analysis was conducted in
which the residuals were plotted against the predicted values. The results of the
analysis produced no discernable pattern, which was confirmed by the Kernel
smoother line closely following the trend of the zero line associated with the linear
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fit of the model. Thus, the dataset was compliant with the multivariate linearity
assumption.
Homoscedasticity of the residuals. This assumption states that the variance
of the residuals around the calculated regression line remains constant regardless of
any value of the independent variable. If this assumption is violated, then the
statistics from the regression analysis will be incorrect. The violation of this
assumption can be detected using the residual versus predicted plot used for the
linearity assumption. As earlier noted, there was no discernable pattern, which was
confirmed by Kernel smoother line. Thus, the dataset was compliant with the
homoscedasticity of residuals assumption.
Independence of the residuals. This assumption ensures there is no
relationship among the residuals for any subset of cases in the analysis; that is, the
residuals of the observations must be independent of one another. Violation of this
assumption can occur when multiple observations are made of a participant over
time with a systematic change in the observations. To determine if this assumption
was met, a residual analysis involving the residuals were plotted against the
corresponding case numbers. The plot showed no discernible pattern, which was
confirmed by the Kernel smoother line closely following the trend of the zero line.
Thus, the dataset was compliant with the independence of the residuals assumption.
Normality of the residuals. This assumption indicates that any error
represented by the residuals should be normally distributed for each set of values of
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the independent variables. This assumption helps to evaluate the statistical
significance of the relationship between dependent and independent variables as
reflected by the regression line. To confirm this assumption, I constructed a normal
q-q plot of residuals with a 95% confidence band. The residuals closely coincided
with the corresponding line of fit, and all of the data were enclosed within the
confidence band. Thus, dataset was compliant with the normality assumption.
Perfect reliability. This assumption assumes that all the independent
variables in the model are measured without error, which means that the
instruments used to measure the independent variables are reliable. If this
assumption is violated, then measurement error could result in biased regression
coefficients and standard errors, and incorrect confidence intervals. According to
Cohen et al. (2003), reliability coefficients of at least .70 are acceptable in practice.
For the current study, the two primary data collection instruments were Fogarty’s
(2005) MES and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) GHQ. As reported in Tables 4.2
and 4.3, the overall reliability coefficients for the MES and GHQ were  = .84 and
 = .78, respectively. However, of the MES subscales, Training ( = .60),
Recognition ( = .68), and Safety Concern ( = .69) had reliability coefficients less
than Cohen et al.’s minimum threshold, and therefore should not be included in the
final model. Given that the Cronbach alphas for the Recognition and Safety
Concern subscales were relatively to  = .70, I decided to keep them in the final
dataset used to test Fogarty’s (2005) and Bandura’s (1977) respective models, but I
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did not include the Training subscale. For the exploratory analysis, though, I kept
all three subscales in the dataset.
Correct specification of the IVs. This last assumption is relevant only to
multiple regression and refers to the notion that the independent variables included
in the model truly belong in the model because of their relationship with the
dependent measure. Given that the current study was a replication of Fogarty
(2005), the variables selected were based on Fogarty. Independent of Fogarty,
though, I also included several demographic factors based on my experience
working in an MRO. Because the relationship these variables have with the
dependent measure is a function of the sample data, it is possible that some of the
variables might not be correctly specified. This could lead to incorrect estimates of
the regression coefficients, significance tests, and confidence intervals.
To determine if the variables were correctly specified, I examined each
variable’s leverage plot, which focuses on the relationship between the residuals of
the dependent variable and the residuals of the targeted independent variable after
both variables have been freed of any relationship they had with all the other
variables. The leverage plots revealed that the following factors had no relationship
with maintenance errors: the Feedback subscale of the MES, gender, marital status,
total years at current MRO, English as a primary language, education level, and
race/ethnicity. Because this assumption was not relevant to SEM, the Feedback
subscale was included in the SEM analysis, which was used to test Fogarty’s
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(2005) model. However, the Feedback subscale was excluded from the multiple
regression analyses used to test Bandura’s (1977) model. Furthermore, because the
demographic factors were not used to test either model, the results obtained from
examining this assumption were not applicable to the primary analyses. However,
these results were incorporated into the exploratory analysis, which included the
demographic variables, to make its dataset compliant with the correct specification
of the IVs assumption.
Summary of the preliminary analyses. As a result of preliminary data
screening, the final dataset was based on a sample size of N = 134, which included
13 outliers. Although the Training, Recognition, and Safety Concern subscales
should have been removed due to low reliability coefficients, I decided to keep
Recognition ( = .68) and Safety Concern ( = .69) in the dataset used to test
Fogarty’s (2005) model because their reliability coefficients were close to .70. I
also decided to keep the Training subscale in the dataset used for exploratory
analysis but not for the primary analyses. Finally, the Feedback subscale and the
demographic factors of gender, marital status, total years at current MRO, English
as a primary language, education level, and race/ethnicity were removed from the
exploratory analysis dataset. A summary of the results of these analyses is
presented in Table 4.4.
Primary analysis 1: Testing Fogarty’s (2005) model. Structural equation
modeling was performed using AMOS version 23 to determine if the sample data
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Table 4.4
Summary of Variable Status As A Result of Preliminary Data Screening
Dataset Used for Primary Analyses
Initial Set of Factors

Decisiona

Reason/Rationalea

Recognition

Kept in final model

 = .68; near minimum threshold of .70

Safety concern

Kept in final model

 = .69; near minimum threshold of .70

Supervision
b

–

–

Feedback

Kept for SEM

Assumption not relevant to SEM

Training

Deleted from final model

 = .60; less than minimum threshold of .70

Stress

–

–

Psychological distress

–

–

Maintenance errors

–

–

Dataset Used for Exploratory Analysis
Recognition

Kept in final model

 = .68; near minimum threshold of .70

Safety concern

Kept in final model

 = .69; near minimum threshold of .70

Supervision

–

–

Feedback

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

Training

Kept in final model

 = .60; close enough for exploratory use

Stress

–

–

Psychological distress

–

–

Age

–

–

Gender

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

Marital status

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

Years experience

–

–

Years at current MRO

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

English is primary

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

Education level

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

Race/Ethnicity

Deleted from final model

Not correctly specified; failed assumption

Note. N = 134.
aDashed items (–) denote no action taken because the factor was compliant with the assumptions. bAlthough the
Feedback subscale was not compliant with the correct specification of the IV assumption, it was included in the
dataset used to test Fogarty’s (2005) model because the assumption is not relevant to SEM. However, Feedback
was excluded from the dataset used to test Bandura’s (1977) model, which used multiple regression.

of the current study fit Fogarty’s (2005) model as presented in Figure 4.1a. Prior to
testing this model, the intercorrelations among the targeted factors were
determined. As shown in Table 4.5, the Maintenance Errors factor, which was the
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Table 4.5
Summary of Intercorrelations among the Subscales of Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance
Environment Survey and Goldberg and Williams’ (1998) General Health Questionnaire
Scalea

1

1. Recognition

—

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. Safety Concern

.31

3. Supervision

.51

.41***

—

4. Feedback

.50

.43***

.61***

5. Training

.35

.24**

.47***

6. Stress

.11

.40***

.07

.11

.16

b

.12

.25**

.11

.17*

.28**

.43***

.14

.26**

.04

.06

.24**

.41*** .39***

7. GHQ

8. Maintenance Errors

8

—
—
.45***

—
—
—
—

Note. N = 123. Correlations greater than |. 20 | are significant for  = .05.
aScales 1–5 defined Safety Climate; Scales 6–7 defined Psychological Strain. bGHQ = Psychological Distress.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

dependent variable, is placed as the last row to more easily examine its correlations
with the other factors. The reader will note that Maintenance Errors was
significantly correlated with both the Psychological Strain variables (Stress and
Psychological Distress), and with two of the five Safety Climate variables (Safety
Concern and Training). The reader also will note that all five Safety Climate
variables had nonzero correlations with the two Psychological Strain variables
(Stress and Psychological Distress). These results are similar to Fogarty (2005)
who pointed out that they “are in keeping with the proposition that safety climate
acts primarily on the psychological health of the individual workers and that
psychological strain is a primary determinant of maintenance errors” (p. 58).
As depicted in Figures 4.2a and 4.2b, when Fogarty’s (2005) model was
tested using the current study’s sample data, a significant model was obtained,
2(19) = 84.27, p = .000, which means that the data did not fit Fogarty’s model.
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Figure 4.2a. Results of SEM analysis of initial hypothesized model (standardized estimates): Chisquare = 84.27, df = 19, p = .000.

Figure 4.2b. Results of SEM analysis of initial hypothesized model (unstandardized estimates):
Chi-square = 84.27, df = 19, p = .000.
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This is because in SEM the null hypothesis is interpreted as there is no significant
difference between the data and the model, which would yield a “fail to reject”
decision and thereby implying a nonsignificant Chi-square (p > .05) for a preset
alpha of  = .05. Because the current study yielded a significant Chi-square (p =
.000), the model was rejected and then underwent several revisions until a
nonsignificant Chi-square resulted.
The first revision involved eliminating the latent factor Errors as shown in
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b. The reader will note from these figures, though, that there
was no change in the results. The next revision involved eliminating the Training
subscale due to its low reliability coefficient (see Table 4.4). Although there was a
slight improvement in the results, the model still was significant, 2(14) = 65.2, p =
.000. The third revision extended the second revision by also eliminating the
Feedback subscale because this factor was not correctly specified when checking
for the regression assumptions (see Table 4.4). Once again, a slight improvement
resulted, but the model still was significant, 2(9) = 52.88, p = .000. The fourth
revision focused on eliminating either the Recognition and Safety Concern
subscales because their reliability coefficients were less than  = .70 (see Table
4.2). Of the two models that resulted from eliminating one factor or the other, the
model without Safety Concern was the better fit, 2(5) = 7.86, p = .164. This is
shown in Figures 4.4a and 4.4b, and the corresponding fit indices are reported in
Table 4.6. Although the path diagrams given in Figures 4.4a and 4.4b yielded
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Figure 4.3a. Results of SEM analysis of initial hypothesized model without the latent variable
Errors (standardized estimates): Chi-square = 84.27, df = 20, p = .000.

Figure 4.3b. Results of SEM analysis of initial hypothesized model without the latent variable
Errors (unstandardized estimates). Chi-square = 84.27, df = 20, p = .000.
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Figure 4.4a. Results of SEM analysis of modified hypothesized model in the absence of Safety
Concern, Feedback, and Training (standardized estimates): Chi-square = 7.86, df = 5, p = .164.

Figure 4.4b. Results of SEM analysis of modified hypothesized model in the absence of Safety
Concern, Feedback, and Training (unstandardized estimates): Chi-square = 7.86, df = 5, p = .164.

108

Table 4.6
Indices of Model Fit (see Figures 4.4a and 4.4b)
Indexa

Recommended Thresholdsb

2(5) = 7.86, p = .164

Nonsignificant, p > .05

GFI = .977

Greater than .90

CFI = .970

Greater than .90

RMSEA = .068

Less than .08

DELTA2 = .971

Greater than .90

aGFI

= goodness-of-fit index, CFI = comparative fit index, RMSEA =
root mean square error of approximation, and DELTA2 is the
incremental fit index (IFI). bSee Jaccard and Wan, 1996, p. 86.

acceptable fit indices—GFI = .977, CFI = .970, RMSEA = .068, and DELTA2 =
.971—none of the non-error paths was significant and the model was not consistent
with Fogarty’s model. From Figure 4.4a (standardized paths), the reader will note
the following:
• The model predicted 1% of the variance in Psychological Strain, which
was defined by Stress and Psychological Distress scores.
• There was a direct negative relationship between Psychological Strain
and Safety Climate, which was defined by the Recognition and
Supervision subscales: As Safety Climate increased, Psychological
Strain decreased. Thus, as participants’ perceptions of the extent to
which they felt rewarded or recognized for doing good work, coupled
with their perceptions of their supervisor’s expertise and the extent to
which their supervisor assisted them increased, the amount of stress and
distress they felt decreased.
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• Although not shown in Figure 4.4a, the standardized indirect (mediated)
effect of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors via Psychological Strain
was -.058. Thus, as Safety Climate increases by 1 standard deviation,
Maintenance Errors decrease by 0.058 standard deviations when
mediated by Psychological Strain. This was not significant, though.
• Of the six error terms in Figure 4.4b, the variances of four were
significant for p < .0001: e6 (22.03), e7 (15.26), e8 (43.75), and e9
(18.81). This indicates there is a considerable amount of unexplained
variance for the factors Stress, Psychological Distress, Psychological
Strain, and Maintenance Errors. Because Psychological Strain was a
latent variable, this implies that relative to the study’s sample data, it is
measured by other factors besides stress and distress. This will be further
elaborated in Chapter 5.
In summary, the path models shown in Figures 4.4a and 4.4b supported
Fogarty’s (2005) model in the sense that Psychological Strain mediated the effect
of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors. However, Fogarty defined Safety
Climate by the five subscales of Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision,
Feedback, and Training whereas the current study’s model defined this construct by
Recognition and Supervision. Another key difference between the two models is
that Fogarty’s paths were significant, but this was not the case for the current study.
Thus, although the revised model was consistent with the sample data and yielded
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acceptable fit indices, the revised model did not completely support Fogarty’s
model. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
Primary analysis 2: Testing Bandura’s (1977) model. Independent of the
SEM analysis, a second objective of the current study was to examine the
reciprocal relationships among Environment, Person, and Behavior relative to
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model (Figure 4.1b). As presented in
Chapter 1, Bandura posited that each dimension influences the other two. Thus: (a)
Person and Behavior influence Environment, (b) Environment and Behavior
influence Person, and (c) Environment and Person influence Behavior. Although
these relationships infer six independent unidirectional arrows, Bandura’s model
generally is shown with three bidirectional arrows as illustrated earlier in Figure
4.1b. In the context of the current study:
• Bandura’s Environment dimension corresponded to Fogarty’s (2005)
Safety Climate construct and consisted of the variables Recognition,
Safety Concern, and Supervision.
• Bandura’s Person dimension corresponded to Fogarty’s (2005)
Psychological Strain construct and consisted of the variables Stress and
Psychological Distress.
• Bandura’s Behavior dimension corresponded to Fogarty’s (2005) Errors
construct and consisted of the variable Maintenance Errors.
A brief summary of each analysis follows.
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Table 4 .7
MANOVA Summary of Person’s Influence Environment and Behavior
(P  E and P  B)
Person Factors

Eigenvalue

F

df

p
< .0001***

Stress

.21

6.87

4, 128

Psychological Distress

.09

2.95

4, 128

.0226*

Note. N = 134. Whole model Wilks Lambda = .67, p < .0001.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Person influences environment and behavior: P  E and P  B. To
examine the influence of Person on Environment and Behavior, I conducted a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) via multiple regression with
Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision, and Maintenance Errors as the
dependent variables, and Stress and Psychological Distress as the independent
variables. The reason for performing a MANOVA was because the dependent
variable consisted of more than one variable and a MANOVA serves as an omnibus
procedure to protect against inflated Type I and Type II errors. As reported in Table
4.7, the overall MANOVA model was significant, Wilks’  = .67, p < .0001, and
the significance was with respect to both Person variables (Stress and
Psychological Distress). As a result, I conducted four independent follow-up
univariate F tests, one for each dependent variable.
The influence of person on recognition. As reported in Table 4.8, the overall
regression model was not significant, R2 = .02, F(2, 131) = 1.21, p = .3015. Thus,
the two Person variables collectively explained 2% of the variance in Recognition
scores, but this was not significant.
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Table 4 .8
Univariate Follow-ups of MANOVA Results for the Influence of Person on
Environment and Behavior (P  E and P  B)
Y = Recognition
(Person effect on Environment)a
Person Factors

B

SE

t(131)

p

95% CI

Intercept

16.50

1.63

10.11

< .0001***

[13.27, 19.73]

Stress

-0.05

0.06

-0.81

.4177

[-0.17, 0.07]

Psychological Distress

-0.06

0.07

-0.85

.3979

[-0.20, -0.08]

Y = Safety Concern
(Person effect on Environment)b
Intercept

24.48

1.33

18.37

< .0001***

[21.84, 27.11]

Stress

-0.20

0.05

-3.98

.0001***

[-0.30, -0.10]

Psychological Distress

-0.07

0.06

-1.14

.2543

[-0.18, 0.05]

Y = Supervision
(Person effect on Environment)c
Intercept

27.11

2.15

12.59

< .0001***

[22.85, 31.37]

Stress

-0.02

0.08

-0.30

.7676

[-0.19, 0.14]

Psychological Distress

-0.09

0.09

-1.03

.3041

[-0.28, 0.09]

Y = Maintenance Errors
(Person effect on Behavior)d
Intercept

18.71

2.90

6.45

< .0001***

[12.97, 24.45]

Stress

0.39

0.11

3.55

.0005**

[0.17, 0.61]

Psychological Distress

0.38

0.12

3.01

.0031**

[0.13, 0.62]

Note. N = 134.
aR2 = .02, F(2, 131) = 1.21, p = .3015. bR2 = .16, F(2, 131) = 12.92, p < .0001. cR2 = .01, F(2, 131) =
0.87, p = .4223. dR2 = .22, F(2, 131) = 18.94, p < .0001.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The influence of person on safety concern. As reported in Table 4.8, the
overall regression model was significant, R2 = .16, F(2, 131) = 12.92, p < .0001.
Thus, the two Person variables collectively explained 16% of the variance in Safety
Concern scores. When each Person variable was examined individually, only Stress
was significant: Holding all other variables constant, for every 1-unit increase in
Stress scores, Safety Concern scores decreased on average by 0.20 units, B = -0.20,
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t(131) = -3.98, p = .0001. Thus, as participants’ feelings and consequences about
their stress and what contributes to it increased, participants’ perceptions that their
MRO has a strong concern for safety issues decreased.
The influence of person on supervision. As reported in Table 4.8, the overall
regression model was not significant, R2 = .01, F(2, 131) = 0.87, p = .4223. Thus,
the two Person variables collectively explained 1% of the variance in Supervision
scores, but this was not significant.
The influence of person on maintenance errors. As reported in Table 4.8,
the overall regression model was significant, R2 = .22, F(2, 131) = 18.94, p < .0001.
Thus, the two Person variables collectively explained 22% of the variance in Safety
Concern scores. When each Person variable was examined individually, both Stress
and Psychological Distress were significant. With respect to Stress, holding all
other variables constant, for every 1-unit increase in Stress scores, Maintenance
Error scores increased on average by 0.39 units, B = 0.39, t(131) = 3.55, p = .0005.
Thus, as participants’ feelings and consequences about their stress and what
contributes to it increased, their reflection on the extent to which they made
maintenance errors on the job (both self-detected and those identified by their
supervisors) also increased.
With respect to Psychological Distress, holding all other variables constant,
for every 1-unit increase in Psychological Distress scores, Maintenance Error
scores increased on average by 0.38 units, B = 0.38, t(131) = 3.01, p = .0031. Thus,
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as participants’ perceptions of psychological distress such as depression, anxiety,
social dysfunction, and psychosomatic symptoms increased, their reflection on the
extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both self-detected and
those identified by their supervisors) also increased.
Environment influences person and behavior: E  P and E  B. To
examine the influence of Environment on Person and Behavior, I conducted a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) via multiple regression with Stress,
Psychological Distress, and Maintenance Errors as the dependent variables, and
Recognition, Safety Concern, and Supervision as the independent variables. As
reported in Table 4.9, the overall MANOVA model was significant, Wilks’  = .75,
p < .0001, and the significance was with respect to only one Environment variable,
namely, Safety Concern, although Recognition was significant for  = .07, which is
slightly higher than the preset alpha level of  = .05. As a result, I conducted three
independent follow-up univariate F tests, one for each dependent variable.

Table 4 .9
MANOVA Summary of Environment’s Influence on Person and
Behavior (E  P and E  B)
Environment Factors

Eigenvalue

F

df

Recognition

.06

2.52

3, 128

Safety Concern

.23

9.68

3, 128

Supervision

.02

0.69

3, 128

Note. N = 134. Whole model Wilks Lambda = .75, p < .0001.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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p
.0608
< .0001***
.5731

Table 4 .10
Univariate Follow-ups of MANOVA Results for the Influence of Environment on
Person and Behavior (E  P and E  B)
Y = Stress
(Environment effect on Person)a
Environment Factors

B

SE

t(130)

p

95% CI
[33.25, 45.09]

Intercept

39.17

2.99

13.10

< .0001***

Recognition

-0.06

0.14

-0.43

.6708

[-0.35, 0.22]

Safety Concern

-0.76

0.15

-4.91

< .0001***

[-1.06, -0.45]

0.15

0.11

1.29

.1993

[-0.08, 0.37]

Supervision

Y = Psychological Distress
(Environment effect on Person)b
Intercept

19.48

2.80

6.96

Recognition

-0.06

0.14

-0.43

.6648

[-0.33, 0.21]

Safety Concern

-0.37

0.14

-2.59

.0107*

[-0.66, -0.09]

0.01

0.11

0.09

.9301

[-0.20, 0.22]

Supervision

< .0001***

[13.94, 25.02]

Y = Maintenance Errors
(Environment effect on Behavior)c
Intercept
Recognition
Safety Concern
Supervision

39.80

3.97

10.02

0.43

0.19

2.23

-0.80

0.21

-3.91

0.11

0.15

0.74

< .0001***
.0276*

[31.94, 47.65]
[0.05, 0.81]

.0001***

[-1.21, -0.40]

.4585

[-0.19, 0.41]

Note. N = 134.
aR2 = .17, F(3, 130) = 8.70, p < .0001. bR2 = .07, F(3, 130) = 3.02, p = .0321. cR2 = .12, F(3, 130) =
6.13, p = .0006.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The influence of environment on stress. As reported in Table 4.10, the
overall regression model was significant, R2 = .17, F(3, 130) = 8.70, p < .0001.
Thus, the three Environment variables collectively explained 17% of the variance
in Stress scores. The only significant factor, though, was Safety Concern: Holding
all other variables constant, for every 1-unit increase in Safety Concern scores,
Stress scores decreased on average by .76 points, B = -0.76, t(130) = -4.91, p <
.0001. Thus, as participants’ perceptions that their MRO has a strong concern for
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safety issues increased, their feelings and consequences about their stress and what
contributes to it decreased.
The influence of environment on psychological stress. As reported in Table
4.10, the overall regression model was significant, R2 = .07, F(3, 130) = 3.02, p =
.0321. Thus, the three Environment variables collectively explained 7% of the
variance in Stress scores. Similar to the previous effect, the only significant factor,
was Safety Concern: Holding all other variables constant, for every 1-unit increase
in Safety Concern scores, Psychological Distress scores decreased on average by
.37 points, B = -0.37, t(130) = -2.59, p = .0107. Thus, as participants’ perceptions
that their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues increased, their perceptions of
psychological distress such as depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and
psychosomatic symptoms decreased.
The influence of environment on behavior. As reported in Table 4.10, the
overall regression model was significant, R2 = .12, F(3, 130) = 6.13, p = .0006.
Thus, the three Environment variables collectively explained 12% of the variance
in Maintenance Error scores. Two of the three Environment variables were
significant, namely, Recognition and Safety Concern. With respect to Recognition,
holding all other variables constant, for every 1-unit increase in Recognition scores,
Maintenance Error scores increased on average by .43 points, B = 0.43, t(130) =
2.23, p = .0276. Thus, as participants’ perceptions of the extent to which they felt
rewarded or recognized for doing good work increased, their reflection on the

117

extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both self-detected and
those identified by their supervisors) also increased.
With respect to Safety Concern, holding all other variables constant, for
every 1-unit increase in Safety Concern scores, Maintenance Error scores decreased
on average by .80 points, B = -0.80, t(130) = -3.91, p = .0001. Thus, as participants’
perceptions that their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues increased, their
reflection on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both
self-detected and those identified by their supervisors) decreased.
Behavior influences person and environment: B  P and B  E. To
examine the influence of Behavior on Person and Environment, I conducted a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) via multiple regression with Stress,
Psychological Distress, Recognition, Safety Concern, and Supervision as the
dependent variables, and Maintenance Errors as the independent variable. The
overall model was significant, F(5, 128) = 10.39, p < .0001, Eigenvalue = .41. As a
result, I conducted five independent follow-up univariate F tests, one for each
dependent variable.
The influence of behavior on stress. As reported in Table 4.11, the overall
regression model was significant, R2 = .17, F(1, 132) = 27.14, p < .0001. Thus,
Maintenance Error scores explained 17% of the variance in Stress scores: Holding
all other variables constant, for every 1-unit increase in Maintenance Error scores,
Stress scores increased on average by .32 points, B = 0.32, t(132) = 5.21, p < .0001.
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Table 4 .11
Univariate Follow-ups of MANOVA Results for the Influence of Behavior on Person
and Environment (B  P and B  E)
Y = Stress
(Behavior effect on Person)a
Person Factors
Intercept
Maintenance Errors

B

SE

t(132)

p

95% CI

17.43

2.17

8.05

< .0001***

[13.14, 21.71]

0.32

0.06

5.21

< .0001***

[0.20, 0.44]

Y = Psychological Distress
(Behavior effect on Person)b
Intercept

3.07

1.94

1.58

.1159

[-0.77, 6.90]

Maintenance Errors

0.26

0.05

4.82

< .0001***

[0.16, 0.37]

Y = Recognition
(Behavior effect on Environment)c
Intercept
Maintenance Errors

11.93

1.52

7.84

< .0001***

[8.92, 14.95]

0.07

0.04

1.63

.1064

[-0.02, 0.16]

Y = Safety Concern
(Behavior effect on Environment)d
Intercept

21.87

1.32

16.62

< .0001***

[19.26, 24.47]

Maintenance Errors

-0.11

0.04

-3.05

.0027**

[-0.18, -0.04]

Y = Supervision
(Behavior effect on Environment)e
Intercept
Maintenance Errors

24.39

2.02

12.07

0.03

0.06

0.44

< .0001***
.6604

[20.40, 28.39]
[-0.09, 0.14]

Note. N = 134.
aR2 = .17, F(1, 132) = 27.14, p < .0001. bR2 = .15, F(1, 132) = 23.24, p < .0001. cR2 = .02, F(1, 132) =
2.64, p = .1064. dR2 = .07, F(1, 132) = 9.33, p = .0027. eR2 = .001, F(1, 132) = 0.19, p = .6604.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Thus, as participants’ reflection on the extent to which they made maintenance
errors on the job (both self-detected and those identified by their supervisors)
increased, their feelings and consequences about their stress and what contributes
to it increased.
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The influence of behavior on psychological distress. As reported in Table
4.11, the overall regression model was significant, R2 = .15, F(1, 132) = 23.24, p <
.0001. Thus, Maintenance Error scores explained 15% of the variance in
Psychological Distress scores: Holding all other variables constant, for every 1-unit
increase in Maintenance Error scores, Psychological Distress scores increased on
average by .26 points, B = 0.26, t(132) = 4.82, p < .0001. Thus, as participants’
reflection on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both
self-detected and those identified by their supervisors) increased, their perceptions
of psychological distress such as depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and
psychosomatic symptoms increased.
The influence of behavior on recognition. As reported in Table 4.11, the
overall regression model was not significant, R2 = .02, F(1, 132) = 2.64, p = .1064.
Thus, Maintenance Error scores explained 2% of the variance in Recognition
scores, but this was not significant.
The influence of behavior on safety concern. As reported in Table 4.11, the
overall regression model was significant, R2 = .07, F(1, 132) = 9.33, p < .0027.
Thus, Maintenance Error scores explained 7% of the variance in Safety Concern
scores: Holding all other variables constant, for every 1-unit increase in
Maintenance Error scores, Safety Concern scores decreased on average by .11
points, B = -0.11, t(132) = -3.05, p < .0027. Thus, as participants’ reflection on the
extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both self-detected and

120

those identified by their supervisors) increased, their perceptions that their MRO
has a strong concern for safety issues decreased.
The influence of behavior on supervision. As reported in Table 4.11, the
overall regression model was not significant, R2 = .001, F(1, 132) = 0.19, p =
.6604. Thus, Maintenance Error scores explained less than 1% of the variance in
Supervision scores, and this was not significant.
Summary of primary analysis 2. Figure 4.5 contains a summary of the
significant relationships among Person, Behavior, and Environment relative to
Bandura’s (1997) reciprocal causation model. A brief overview follows.
The influence of person. As illustrated in Figure 4.5, the Person dimension
(Stress and Psychological Distress) had a significant effect on both the
Environment and Behavior dimensions. With respect to Environment, Stress
influenced only Safety Concern. With respect to Behavior, both Stress and
Psychological Distress influenced Maintenance Errors.
The influence of environment. As illustrated in Figure 4.5, the Environment
dimension had a significant effect on both Person and Behavior. More specifically,
Safety Concern influenced both Person variables (Stress and Psychological
Distress) as well as Maintenance Errors. Recognition, however, only influenced
Maintenance Errors; it had no influence on Person. The third Environment variable,
Supervision, had no influence on either Person or Behavior.
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Figure 4.5. Summary of findings from testing the current study’s data against Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model.

The influence of behavior. As illustrated in Figure 4.5, the Behavior
dimension had a significant effect on Person and a limited effect on Environment.
More specifically, Maintenance Errors influenced both Person variables (Stress,
Distress), and only one Environment variable (Safety Concern). It had no influence
on the other two Environment variables (Recognition and Supervision). These
relationships will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
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Exploratory analysis. Given the seminal nature of the current study, I also
conducted an exploratory analysis using stepwise regression to provide additional
insight into the relationship among the targeted variables and maintenance errors.
This analysis was independent of the study’s research questions and corresponding
hypotheses. The stepwise regression was based on the forward addition method
with a p-to-enter value of .15. It also treated Maintenance Errors as the dependent
variable and included four Safety Climate factors (Recognition, Safety Concern,
Supervision, and Training) the two Psychological Strain factors (Stress and
Psychological Distress), and the demographic variables (Age and Total Years
Experience). As reported in Table 4.12, the overall results of the stepwise analysis
were significant, R2 = .38, F(8, 125) = 9.67, p < .0001. The eight factors
collectively explained 38% of the variance in Maintenance Error scores.
Furthermore, each factor in the model also was significant.
Similar to the findings from Primary Analysis 2, the results from the
stepwise analysis essentially confirmed that (a) Recognition, Stress, and
Psychological Distress each had a positive significant relationship with
Maintenance Errors; and (b) Safety Concern had a significant negative relationship
with Maintenance Errors. The stepwise analysis also provided the following new
information:
• Supervision had a significant positive relationship with Maintenance
errors. Holding all other variables constant, for each 1-unit increase in
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Table 4 .12
Summary of Stepwise Regression Relative to Maintenance Errors As the Dependent Variable
Term

B

SE

35.03

6.58

5.33

< .0001***

95% CI
[22.02, 48.04]

0.48

0.17

2.85

.0051**

[0.15, 0.81]

-0.46

0.19

-2.41

.0174*

[-0.85, -0.08]

0.28

0.14

1.99

.0484*

[0.002, 0.57]

-0.76

0.23

-3.29

.0013**

[-1.21, -0.30]

Stress

0.26

0.11

2.33

.0213*

[0.04, 0.47]

Psychological Distressa

0.29

0.12

2.41

.0172*

[0.05, 0.52]

-0.16

0.07

-2.25

.0259*

[-0.30, -0.02]

0.25

0.08

3.05

.0028**

[0.09, 0.41]

Intercept
Recognitiona
a

Safety Concern
b

Supervision
b

Training
a

Ageb
Total Years Experience Overallb

t(125)

p

Note. N = 134. The analysis was performed using stepwise regression (forward addition method with a p-toenter value of .15.). Final model results: R2 = .38, F(8, 125) = 9.67, p < .0001.
aResults consistent with the findings from Primary Analysis 2. bResults reflect new information uncovered by
the exploratory analysis.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Supervision scores, Maintenance Error scores increased on average by .28
units, B = 0.28, t(125) = 1.99, p = .0484. Thus, as participants’
perceptions of their supervisor’s expertise and the extent to which their
supervisor assisted them improved, participants’ reflection on the extent
to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both self-detected and
those identified by their supervisors) increased.
• Training had a significant negative relationship with Maintenance errors.
Holding all other variables constant, for each 1-unit increase in Training
scores, Maintenance Error scores decreased on average by .76 units, B =
-0.76, t(125) = -3.29, p = .0013. Thus, as participants’ perceptions related
to their training, including if it was adequate for their job, if they were
encouraged to enhance their training, and whether there were
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opportunities for on-the-job training increased, their reflection on the
extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both selfdetected and those identified by their supervisors) decreased.
• Age had a significant negative relationship with Maintenance Errors.
Holding all other variables constant, for each 1-year increase in age,
Maintenance Error scores decreased on average by .16 units, B = -0.16,
t(125) = -2.25, p = .0259. Thus, as participants got older, their reflection
on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job (both
self-detected and those identified by their supervisors) decreased.
• Total overall years experience working at an MRO had a significant
positive relationship with Maintenance errors. Holding all other variables
constant, for each 1-unit increase in Years Experience, Maintenance Error
scores increased on average by .25 units, B = 0.25, t(125) = 3.05, p =
.0028. Thus, as employees gained more experience working at an MRO,
their reflection on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on
the job (both self-detected and those identified by their supervisors)
increased.
These findings will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
Results of Hypotheses Testing
The research questions and the corresponding research hypotheses of the
current study were stated in Chapter 1. These research hypotheses are restated here
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in null form for testing purposes. The decision to reject or fail to reject a null
hypothesis and a discussion of the decisions made with respect to each follows.
Null hypothesis 1a: There is no significant difference between the
current study’s sample data and Fogarty’s (2005) model. As illustrated in
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b, the sample data did not fit Fogarty’s model, 2(19) = 84.27,
p = .000, and therefore this hypothesis was rejected. As a result of this rejection, a
different model was fitted to the data as illustrated in Figures 4.4a and 4.4b.
Null hypothesis 1b. Psychological strain will not significantly mediate
the effect of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors relative to Fogarty’s
(2005) model. Working from the revised model of Figures 4.4a and 4.4b,
Psychological Strain mediated the effect of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors.
However, this effect was not significant and the Safety Climate construct was
defined by only two of Fogarty’s (2005) subscales, namely, Recognition and
Supervision. Therefore, this hypothesis was not rejected.
Null hypothesis 2a. The Person dimension will not significantly
influence the Environment and Behavior dimensions relative to Bandura’s
(1977) model. As reported in Table 4.8 and illustrated in Figure 4.5, Person (Stress
and Distress) significantly influenced Environment (Safety Concern) and Behavior
(Maintenance Errors). As a result, this hypothesis was rejected.
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Null hypothesis 2b. The Environment dimension will not significantly
influence the Person and Behavior dimensions relative to Bandura’s (1977)
model. As reported in Table 4.10 and illustrated in Figure 4.5, Environment (Safety
Concern) significantly influenced Person (Stress and Distress) and Behavior
(Maintenance Errors). Environment (Recognition) also influenced Behavior
(Maintenance Errors). As a result, this hypothesis was rejected.
Null hypothesis 2c. The Behavior dimension will not significantly
influence the Person and Environment dimensions relative to Bandura’s
(1977) model. As reported in Table 4.11 and illustrated in Figure 4.5, Behavior
(Maintenance Errors) significantly influenced Environment (Safety Concern) and
Person (Stress and Psychological Distress). As a result, this hypothesis was
rejected.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion, Implications and Recommendations
Summary of Study
The primary purpose of the current study was two-fold: (a) to replicate
Fogarty (2005) by determining if the current study’s data were consistent with
Fogarty’s model involving the three constructs of Safety Climate, Psychological
Strain, and Maintenance Errors; and (b) to examine the extent to which the sample
data supported Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model involving the three
dimensions of Environment, Person, and Behavior, which corresponded to
Fogarty’s three constructs, respectively. Scores from the Recognition, Safety
Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training subscales of Fogarty’s Maintenance
Environment Survey (MES) were used to measure Safety Climate/Environment.
Scores from the Stress subscale of Fogarty’s MES and scores from Goldberg and
Williams’ (1988) General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) were used to measure
Psychological Strain/Person. Scores from Fogarty’s Maintenance Error subscale
were used to measure Maintenance Errors/Behavior, which was the dependent
variable.
The study used an explanatory correlational design to determine if sample
data fit Fogarty’s (2005) hypothesized causal model. This design was appropriate
because the study involved a single group (U.S. based civilian MRO workers) and
multiple measures collected from this group. In quantitative terms this design helps

128

to examine both the nature of the relationship and the degree of the relationship
between/among variables.
The target population consisted of 200 maintenance, repair, and overhaul
(MOR) facilities in the United States that perform base, engine, component,
corporate, and line maintenance. The accessible population consisted of one
national MRO and other smaller MRO facilities in the U.S. The national MRO has
multiple repair stations with major maintenance facilities across the U.S. and
provides world-class maintenance, repair, and overhaul services for private
business, narrow body, and regional transport jets. The smaller MROs have
multiple locations and are certified repair stations with Airframe classes 1, 3, and 4
ratings and offer maintenance services for private business jets. They also provide
airframe and engine inspection and maintenance, avionics and instrumentation,
overhaul and repair, painting services, interior completion, and retrofits for the
cabin, cockpit, and systems. A convenience sample of N =188 volunteers across
these MROs accessed the questionnaire, but only N =134 completed all the study’s
protocols.
The primary data collection instrument was the researcher prepared
Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS) and consisted of three
sections. Section A comprised Fogarty’s 48-item Maintenance Environment Survey
(MES). Section B comprised Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) 12-item General
Health Questionnaire (GHQ). Section C comprised a set of questions related to
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participants’ demographics and maintenance experiences. Based on sample data,
the reliability coefficients of the MES and GHQ using Cronbach’s alpha were  =
.84 and .78, respectively. The various subscales of the MES also had Cronbach
alphas that ranged from  = .68 to .85 as summarized in Table 3.6 (Chapter 3).
The AMSCS was administered as a web-based questionnaire hosted online by
Fluid Surveys and distributed via a link to the targeted MROs by email. Data
collection occurred over a 4-month period ending October 24, 2016.
Summary of Findings
As noted earlier, complete data were collected from N = 134 participants.
Working with this dataset, two primary statistical strategies were performed:
structural equation modeling (SEM), which was used to test Fogarty’s (2005)
causal model, and multiple regression analysis, which was used to test Bandura’s
(1977) reciprocal causation model. Independent of these two primary analyses, an
exploratory analysis using stepwise regression was conducted to provide additional
insight among the relationships of the targeted variables. Prior to performing these
analyses, the dataset underwent several preliminary data screening measures,
including outliers and missing data analysis, and checking to confirm that the data
were compliant with structural equation modeling and multiple regression
assumptions. A brief summary of the findings and the results of the corresponding
hypothesis testing on those findings are summarized in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1
Summary of the Results of Hypothesis Testing
Null Hypothesis

Decision

H1a. There is no significant difference between the current study’s sample data
and Fogarty’s (2005) model.

Reject

H1b. Psychological strain will not significantly mediate the effect of Safety
Climate on Maintenance Errors relative to Fogarty’s (2005) model.

Fail to
Reject

H2a. The Person dimension will not significantly influence the Environment and
Behavior dimensions relative to Bandura’s (1977) model.

Reject

H2b. The Environment dimension will not significantly influence the Person and
Behavior dimensions relative to Bandura’s (1977) model.

Reject

H2c. The Behavior dimension will not significantly influence the Person and
Environment dimensions relative to Bandura’s (1977) model.

Reject

Primary analysis 1: Testing Fogarty’s (2005) model. The first primary
analysis was used to examine how closely the sample fit Fogarty’s model. The
initial model was rejected, which means the data did not adequately fit the model.
This then led to several model revisions, including eliminating some of the Safety
Climate subscales, until an adequate fit was achieved and the corresponding fit
indices were acceptable. The final model as presented in Figure 4.4 was different
from Fogarty’s model in the following manner: (a) the Safety Climate construct
was defined by only two of Fogarty’s five subscales, namely, Recognition and
Supervision; (b) the Errors construct was eliminated; and (c) although Safety
Climate’s influence on Maintenance Errors was mediated by Psychological Strain,
this mediation effect was not significant.
The final model that emerged predicted 1% of the variance in Psychological
Strain. There also was a direct negative relationship between Psychological Strain
and Safety Climate, which implies that as Safety Climate improved Psychological
131

Strain decreased. Lastly, the relationship between Safety Climate and Maintenance
Errors was fully mediated by Psychological Strain, but this indirect relationship
was not significant.
Primary analysis 2: Testing Bandura’s (1977) model. The second
primary analysis tested Bandura’s reciprocal causation model by examining the
influence each dimension had on the other two. Bandura’s model was tested by
performing three MANOVAs using multiple regression. The results of these
analyses supported Bandura’s model.
In the context of the current study the following results were obtained: (a)
The Person dimension influenced Environment via a negative relationship between
Stress and Safety Concern. Person also influenced Behavior via a positive
relationship with Maintenance Errors. (b) The Environment dimension influenced
Person via a negative relationship with both Stress and Psychological Distress.
Environment also influenced Behavior via a positive relationship between
Recognition and Maintenance Errors, and a negative relationship between Safety
Concern and Maintenance Errors. (c) The Behavior dimension influenced Person
via a positive relationship between Maintenance Errors and both Stress and
Psychological Distress. Behavior also influenced Environment via Maintenance
Errors and Safety Concern. Thus, Bandura’s (1977) concept of reciprocal causation
among the three dimensions of Person, Environment, and Behavior was supported
in the current study.
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Exploratory analysis. The third analysis used stepwise regression to get
additional insight into the relationship between the targeted variables and
Maintenance Errors. This analysis included (a) the demographic variables of age
and total years overall MRO experience, (b) four of the five Safety Climate
subscales (Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision, and Training), and (c) both
Psychological Strain variables (Stress and Psychological Distress). The Safety
Climate factor of Feedback and all of the other demographic variables (gender,
marital status, years experience at current MRO, English as primary language,
education level, and race/ethnicity) were not included in this analysis because they
were not compliant with one of the regression assumptions.
All of the factors in the final model were significant. Furthermore, the
results involving the Safety Climate factors of Recognition and Safety Concern,
and the two Psychological Strain variables of Stress and Psychological Distress
were consistent the findings from testing Bandura’s (1977) model. The results also
uncovered four new relationships: (a) Supervision and total years overall MRO
experience each had a positive relationship with Maintenance Errors, and (b)
Training and age each had a negative relationship with Maintenance Errors.
Conclusions and Inferences
In this section, I review the study’s findings relative to the research
questions given in Chapter 1. A separate discussion for each research question and
a summary of the corresponding findings and inferences are provided.
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Research question 1. What is the relationship between the current
study’s sample data and Fogarty’s (2005) model (Figure 1.2)? This research
question was examined via hypothesis testing from two perspectives: The first was
relative to model fit and the second was relative to mediation (see Table 5.1). A
discussion of each follows.
Model fit. As discussed in Chapter 4, the current study’s data did not fit
Fogarty’s (2005) causal model. Fogarty’s Safety Climate construct was measured
by five factors: Recognition, Safety Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training.
The study’s results showed that Safety Concern, Feedback, and Training were not
significant predictors of Safety Climate and a better improvement in model fit was
obtained when these three factors were eliminated from the model.
One plausible explanation for the lack of model fit is that Fogarty (2005)
included these three factors even though their reported reliability coefficients were
less than  = .70. The reported reliability coefficients for Safety Concern,
Feedback, and Training were  = .36, .51, and .60, respectively. In the current
study Training was eliminated because it had a low reliability coefficient ( = .60).
Feedback was targeted for elimination because it failed the correct specification of
the IV assumption, which is relevant to multiple regression. Because SEM is based
partially on multiple regression, eliminating this factor was appropriate and it did
indeed improve the model fit. This left Recognition and Safety Concern, both of
which had reliability coefficients less than  = .70. Of the two, a better model fit
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was with Recognition. As a result, if Fogarty (2005) did not include the three
factors of Safety Concern, Feedback, and Training, it is conceivable that current
study’s data might have fit his model.
A second plausible explanation is that Fogarty’s (2005) model was
validated using data acquired from Australian army helicopter maintenance
workers. Fogarty acknowledged this as a limitation to his findings and reported
“Maintenance engineers working in this setting face some challenges (e.g.,
demands of military duties) that are not faced by those working in commercial
settings” (p. 61). Because the current study’s data were acquired from maintenance
workers at U.S. civilian based MROs that maintain private business, narrow body,
and regional transport jets, it is conceivable that this difference in research setting
and conditions could explain why the current study’s data was not consistent with
Fogarty’s model.
A third plausible explanation is sample size and sample composition.
Fogarty’s model was validated from two different studies that consisted of an
aggregate sample of N = 390 participants with a mean age of M = 29.5 years old.
The current study, however, was limited to a sample size of N = 134 with a mean
age of M = 43.2 years old. As a result, these two factors alone also could explain
why the current study’s data did not fit Fogarty’s model.
Mediation. As discussed in Chapter 4, Fogarty’s (2005) model confirmed
that Psychological Strain, as measured by Stress and Psychological Distress,
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significantly mediated the effect between Safety Climate and Maintenance Errors.
The current study’s data also found this mediating effect, but it was not statistically
significant.
One plausible explanation for this inconsistency is that Fogarty’s (2005)
Safety Climate construct was measured by five factors (Recognition, Safety
Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training). Furthermore, as presented earlier,
three of these factors also had inadequate reliability coefficients. Because the
current study measured this construct by only Recognition and Supervision, it is
conceivable that Psychological Strain was unable to significantly mediate these two
factors’ effect on Maintenance Errors. This can be confirmed by the
intercorrelations given in Table 4.5. The reader will note there were significant
relationships between the two Psychological Strain variables (i.e., the mediators)
and Maintenance Errors. However, there were no significant relationships between
the two Safety Climate variables and Maintenance Errors, which imply there was
no effect to mediate. The reader also will note that Safety Concern and Training,
two of the factors that were eliminated in the current study, had a significant
relationship with Maintenance Errors and therefore these effects could have been
mediated if they were included in the current study’s model. Conversely, it also is
plausible that if Fogarty did not include these two variables in his model, he too
might not have found a significant mediation effect.
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Two other plausible explanations are related to the research setting
(Australian military vs. U.S. civilian MROs) and sample size and sample
composition. Both were discussed in the foregoing paragraphs.
Research question 2. What is the relationship between the current
study’s sample data and Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model (Figure
1.1)? This research question was examined via hypothesis testing from three
perspectives: (a) the influence of the Person dimension on the Environment and
Behavior dimensions, (b) the influence of Environment on Person and Behavior,
and (c) the influence of Behavior on Person and Environment (see Table 5.1). A
discussion of each follows.
Influences of person. As summarized in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.5 in
Chapter 4, the Person dimension, which consisted of Stress and Psychological
Distress, had a significant influence on Environment, but this was restricted to
Stress and Safety Concern. This influence was negative, which implies that as
MRO workers’ feelings and consequences about their stress and what contributes to
it increase, their perceptions that their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues
decrease. This finding is plausible because as workers’ stress levels increase, it is
conceivable that their judgment becomes impaired. This in turn can give workers
the false impression, for example, that their work schedule is overbearing and/or
their equipment is inadequate, all of which could lead to an unfavorable or
inaccurate assessment of their organization’s concern for safety.
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The influence of Person on Behavior was related to both Person variables.
Stress and Psychological Distress each had a significant positive relationship on
Maintenance Errors. This implies that as MRO workers’ feelings and consequences
about their stress and what contributes to it increase, their reflection on the extent to
which they made maintenance errors on the job also increase. Similarly, as MRO
workers’ perceptions of their psychological distress (depression, anxiety, social
dysfunction, and psychosomatic symptoms) increase, their reflection on the extent
to which they made maintenance errors on the job also increases. These findings
are plausible because as observed in the foregoing paragraph increased levels in
stress/distress can impair judgment, which could lead to errors. This relationship
was posited in Higbee’s (2002) at-risk behavioral model: Workers under high
levels of stress/distress could feel rushed, frustrated, fatigued, or complacent—all
of which could lead to workplace errors such as eyes or mind not on task—
enabling small errors to become major errors.
Influences of environment. As summarized in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.5 in
Chapter 4, the Environment dimension, which consisted of Recognition, Safety
Concern, and Supervision, had a significant influence on Person, but this was
restricted to Safety Concern and Stress, and Safety Concern and Psychological
Distress. Both influences were negative. This implies that as workers’ perceptions
that their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues increase, workers’ feelings
and consequences about their stress and what contributes to it as well as their
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psychological distress (depression, anxiety, social dysfunction, and psychosomatic
symptoms) decrease. This finding makes sense because if workers feel that their
organization regards safety as being vital to their environment, which effectively
translates to workers’ perception that management is concerned for their safety, this
could help reduce workers’ stress/distress levels.
The influence of Environment on Behavior was related to Recognition and
Safety Concern. More specifically, as MRO workers’ perceptions that they are
rewarded or recognized for doing good work increase, their reflection on the extent
to which they made maintenance errors on the job also increases. This finding is
counterintuitive because one would think that recognition for doing good work
would lead to a more positive attitude toward the job, which would then translate to
fewer errors. Nevertheless, a plausible explanation for this finding is that being
recognized for good work could lead to being overconfident and a false sense of
competence. This in turn has the potential for creating more errors.
On the other hand, as workers’ perceptions that their MRO has a strong
concern for safety issues increase, workers’ reflection on the extent to which they
made maintenance errors on the job decreases. This finding also is plausible
because as explained above, workers who feel that management is concerned for
their safety would have lower levels of stress/distress, which could thenlead to
fewer errors.
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Influences of Behavior. As summarized in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.5 in
Chapter 4, the Behavior dimension, which consisted of Maintenance Errors, had a
significant positive influence on both Person factors. This implies that as workers’
reflection on the extent to which they made maintenance errors on the job
increases, their Stress and Psychological Distress also increase. This finding is
logical because the more errors a person commits on the job, the more likely that
person is going to be flagged for safety violations, placed on suspension, have a
reduction in salary, or even laid off. All of these consequences of increased errors
can be troubling and lead to an increase in a person’s level of stress/distress.
The influence of Behavior on Environment was related to Safety Concern
and it reflected a negative relationship: as MRO workers’ reflection on the extent to
which they made maintenance errors on the job increases, workers’ perceptions that
their MRO has a strong concern for safety issues decrease. A plausible explanation
for this finding is related to the concept of locus of control. It is generally agreed
that most humans have an external locus of control relative to situations in which
errors have been committed. Thus, in the current context, it is conceivable that as
workers commit more errors the more likely they are to blame external sources
such as management rather than accept personal responsibility. For example,
workers might be inclined to believe that management does a poor job maintaining
a safe environment such as providing proper equipment or articulating proper
operating procedures.
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Implications
The implications of the current study’s results are discussed in this section,
which is organized into three distinct parts: the implications of the results relative
to theoretical foundations, the implications of the results relative to past studies,
and the implications for practice.
Implications relative to theory. The current study was grounded in two
models: Fogarty’s (2005) hypothesized causal model and Bandura’s (1977)
reciprocal causation model.
Fogarty’s (2005) model. The current study’s findings did not support
Fogarty’s model in two ways. First, the Safety Climate construct was defined in the
current study by only two variables instead of the five that Fogarty posited. Second,
the current study did support Fogarty’s claim that Psychological Strain mediates the
impact of Safety Climate on Maintenance Errors. Nevertheless, the results of this
study build on Fogarty’s model and the related research because it now offers a
different model that was grounded in U.S. based civilian MROs that maintain
private business, narrow body, and regional transport jets instead of Australian
military helicopter MROs, which was the focus of Fogarty’s study.
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. The current study’s findings
supported Bandura’s reciprocal causation model, which posits that each of the three
dimensions, Person, Environment, and Behavior, influences the other two to form
reciprocal relationships between any two dimensions. The current study found
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significant reciprocal relationships between (a) Person (Stress) and Environment
(Safety Concern), (b) Person (Stress and Psychological Distress) and Behavior
(Maintenance Errors), and (c) Environment (Safety Concern) and Behavior
(Maintenance Errors). These findings build on Bandura’s model because they
demonstrate that the model provides support in understanding the relationship
among the three dimensions in an MRO context. More specifically, based on the
study’s data, the model suggests that (a) Stress and Safety Concern both influence
Maintenance Errors, and vice versa, and (b) Stress and Safety Concern influence
each other in both directions.
Implications relative to prior research. The current study was based on
prior research involving studies conducted in both non-aviation contexts such as the
nuclear power, building construction, and coal mining industries, and aviation
contexts. Following is a brief overview of the prior research and how the findings
of the current study compare to those reported in the literature.
Nuclear power industry. As reported in Chapter 2, Morrow et al. (2014)
examined the safety culture of nuclear power plants in the United States. However,
based on the distinction given between safety culture vs. safety climate, Morrow et
al’s study actually examined safety climate. Morrow et al. examined the
relationship between nine factors and safety performance. These factors were (a)
management’s commitment to safety, (b) willingness to raise safety concerns, (c)
decision making, (d) supervisory responsibility for safety, (e) questioning attitude,
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(f) safety communication, (g) personal responsibility for safety, (h) prioritizing
safety, and (i) training quality. In the context of the current study, these nine factors
collectively corresponded to the five Safety Climate variables (Recognition, Safety
Concern, Supervision, Feedback, and Training), and safety performance
corresponded to Maintenance Errors. Morrow et al. Reported that these safety
climate factors accounted for 7% to 21% of the variance in the targeted safety
performance measures. To compare the current study’s results, a separate multiple
regression analysis was performed in which Maintenance Errors was regressed on
the five Safety Climate variables. This analysis showed that 21.6% of the variance
in Maintenance Errors was explained by the Safety Climate factors, which is
similar to what was reported by Morrow et el. Furthermore, as reported in Table
4.12 (Chapter 4), the results of the exploratory study, which included the
Psychological Strain variables, yielded an overall R2 of .38, which indicates that
38% of the variance in Maintenance Errors was explained by Safety Climate and
Psychological Strain. These results also are consistent with those of Morrow et al.
who reported that all of their safety culture factors accounted for 23–52% of the
variance in performance. As a result, it appears that the relationship between safety
climate and performance is similar in both the nuclear power industry and aviation
MROs. This consistency is plausible because both environments are high reliability
industries.
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Building construction industry. As reported in Chapter 2, Jin and Chen
(2013) measured the effectiveness of a safety program of a regional general
contractor in the U.S. building construction industry from the perspective of
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. Similar to the current study, Jin and
Chen’s Person dimension represented employees’ perceptions and attitudes about
safety. However, unlike the current study, Jin and Chen’s Environment and
Behavior dimensions were examined from a qualitative research perspective and
therefore the results from the current study relative to these two dimensions cannot
be compared to Jin and Chen. Furthermore, because Jin and Chen reported
frequencies related to the Person dimension, comparisons of the current study
relative to this dimension are limited. Jin and Chen reported that more than 50% of
the participants had a positive view of the company’s safety program and there was
increased safety accountability among the participants. This finding equates to the
Safety Concern factor of the current study. As reported in Table 4.2 (Chapter 4),
the overall mean of participants’ perceptions that their MRO has a strong concern
for safety issues was 3 points higher than the midrange, which indicates
participants’ overall perceptions of their MRO’s concern for safety was positive.
This result is consistent with what was reported by Jin and Chen. Thus, from this
perspective, the results of the two studies are consistent.
Coal mining industry. As reported in Chapter 2, Cui et al. (2013) examined
the safety culture of China’s coal mining industry. Their study was grounded in
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both Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model and Geller’s (2001) total safety
culture triad. Cui et al. hypothesized that human interactions (the Person
dimension) played a mediating role between Environment and Behavior. This
hypothesized mediation relationship is similar to Fogarty’s (2005) causal model,
which was tested in the current study. Cui et al. reported that employees’ beliefs
toward safety was fully mediated by management’s commitment to safety, and “...
management commitment to safety on employee safety-specific behavior and
employee safety involvement were fully mediated by employees’ beliefs toward
safety” (p. 42). The findings of the current study were inconsistent with those
reported by Cui et al. For example, the current study found no significant mediation
effects, and unlike Cui et al.’s SEM model, the current study found no significant
paths other than those that were related to unexplained variances. Plausible
explanations for these inconsistent findings are geographic location (U.S. vs.
China) and type of industry (aviation MROs vs. coal mining).
Fogarty (2004, 2005). As reported in Chapter 2 as well as throughout this
dissertation, the current study was a replication of Fogarty (2005) who examined
the safety climate of Australian military helicopter MROs. In his first study,
Fogarty (2004) reported that safety climate influenced psychological health, and
that as safety climate improved, psychological health also improved. Fogarty also
reported that the major predictor of maintenance errors was psychological health,
which accounted for 30% of the variance in errors. The findings of the current
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study were consistent Fogarty (2004). As demonstrated in Figure 4.5 (Chapter 4),
as safety climate via workers’ perception of Safety Concern improved, so did their
psychological health: both Stress and Psychological Distress decreased. The current
study also found that psychological health accounted for the most variance in
maintenance errors.
With respect to Fogarty’s (2005) follow-up study, though, which focused
primarily on the impact of the psychological health construct, the current study’s
findings were inconsistent with those of Fogarty. The current study’s data did not
fit Fogarty’s model, and the current study did not find psychological health to be a
significant mediator between safety climate and errors. Plausible explanations for
these inconsistent findings are related to sample size and setting. Unlike Fogarty,
the current study’s sample size of N = 134 was inadequate for SEM analysis, and
the setting of the current study was U.S. based civilian MROs as opposed
Australian military MROs. The types of MROs also were different; Fogarty’s focus
was helicopter mechanics whereas the current study’s focus was fixed-wing aircraft
MROs.
Implications relative to practice. The primary implication of the current
study’s findings relative to practice is the relationship between psychological health
and maintenance errors. In each of the different analyses (SEM, multiple
regression, and stepwise regression), the two psychological health-related variables
of stress and distress each had a positive influence on maintenance errors. Although
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participants simply reflected on the extent to which they made maintenance errors
and did not specify the actual number of errors they committed, the findings imply
that workers’ psychological health can negatively impact maintenance errors: as
stress/distress increases, so too do maintenance errors. Thus, workers who feel
stressed out, depressed, or anxious, could manifest these feelings via an increase in
maintenance errors.
A second implication of the current study’s findings is related to safety
concern and maintenance errors. The study found that as workers’ perceptions of
their MRO’s concern for safety issues improved, their reflection on the extent to
which they made maintenance errors decreased. Once again, although participants’
did not specify the actual number of errors they committed, this finding implies that
the number of maintenance errors could decrease if management were to improve
workers’ perceptions of the organization’s overall concern for safety.
A third implication is related to Recognition and Maintenance Errors. The
current study found that workers’ perceptions of being rewarded or recognized for
doing good work had a positive relationship with maintenance errors. This implies
that employee reward/recognition programs have the opposite effect of their
intention. It appears that by recognizing and/or rewarding employees for good job
performance does not have the desired effect of reducing errors but instead actually
results in an increase in errors.

147

A fourth implication is related to Safety Concern and Psychological Health.
The current study found workers’ perceptions of their MRO’s concern for safety
issues were inversely related to worker’s stress and distress. This implies that if
management were to improve workers’ perceptions of the organization’s overall
concern for safety, this could decrease workers’ feelings of stress, depression, or
anxiety, which could lead to a decline in maintenance errors.
A fifth implication of the study’s findings is related to the inverse
relationship between Training and Maintenance Errors, which emerged from the
exploratory analysis. This finding implies that an increase in workers’ perceptions
related to their training—including if it was adequate for their job, if they were
encouraged to enhance their training, and whether there were opportunities for onthe-job training—would lead to a reduction in maintenance errors. Thus, this
finding suggests that the more the participants’ feel they are adequately trained for
their job, the less number of errors they would commit.
A sixth implication of the study’s findings is related to the direct
relationship between Supervision and Maintenance Errors, which also emerged
from the exploratory analysis. This finding implies that an increase in workers’
perceptions of their supervisor’s expertise and the extent to which their supervisor
assists them would lead to an increase in maintenance errors. Thus, this finding
suggests it is possible that workers might be relying on their supervisor for
assistance and as a safety net for error capturing.
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A last implication of the study’s findings is related to the two significant
demographic variables, age and total years overall MRO experience, which also
emerged from the exploratory analysis. With respect to age, the study’s findings
imply that older employees tend to commit fewer errors than younger employees,
but the more years of experience an employee has the more errors he/she will
commit. A plausible explanation for the former is that older employees tend to be
mature, patient, and compliant with standard operating procedures than younger
employees. However, it also is conceivable that the more experience workers have,
the more likely they could become complacent in executing their job, which in turn
could lead to errors.
Generalizability, Limitations, and Delimitations
Generalizability. The generalizability of the study’s findings was assessed
from both population and ecological perspectives. With respect to population
generalizability, the sampling strategy was convenience sampling and the sample
consisted of MRO workers who volunteered to participate in the study. As a result,
the sample most likely was not representative of the target population, which
consisted of approximately 200 MRO facilities in the United States that perform
base, engine, component, corporate, and line maintenance. However, it is plausible
that the sample was representative of the accessible population, which consisted
partly of one national MRO, because 99 of the 134 participants were from this
MRO. The sample also represented: (a) a broad range of ages, from 20 to 72 years
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old; (b) a nearly even split between married and not married employees; (c) all
levels of education, from high school to graduate school; (d) a wide range of years
of experience, from 0 to 45 years; and (e) a diverse mix among various races and
ethnicities, including Caucasian, African American, Asian American, and Hispanic.
The only relevant demographic that the sample did not represent was gender. Of the
131 participants who reported their gender, 114 were males. Therefore, the study’s
findings are generalizable to male workers at the national MRO with demographics
similar to those described above.
With respect to ecological generalizability, which refers to different settings
or conditions, the study’s results were derived from U.S. based civil fixed-wing
aircraft MROs and therefore are limited to such facilities. However, it is
conceivable that the current study’s findings could be applied to U.S. based civil
rotary-wing aircraft (i.e., helicopter) MROs and small maintenance facilities
associated with flight schools. The reader is cautioned not to apply the study’s
findings to U.S. military based fixed- or rotary-wing MROs. This is because, as
Fogarty (2005, p. 61) observed, the types of assignments and responsibilities in a
military environment are not necessarily the same as those workers face in
commercial environments. To assist the reader in determining the external validity
of the current study’s findings, Chapter 3 (Tables 3.1–3.4) contains information
about the sample demographics and detailed information about how the study was
implemented.
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Study limitations and delimitations. The limitations and delimitations of
the current study were presented in Chapter 1. Because the current chapter includes
a discussion related to recommendations for future research relative the study’s
limitations and delimitations, these limitations/delimitations are replicated in this
section for the convenience of the reader.
Limitations. The limitations of a study are conditions, events, or
circumstances over which a researcher has no control. These conditions, events, or
circumstances have the potential to limit the generalizability of the study’s results.
The limitations of the current study are given here and the reader is advised to
consider any conclusions or inferences emanating from the study’s results with
respect to these limitations.
1. Sample demographics. Although I targeted U.S. based civilian MROs, I
did not have any control over the individuals who volunteered to participate in the
current study. For example, because 114 of 134 participants were males, the study’s
results would not be generalizable to female MRO employees. As a result, similar
studies that have different sample demographics might get different results.
2. Honesty of participants’ responses. Given the manner in which data were
collected in the current study—a questionnaire hosted by an online Web site—I had
no control over how truthful the participants responded to the questionnaire items,
and I had no control if those who responded were actual employees of the targeted
MROs. Although I followed all the proper protocols related to privacy and
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confidentiality issues, the current study’s findings, inferences, and conclusions
might be limited due to the possibility of inaccurate responses from participants.
3. Research support. The current study benefited from the outside support
of a nationally based MRO. This support included announcing the study and
encouraging employees to participate. This support was performed as a courtesy
and was not something I incorporated into the study. As a result, similar studies
that do not have this same type and level of support might get different results.
4. Excluded cases. As noted in Chapter 4, 54 of 188 cases (29%) were
eliminated from the analyses because they had either no or partially completed
responses. As a result, similar studies that do not exclude any cases might get
different results.
5. Missing subscales. As noted in Chapter 4, of Fogarty’s (2005) five Safety
Climate subscales, Feedback and Training were not included in the final analyses
because the former was not correctly specified and the latter had a reliability
coefficient of  = .60, which was lower than Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken’s
(2003) recommended threshold of  = .70. As a result, similar studies that
incorporate all five of Fogarty’s Safety Climate subscales or include a different set
of these subscales might get different results.
Delimitations. The delimitations of a study are conditions, events, or
circumstances that a researcher imposes to make the study feasible to implement.
These additional restrictions are needed from a practical perspective but have the
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potential to further limit the generalizability of the results. The delimitations of the
current study are given here, and the reader is advised to consider any conclusions
or inferences emanating from the study’s results with respect to these delimitations.
1. Study design. The current study was a replication of Fogarty (2005)
applied to U.S. based MROs. It was designed to test Fogarty’s hypothesized causal
model (Figure 1.2) and to determine the extent to which the data supported
Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model (Figure 1.1). As a result, similar
studies that use a different hypothesized causal model, or uses different variables to
define Fogarty’s latent constructs or Bandura’s dimensions, might get different
results.
2. Sample. The current study targeted two specific types of MROs: one
specialized in business jets and the other specialized in transport aircraft. As a
result, similar studies that target different MROs might get different results.
3. Data collection period. The current study was implemented during a 4month period that ended October 24, 2016. Although unlikely, similar studies that
are implemented for a shorter or longer time period, or during a different time of
the year might get different results.
4. Data collection instruments. The current study employed a data
collection instrument comprised of both standardized and researcher-prepared
instruments. The standardized instruments included Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance
Environment Survey (MES) and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) General Health
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Questionnaire (GHQ). These two instruments were packaged into the researcherprepared Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS), which also
included a Background Information section to collect participant demographics. As
a result, similar studies that use different instruments might get different results.
5. Type of data. Although past studies have collected qualitative data for the
Environment and Behavior dimensions and used content analysis to analyze these
data, the current study was designed to collect quantitative data across all three
dimensions of Environment, Person, and Behavior. As a result, similar studies that
use a mixed methods approach that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative
methodologies, or that are exclusively qualitative in nature, might get different
results.
6. Data analysis approach. The current study used SEM and multiple
regression statistical procedures to test the study’s hypotheses and answer the
corresponding research questions. Thus, similar studies that use different statistical
procedures might get different results.
7. Outliers. Of the 134 cases on which the results of the current study were
based, 13 cases were flagged as outliers via Jackknife distances but remained in the
final dataset because they were rare cases (not contaminants) and their presence
neither inflated nor masked significance. As a result, similar studies that do not
include outliers in the final analysis or use a different outlier analysis procedure
might get different results.
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Recommendations for Future Research and Practice
This section contains a discussion of various recommendations emanating
from the current study’s findings. The discussion is partitioned into four parts: The
first two parts present recommendations for future research relative to the study’s
limitations and delimitations; the last two parts contain a set of recommendations
for future research and for practice relative to the study’s implications.
Recommendations for future research relative to study limitations. The
following list of recommendations for future research is based on the study’s
limitations, which were provided earlier in this chapter as well as in Chapter 1.
1. The current study’s sample consisted of MRO employees who volunteered to
participate by completing the online questionnaire and hence I had no control
over the sample demographics. Therefore, a recommendation for future
research is to replicate the study targeting a specific demographic group. For
example, one suggestion might be to focus only on Hispanics, another
suggestion might be to focus only on females, and a third suggestion might be
to focus exclusively on graduates of a technical/trade school.
2. The honesty of participants’ responses as well as confirmation that those who
participated in the study were actually MRO employees could not be verified.
Therefore, a recommendation for future research is for management of an MRO
to personally administer the study’s protocols to their employees and to followup participants’ responses with a focus group or personal interviews.
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3. Participants from the national MRO were encouraged to participate by the
organization’s “safety officer,” who reminded employees once a week about the
study and requested that they participate. Therefore, a recommendation for
future research is to replicate the current study in a setting in which employees
are not persuaded or reminded to participate.
4. Approximately 29% (54 of 188 cases) were eliminated from the current study
because of incomplete responses. Many of these prospective participants
viewed the questionnaire and either decided not to complete it or stopped part
way. One possible reason for this could be the length of the questionnaire. For
example, the mean time of completion was M = 45 minutes. Therefore, a
recommendation for future research is reduce the length of the questionnaire or
provide an environment for employees to complete the questionnaire in one
setting.
5. Several of the subscales of Fogarty’s (2005) Maintenance Environment Survey
(MES) had low reliability coefficients. For example, Fogarty reported reliability
coefficients of  = .36, .51, and .60 respectively for the Safety Concern,
Feedback, and Training subscales, and based on the current study’s data, a
similar coefficient was obtained for the Training subscale. Furthermore, one of
the subscales also was not compliant with regression assumptions. As a result,
these subscales were eliminated from the final analysis. Therefore, a
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recommendation for future research is to conduct additional factor analyses and
instrument validation studies for these subscales to improve their reliability.
Recommendations for future research relative to study delimitations.
The following list of recommendations for future research is based on the study’s
delimitations, which were provided earlier in this chapter as well as in Chapter 1.
1. The current study yielded a revised causal model of Fogarty’s (2005)
hypothesized causal model. Given the disparity between the two models,
including the context in which they were generated, a recommendation for
future research is to replicate the current study in U.S. based civilian MROs to
either confirm or refute this revised model.
2. The current study sample consisted of U.S. based civilian MROs that maintain
fixed-wing aircraft. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to
replicate the study at rotary-wing MROs and aircraft maintenance facilities
associated with flight schools.
3. The current study’s implementation period was 4 months and was conducted
between July and October. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is
to shorten or extend the data collection period, and a complementary
recommendation is to implement the study during a different time of the year
(e.g., during the winter months when levels of stress or psychological distress
might be higher).

157

4. As a replication of Fogarty (2005), the current study exclusively used Fogarty’s
MES and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988) General Health Questionnaire
because Fogarty used both instruments to validate his model. Therefore, a
recommendation for future research is to replicate the study using different
instruments to measure safety climate and psychological health.
5. The current study relied on quantitative measures exclusively, particularly for
testing Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model. Therefore, a
recommendation for future research is to employ qualitative instruments that
would complement Fogarty’s (2005) MES and Goldberg and Williams’ (1988)
GHQ. Another recommendation is to conduct follow-up interviews with
employees to further confirm the quantitative data.
6. The current study relied on structural equation modeling to test Fogarty’s
(2005) model and multiple regression to test Bandura’s (1977) model. One
recommendation for future research is to conduct exclusive mediation analyses
relative to Fogarty’s model to confirm which Safety Climate measure is being
mediated by which Psychological Strain measure relative to maintenance
errors. A second recommendation for future research is to use SEM to test
Bandura’s model.
7. The current study’s dataset included 13 outliers, which were flagged using
Jackknife distances. These outliers were rare cases and did not impact the over
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results. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to apply different
outlier analysis procedures and to exclude outliers even if they are rare cases.
Recommendations for future research relative to implications. The
following list of recommendations for future research is based on the study’s
implications relative to prior research as well as theory.
1. The final SEM model that emerged from the current study’s data indicated
there was a significant amount of unexplained variance for the measured
variables of Stress, Psychological Distress, and Maintenance Errors, and for the
latent construct Psychological Strain, which was measured by the stress/distress
variables. This latter finding implies there are other measured variables related
to Psychological Strain. As a result, a recommendation for future research is to
identify those variables or possibly use different instruments to measure
stress/distress. With respect to the former, it appears there also are other factors
affecting maintenance errors other than workers’ psychological health. As a
result, a recommendation for future research is to identify those factors.
2. It appears that Bandura’s (1977) reciprocal causation model is appropriate for
research involving an organization’s safety culture/climate. For example, Jin
and Chen (2013) and Cui et al. (2013) grounded their respective safety culture
studies of a construction company and coal mining in Bandura’s model, and the
current study also confirmed how Bandura’s model can be applied to examining
the safety climate of MROs. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is
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to use Bandura’s model as the framework for examining an organization’s
safety climate or culture. For example, within the aviation profession safety
climate/culture studies targeting air traffic control, flight training, and passenger
facilitation could benefit from Bandura’s model.
3. The results of the current study yielded a causal model different from Fogarty’s
(2005) model. As a result, a recommendation for future research is to test this
revised model in other MRO settings within and outside the United States in
both civilian and military environments.
4. One of the weaknesses of the current study was that it relied exclusively on
quantitative data that measured employees’ perceptions of safety climate,
psychological health, and errors. Furthermore, the maintenance errors variable
did not measure the number of errors employees committed but instead
measured employees’ reflection on the extent to which they made maintenance
errors on the job (both self-detected and those identified by their supervisors).
As a result, a recommendation for future research is to implement a mixed
methods study that includes both quantitative and qualitative measures where
the latter measure involves employee interviews and a content analysis of an
organization’s safety records. A second recommendation for future research is
to replicate the current study but to measure the actual number of errors
employees committed.
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Recommendations for practice relative to implications. The following
list of recommendations for practice is based on the study’s implications.
1. The current study’s findings imply that workers’ psychological health can
negatively impact maintenance errors: as stress/distress increases, maintenance
errors also increase. As a result, a recommendation for practice is for
management to address various workplace stressors such as work roster and
scheduling, shift related problems, workplace fatigue, and mental health
policies.
2. The current study’s findings imply that maintenance errors could decrease if
management were to improve workers’ perception of the organization’s overall
concern for safety. Therefore, it is recommended that management overtly
communicate/disseminate information to employees about safety issues, create
awareness of safety issues in the workplace, and give safety a priority in
meetings and when preparing budgets.
3. The current study’s findings imply that employee reward/recognition programs
have the opposite effect of their intention. The data suggest that by recognizing
and/or rewarding employees for good job performance actually results in an
increase in errors. Therefore, a recommendation for practice is for management
to review employee recognition programs for their effectiveness and possibly
consider revising or eliminating them. For example, perhaps such programs do
not have a standard process for rewards or promotion, which might make
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employees feeling they are not being treated fairly and consistently. Another
recommendation is to reconsider establishing employee recognition programs if
one currently does not exist.
4. The current study’s findings imply that if management were to improve
workers’ perceptions of the organization’s overall concern for safety, this could
decrease workers’ feelings of stress, depression, or anxiety, which could lead to
a decline in maintenance errors. Therefore, the corresponding recommendations
for practice would be the same as those indicated in 2 above.
5. The current study’s findings suggest a direct relationship between training and
errors: the more the participants’ feel they are adequately trained for their job,
the less number of errors they commit. Therefore, one recommendation for
practice is for management to provide additional training opportunities for
employees that will enhance employees’ skills, knowledge, and abilities. A
second recommendation is to implement a regular refresher program so
employees maintain currency relative to recent developments in maintenance
practice. A third recommendation is to provide inter-facilities on-the-job
training programs. A fourth recommendation is to implement an
apprenticeship-mentorship program for newly hired maintenance workers.
6. The current study’s findings suggest that workers might be relying on their
supervisor for assistance and as a safety net for error capturing. Therefore, a
recommendation for practice is to encourage supervisors, particularly those
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who are “hands-on,” to foster employee independence when performing a
maintenance task. One way in which this could be addressed is by using “work
cards,” which contain a set of procedures for an assigned maintenance task.
Another approach is for supervisors to subscribe to Vygotsky’s (1987) concepts
of zone of proximal development (ZPD) and scaffolding. Yet a third approach
is to apply Meichenbaum’s (1985) five-step approach:
• Cognitive modeling: The supervisor performs the maintenance task while
verbalizing instructions that guide performance.
• Overt, external guidance: The employee/apprentice performs the
maintenance task while listening to the supervisor verbalize instructions.
• Overt, self-guidance: The employee/apprentice repeats instructions aloud
while performing the maintenance task.
• Faded, overt self-guidance: The employee/apprentice whispers
instructions while performing the maintenance task.
• Covert self-instruction: The child silently thinks about the instructions
while performing the task.
7. The current study’s findings imply that older employees tend to commit fewer
errors than younger employees. Therefore, a recommendation for practice is to
pair younger employees with older employees via an apprenticeship-mentorship
program.
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8. The current study’s findings imply that the more years of experience an
employee has the more errors he/she will commit. Therefore, a recommendation
for practice is for management to be sensitive to the possibility of complacency
and to help ward off complacency among the experienced staff by offering
refresher courses or by providing more challenging opportunities.
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The Aviation Maintenance Safety Climate Survey (AMSCS)

Introduction
Hello.
You are invited to participate in a research study that endeavors to understand safety climate within
aviation maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) organizations. As part of this study, I am
requesting that you complete this questionnaire, which consists of two sections followed by a set of
demographic questions. It will take about 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Before clicking
“Continue” to begin, it is important for you to understand the following:
1. Your responses will be treated as strictly confidential and will be accessible only
by the research team.
2. Your responses will remain completely anonymous.
3. No reference will be made in oral or written reports that could connect you in any
way to this study.
4. Your participation is completely voluntary and you are not required to participate
in the study.
5. If you begin completing the questionnaire and opt not to continue, you may
simply close your browser’s window to close your session. This action will
eliminate you as a participant.
6. By clicking on the link below, you are indicating that you are at least 18 years old
and have agreed to voluntarily participate in the study.
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Section A: Maintenance Environment Survey (MES)
Please rate the given statements using the following scale:
1 =Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither disagree nor agree, 4 =Agree, 5 =Strongly Agree
Statement
A1-R

Response

In this job the rewards and encouragement usually outweigh the
threats and the criticism.

1

2

3

4

5

A2-R

In this job people are rewarded according to performance.

1

2

3

4

5

A3-R*

There is not enough reward and recognition for doing good work.

1

2

3

4

5

A4-R

In our promotion system, the best people generally rise to the top.

1

2

3

4

5

A5-R

I am satisfied with the recognition I get for doing good work.

1

2

3

4

5

A6-SC

Personnel are well trained in the consequences of unsafe acts.

1

2

3

4

5

A7-SC

This workplace regards safety as a major factor in achieving its
goals.

1

2

3

4

5

Lack of proper equipment sometimes forces us to cut corners in
our work.

1

2

3

4

5

There is not always time to follow safe procedures.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

My immediate supervisor has had many years experience in
aviation maintenance.

1

2

3

4

5

A12-S

My supervisor really understands the maintenance task.

1

2

3

4

5

A13-S

I trust my supervisor.

1

2

3

4

5

A14-S

My supervisor sets clear goals and objectives for the team.

1

2

3

4

5

A15-S

My supervisor actively encourages team members to lift their level
of performance.

1

2

3

4

5

A16-S

When I make an error, my supervisor will support me.

1

2

3

4

5

A17-S

My immediate supervisor checks my work very carefully.

1

2

3

4

5

A18-F

The quality of our work is rated or evaluated frequently.

1

2

3

4

5

A19-F*

It is difficult for me to find out how well I am doing my job.

1

2

3

4

5

A20-F

My supervisor keeps me regularly informed of my progress.

1

2

3

4

5

A21-F

My work group receives detailed feedback regarding overall
performance.

1

2

3

4

5

My training and experience have prepared me well for duties in my
current job.

1

2

3

4

5

I have been encouraged to improve myself through continued
training.

1

2

3

4

5

I have found many opportunities to use my training in my current
job.

1

2

3

4

5

A8-SC*
A9-SC*

A10-SC* In high workload conditions, I am prepared to take a few shortcuts
to get jobs done on time.
A11-S

A22-T
A23-T
A24-T

179

A25-T

I am not expected to perform tasks for which I have not been
trained.

1

2

3

4

5

A26-T

Maintenance personnel receive a lot of "hands-on" training.

1

2

3

4

5

A27-ST

I need to spend more time with my family and friends.

1

2

3

4

5

A28-ST

The demands of my work interfere with my home and family life.

1

2

3

4

5

A29-ST

I find it difficult to leave work concerns at work.

1

2

3

4

5

A30-ST

I have sometimes felt unwell because of work pressures.

1

2

3

4

5

A31-ST

My job here does not allow me enough time to relax.

1

2

3

4

5

A32-ST

I often feel irritated by things that happen at work.

1

2

3

4

5

A33-ST

Other workgroups don't appreciate the problems they cause by
amending their work schedules.

1

2

3

4

5

A34-ST

A heavy workload makes me feel tense.

1

2

3

4

5

A35-ST

I get anxious when I work to strict deadlines.

1

2

3

4

5

A36-E

When performing a maintenance task, I sometimes miss a step in a
test sequence.

1

2

3

4

5

A37-E

In a maintenance task, I sometimes do things I don't intend to do.

1

2

3

4

5

A38-E

Occasionally I plan an action that subsequently proves to be
incorrect.

1

2

3

4

5

There are times I have deliberately acted contrary to written
procedures.

1

2

3

4

5

When I return to a task sequence after an interruption, I sometimes
don't start at the right place.

1

2

3

4

5

A41-E

Occasionally, I forget to remove a tool at the completion of a task.

1

2

3

4

5

A42-E

I have been known to make a slip-up when I haven't been
concentrating.

1

2

3

4

5

A43-E

Under pressure, it's easy to forget steps in a task sequence.

1

2

3

4

5

A44-E

I only depart from approved procedures with my supervisor's
approval.

1

2

3

4

5

A45-E

I make errors in my job from time to time.

1

2

3

4

5

A46-E

There have been times when tiredness has affected my attention to
detail.

1

2

3

4

5

A47-E

I am pretty hard on myself when I make an error.

1

2

3

4

5

A48-E

I have made errors that have been detected by my supervisor.

1

2

3

4

5

A39-E
A40-E
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Section B: “Person” Factors (GHQ)
Please rate the given statements using the following scale:
0 = Not at all, 1 = No more than usual, 2 = Rather more than usual, 3 = Much more than usual
Item

Have you recently …

B1*

… been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing?

Response
0 1 2 3

B2*

… felt capable of making decisions about things?

0 1 2 3

B3*

… been able to face up to your problems?

0 1 2 3

B4

… lost much sleep over worry?

0 1 2 3

B5

… felt constantly under strain?

0 1 2 3

B6

… felt you could not overcome your difficulties?

0 1 2 3

B7

… been feeling unhappy and depressed?

0 1 2 3

B8

… been losing confidence in yourself?

0 1 2 3

B9

... been thinking of yourself as a worthless person?

0 1 2 3

B10*

… felt that you are playing a useful part in things?

0 1 2 3

B11*

… been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities?

0 1 2 3

B12*

… been feeling reasonably happy , all things considered?

0 1 2 3
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Section C: Background Information
Please provide the following information:
Item

Demographic / Background Information

C1

Age _________

C2

Gender:

C3

Marital status:  Single

C4

Race/Ethnicity:

C5

Ratings:

C6

Total years experience as an aviation maintenance personnel __________

C7

Highest education:

C8

 Male

 Female
 Married

 Divorced

 Separated  Widowed

 Caucasian
 African American
 Hispanic
 Asian American
 Other (please specify) ___________

 Airframe
 Powerplant
 Inspection authorization
 Other (please specify) ______________________________

 High School Diploma
 2-year/Associate’s Degree
 4-year/Undergraduate Degree
 Graduate Degree
 Other (please specify) ________________
How many voluntary reports have you submitted to FAA’s ASRS that was related to a
maintenance error in the past 2 years? ______
Please provide a brief description of the report.

C9

How many voluntary reports have you submitted to that related to a maintenance
hazard in the past 2 years? ______
Please provide a brief description of the report.

C10

Please describe any circumstances in which you were involved in a maintenance error.
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Table C.1
Raw Data
Row
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Y
38
36
39
28
36
43
41
29
42
42
29
28
29
36
37
28
28
33
39
35
27
34
28
34
29
38
25
29
30
39
35
32
48
31
33
24
34
28
26
21
32
19
26
30
31
39
37
37
30
30

X1
18
18
15
10
17
16
11
12
10
13
12
8
17
11
9
9
12
11
16
8
20
17
11
9
13
7
7
12
10
9
17
13
15
17
6
12
13
12
15
16
16
13
10
16
15
12
18
14
22
23

X2
25
17
19
15
20
20
14
25
15
15
17
19
20
14
9
16
16
23
17
21
14
22
12
13
20
14
14
14
20
15
24
23
18
13
15
19
16
20
23
22
14
18
14
20
18
15
20
18
24
23

X3
27
28
34
29
29
27
18
27
17
16
20
30
28
18
27
21
21
28
21
20
28
27
28
20
28
25
22
22
21
22
29
30
24
28
15
18
12
25
23
28
23
16
14
25
28
21
29
20
29
34

X4
16
16
18
17
14
14
11
14
8
12
9
14
13
10
11
8
12
16
12
15
14
15
9
9
12
9
11
9
14
15
16
15
10
14
5
9
10
11
10
15
11
11
10
12
15
11
16
11
17
16

X5
19
20
23
21
17
19
17
20
15
19
19
22
19
15
25
18
20
21
19
18
23
24
17
15
21
14
18
17
17
20
23
21
15
24
13
20
13
18
17
20
24
15
14
16
19
15
21
16
21
21

X6
31
33
40
45
19
35
37
20
26
34
35
25
23
28
34
25
28
18
26
23
27
24
35
31
33
26
28
28
29
27
19
28
40
28
23
16
25
25
29
19
36
34
30
18
27
27
23
29
33
23

X7
14
19
18
11
13
13
21
9
17
15
23
16
7
23
11
11
12
8
18
8
12.15
18
19
19
10
12
9
5
19
18
9
8
19
5
14
11
15
14
6
4
9
5
16
14
18
18
12
10
6
16

X8
51
35
31
45
57
54
34
45
49
31
35
42
47
49
51
54
50
43.22
55
43.22
43.22
26
30
34
56
53
29
38
49
35
45
32
36
40
55
48
31
28
38
32
43.22
36
36
58
36
25
49
38
59
63

X9
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

X10
M
NM
M
M
M
NM
M
M
NM
NM
M
M
NM
NM
M
M
M
M
M
M
NM
NM
NM
NM
M
M
M
NM
M
NM
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
NM
NM
NM
M
M
M
NM
M
M
NM
M
M
M
NM

X11
28
1
5
25
40
16.75
16.75
10
19
16.75
15
10
19
19
21
16.75
16.75
22
22
25
16.75
4
5
9
25
6
11
10
32
10
16.75
16.75
10
10
6
1
2
10
16
7
16.75
13
15
16.75
10
3
16.75
12
16.75
36

X12
5
1
5
15
0.5
25
9.22
10
19
10
10
10
19
19
7
10
6
9.22
22
12
9.22
1
3
9
20
5
10
9
6
10
17
4
10
5
6
1
2
10
10
7
17
10
12
7
10
1
23
9
12
9

X13
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y

X14
2-yr
4-yr
Grad
4-yr
HS
2-yr
Grad
2-yr
HS
2-yr
2-yr
HS
2-yr
TS
TS
2-yr
TS
HS
HS
2-yr

Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

TS
HS
2-yr
4-yr
Grad
2-yr
2-yr
TS
2-yr
TS
HS
2-yr
HS
2-yr
TS
HS
HS
2-yr
HS
TS
2-yr
Grad
4-yr
Grad
HS
TS
TS
2-yr
TS

X15
C
AsA
AsA
C
C
C
H
H
AsA
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
C
H
H
H
O
AfA
H
AsA
AsA
H
H
H
AsA
H
H
AfA
AsA
H
AfA
AfA
AsA
H
H
H
H
AsA
H
AfA
AfA
H
AfA
H
AfA
H

Note. Y = Maintenance Errors, X1 = Recognition, X2 = Safety Concern, X3 = Supervision, X4 = Feedback, X5 = Training, X6 =
Stress, X7 = Psychological Distress, X8 = Age, X9 = Sex (M= Male, F = Female), X10 = Marital Status (M = Married, NM =
Not Married), X11 = Total Years Overall, X12 = Total Years at Current MRO, X13 = English is Primary Language (Y = Yes,
N = No), X14 = Highest Level of Education (HS = High School Diploma, TS = Trade School Degree, 2-yr = 2-year college
degree, 4-yr = 4-year college degree, Grad = Graduate Degree), X15 = Race/Ethnicity (AfA = African American, AsA- Asian
American, C = Caucasian, H = Hispanic, O = Other).
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Table C.1
Raw Data (Continued)
Row
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Y
26
30
42
33
27
24
29
33
29
31
26
38
19
30
26
29
37
33
27
30
41
18
33
40
20
30
41
23
38
30
24
36
52
30
37
32
42
43
44
28
47
30
42
26
44
40
31
20
38
41

X1
12
15
16
12
12
8
13
18
12
19
12
15
8
17
11
17
12
5
18
18
11
13
10
10
10
14
11
9
12
18
11
19
18
12
9
15
15
15
13
12
15
16
19
20
10
13
12
14
10
12

X2
20
17
13
19
21
11
17
16
17
17
21
17
22
20
21
19
14
17
24
18
14
23
19
13
20
17
17
11
14
22
15
20
20
14
25
22
17
18
18
13
19
23
24
25
17
17
22
19
15
16

X3
24
20
27
28
26
26
33
30
26
27
24
27
21
32
21
27
27
27
26
27
27
31
25
21
15
25
15
10
15
34
23
30
30
23
34
32
26
25
27
24
25
27
28
30
26
24
35
19
22
24

X4
14
14
9
16
14
15
16
16
16
14
10
14
8
16
13
14
12
11
15
14
15
17
16
6
13
14
9
16
8
16
6
15
15
11
16
9
13
15
16
8
11
14
13
15
14
12
13
12
9
13

X5
23
19
20
20
17
25
22
20
19
20
20
20
22
23
17
21
20
13
20
20
17
21
20
20
21
18
12
17
17
19
18
20
19
18
17
20
25
23
16
21
21
21
17
24
10
18
20
16
16
21

X6
25
32
22
30
21
31
23
31
28
25
24
23
30
37
28
31
26
32
20
34
35
28
31
29
18
16
23
26
29
28
32
29
28
30
31
29
33
32
38
28
23
27
22
20
28
32
19
20
30
34

X7
9
13
12
13
3
16
9
11
12.15
8
0
11
0
6
18
14
5
16
6
19
20
15
20
12
9
6
7
0
16
15
11
14
18
12
9
16
12.15
13
19
3
13
12
14
14
15
15
12
1
16
18

X8
43.22
60
60
56
33
58
29
55
43.22
61
32
38
43.22
60
66
43.22
43.22
53
35
61
43.22
56
64
27
36
25
42
43.22
39
46
33
72
21
43.22
42
43.22
43.22
58
31
56
57
39
27
53
30
50
54
54
22
44

X9
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
M

X10
M
M
M
NM
NM
M
M
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
M
M
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
M
M
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
M
M
M
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
NM
NM
NM
NM

X11
16.75
16.75
36
16.75
11
13
1.5
13
16.75
14
16.75
20
16.75
35
29
15
16.75
28
6
40
25
16.75
39
3
16.75
4.5
15
16.75
5
12
16.75
16.75
16.75
16.75
3.5
16.75
16.75
37
2
16.75
37
16.75
3
28
5
16.75
20
18
0
22

X12
17
4
13
10
8
13
0.8
0
9.22
6
8
20
7
5
27
5
12
28
6
16
20
37
16
3
5
0.5
15
5
2
12
9
0
4
9.22
1.5
2
9.22
2
2
5
1
12
3
21
5
13
10
18
4
22

X13
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N

X14
TS
TS
4-yr
TS
2-yr
4-yr
HS
4-yr

N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y

4-yr
TS
TS
4-yr
HS
2-yr
4-yr
2-yr
HS
HS
2-yr
4-yr
HS
2-yr
2-yr
HS
TS
TS
2-yr
2-yr
Grad
TS
TS
TS

Y

2-yr
2-yr

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

2-yr
4-yr
2-yr
HS
HS
4-yr
HS
4-yr
HS
TS
HS
2-yr
4-yr

X15
H
C
C
AfA
H
H
AsA
H
O
H
H
AfA
AfA
H
AsA
C
H
AsA
C
C
O
H
C
H
H
H
AsA
C
H
C
H
O
AsA
O
AfA
H
O
C
AsA
C
C
C
C
C
AsA
C
C
C
C
C

Note. Y = Maintenance Errors, X1 = Recognition, X2 = Safety Concern, X3 = Supervision, X4 = Feedback, X5 = Training, X6 =
Stress, X7 = Psychological Distress, X8 = Age, X9 = Sex (M= Male, F = Female), X10 = Marital Status (M = Married, NM =
Not Married), X11 = Total Years Overall, X12 = Total Years at Current MRO, X13 = English is Primary Language (Y = Yes,
N = No), X14 = Highest Level of Education (HS = High School Diploma, TS = Trade School Degree, 2-yr = 2-year college
degree, 4-yr = 4-year college degree, Grad = Graduate Degree), X15 = Race/Ethnicity (AfA = African American, AsA- Asian
American, C = Caucasian, H = Hispanic, O = Other).
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Table C.1
Raw Data (Continued)
Row
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Y
45
35
39
58
43
55
31
29
32
17
22
46
26
50
40
31
38
49
39
44
50
34
48
22
41
29
44
51
44
44
41
42
43
36

X1
21
17
21
16
21
21
19
22
24
25
23
19
13
15
17
14
18
14
15
20
16
14
16
15
10
18
10
14
21
16
13
13
22
18

X2
17
21
17
15
8
12
14
22
20
25
21
16
22
16
16
17
16
13
18
21
18
16
17
18
15
21
14
19
18
21
18
20
17
25

X3
31
35
22
29
29
28
28
29
35
31
35
28
27
32
26
31
28
16
21
27
21
26
21
18
10
27
14
29
29
27
28
29
29
31

X4
7
15
15
14
15
17
14
16
20
20
19
15
15
13
16
16
15
8
11
16
10
8
14
12
10
16
7
14
14
14
15
15
13
18

X5
18
15
14
13
17
20
20
20
23
25
23
18
16
21
20
20
22
13
19
21
19
15
18
19
16
21
16
17
16
19
20
21
23
24

X6
36
32
32
39
38
45
18
20
20
11
17
27
29
30
32
31
27
40
30
20
36
25
34
43
32
23
29
37
33
35
34
35
29
21

X7
17
22
19
17
16
20
12
11
3
0
3
16
3
16
1
7
11
14
16
7
13
12
14
26
18
2
16
18
7
8
6
6
9
7

X8
52
30
27
20
39
52
21
56
32
45
32
28
33
47
32
42
49
58
61
54
47
43
65
31
53
45
63
36
40
35
43.22
35
29
26

X9
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
M
F
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
F

X10
M
NM
NM
M
NM
M
NM
NM
NM
M
NM
NM
M
NM
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
NM
M
NM
M
NM
NM
M
M
NM
NM

X11
20
10
14
2
17
32
1
15
1
16.75
16.75
1
4
20
16.75
21
31
40
41
30
25
19
45
10
35
10
45
16.75
16.75
16.75
16.75
16.75
10
8

X12
13
5
2
2
4
2
1
0
1
0
9.22
1
2
4
3
12
11
28
28
1
1.5
15
25
0.17
26
8
2
5
10
6
10
7
8
11

X13
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y

X14
Grad
2-yr
2-yr
2-yr
4-yr
2-yr
HS
2-yr
TS
TS
TS
Grad
Grad
Grad
Grad
Grad
4-yr
Grad
HS
2-yr
4-yr
4-yr
2-yr
4-yr
2-yr
4-yr
HS
2-yr
2-yr
4-yr
4-yr
2-yr
Grad
Grad

X15
AfA
C
AfA
H
H
AfA
AfA
C
H
AfA
H
AfA
AfA
C
AfA
H
H
C
C
C
C
C
C
AfA
C
AfA
O
AfA
C
AfA
O
H
AfA
AfA

Note. Y = Maintenance Errors, X1 = Recognition, X2 = Safety Concern, X3 = Supervision, X4 = Feedback, X5 = Training, X6 =
Stress, X7 = Psychological Distress, X8 = Age, X9 = Sex (M= Male, F = Female), X10 = Marital Status (M = Married, NM =
Not Married), X11 = Total Years Overall, X12 = Total Years at Current MRO, X13 = English is Primary Language (Y = Yes,
N = No), X14 = Highest Level of Education (HS = High School Diploma, TS = Trade School Degree, 2-yr = 2-year college
degree, 4-yr = 4-year college degree, Grad = Graduate Degree), X15 = Race/Ethnicity (AfA = African American, AsA- Asian
American, C = Caucasian, H = Hispanic, O = Other).
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